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ABSTRACT. 
This study attempts to envisage a United Kingdom of the 
future. After opening with a history and description of the 
recently galvanized constitutional reform movement in that 
country, it projects an image of a Britain governed by 
conventions advocated by this vociferous thesis: a written 
and sovereign constitution, an entrenched and enumerated 
collection of individual liberties and judicial review. 
Because such an image would represent foundationless 
conjecture, it is then displayed through the lens of 
American history, society and culture; phenomena that are 
themselves essentially molded by the institutions called for 
by the revisions, in order to give it more dimension and 
shape. The result is a radical vision of a "new" United 
Kingdom. 
Once this apparition has formed, the work attempts to 
evaluate the desirability and practicability of such a 
future, while all the time making references to the 
experience of the United States. Benchmarks such as 
democracy and British suitability are employed in order to 
make such a process more manageable and discussions of the 
feasibility and the effectiveness of enumerating rights and 
excavating judicial review give the appraisal of this vision 
increased depth. What remains is a series of results left 
behind by this evaluation and the number of intellectual and 
1 
empirical exercises that went with it. From this 
a 
conclusion is drawn. 
Since the use of the American paradigm shows writt
en 
constitutions, entrenched rights and judicial review to be 
undemocratic, rigid, ineffective and often imprac
tical, and 
British society yields the contemporary constituti
onal 
reform movement's vision as unworkable in that co
untry, this 
study, in its conclusion, looks elsewhere for a re
medy to 
Britain's antiquated and over-centralized politica
l system. 
The answer is not found in the federal approach th
at is also 
championed by the new force for change, but in a 
revision of 
the electoral system. What is seen at the end of t
his work 
is that Britain's problems can be resolved, to a c
ertain 
extent anyway, with a more realistic, widely acce
ptable and 
democratic adjustment: the adoption of proportional 
representation. 
2 
PREFACE 
\ 
In the autumn of 1988 a coalition of British politicia
ns, 
academics, journalists and other professionals introduced, 
via the weekly left-wing periodical ''Newstatesman and
 
Society", a document named Charter 88. To these autho
rs and 
initial signatories, Charter 88 represented the zenit
h of a 
burgeoning constitutional reform movement that had re
ceived 
momentum from the pan-Europeanism that had infiltrate
d 
British politics, the success of the Liberal and Soc
ial 
Democratic Party's ''Alliance" and the reemergence of 
third 
party politics, as well as the thinking of such prom
inent 
personalities as Lord Leslie Scarman and Lord'Quintin Hogg 
Hailsham. Now it had come to fruition riding the back
 of a 
wave of nonpartisan opposition to Margaret Thatcher
's 
Conservative government: an opposition that had devel
oped in 
response to the perceived erosion of civil liberties 
that 
the nation had experienced under the leadership of th
e "Iron 
Lady". ( 
This essay is an attempt to describe Charter 88 and t
he 
rest of the contemporary British constitutional modi
fication 
movement that is gathering influence in the wake of 
Mrs. 
Thatcher's "Electora+ Dictatorship"
1
• In a two-pronged 
approach to the movement, it will outline the conditi
ons 
1 Lord Quintin Hogg Hailsham coined this phrase during a 
Dimbleby Lecture and in his book The Dilemma of De
mocracy, 
London: Collins, 1978. 
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that led to the arrival of this new philosophy, r
equisites 
that originate from both within and without the B
ritish 
system, and then examine the proposals put forward
 by 
Charter 88 et al. Amongst the most important of t
hese 
proposals are the enumeration and entrenchment of
 a certain 
set of individual freedoms and, in a number of th
e 
I 
components of the reform movement, the establishm
ent of a 
' 
written constitution and even the creation of judicial 
independence and review. After the initial treatm
ent of the 
push for change, these proposals will be discusse
d and 
evaluated in detail. Although some influential ele
ments of 
this new paradigm forward the adoption of a more 
decentralized, if not federal, complexion for the
 British 
system, this work will not scrutinize this compo
nent as it 
will the troika of a written constitution, bill o
f rights 
and judicial review. This is because the geographical 
dispersion of power does not pose such a radical 
challenge 
to Britain's constitutional status quo and envelo
pes an 
argument that is out of the realm of this body of
 work. 
Throughout the essay, the vision of a system with
 a 
written and sovereign constitution, entrenched rig
hts and 
judicial review will be referred to as American, modern or 
written constitutionalism2 • Moreover, the assessm
ent of this 
vision will come with an examination of the Amer
ican 
2 It should be realized that all written constitution
s do 
not have to be of the American type. 
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____., 
experience, something that has unravelled und
er the auspices 
of a constitutional settlement that resembles
, even if it 
does not exactly mirror, the ''utopia" sketched
 in Charter 
88, and the employment of certain episodes in 
American 
history or characteristics of that nation's s
ociety. The 
American model has been utilized because the U
nited States 
is frequently referred to in so much of the li
terature 
produced by and critiquing Lord Scarman, Char
ter 88 and the 
other groups and individuals espousing reform
. In addition, 
although it is realized that the use of two h
undred years of 
history from am~} that inhabits a different continen
t 
cannot be a truly adequate way of predicting a
 Britain of 
the future, it is also the most readily availa
ble and 
clearly parallels the reform movement's propo
sals. It is 
hoped that readers see enough similarity betw
een the 
American model and the goals of the British c
onstitutional 
reform movement to accept the comparison. 
During the examination of the reform movemen
t's thesis, 
several litmus tests, through the ubiquitous u
se of the 
American model as a signpost, will be employe
d. The essay 
will see if the adoption of a written constitu
tion and the 
other provisions will be desirable for Britain
, and here 
democracy, or perhaps more specifically weste
rn liberal 
democracy, will be the benchmark against which
 desirability 
will be measured. In another examination, emp
loyed to see 
whether the assumption of such a system will 
be practical, 
5 
the problematic nature of enumerated and entrenched rights 
and the political compatibility of British society and this 
system will be utilized. Through the use of these tests, a 
position that claims it is both undesirable and impractical 
for constitutional modification to be realized, will be 
established. 
Finally, as way of a conclusion, the study will admit 
that there is a need for some sort of reform. Sensing that 
such an argument would, as it stands at this juncture, be 
too negative and rather one-dimensional, it will offer a 
,,,., 
prescription to the problems highlighted by Charter 88 and 
its allies. The work will begin, however, in an introductory 
chapter, by outlining the character and historical 
development of the British Constitution, the ~litical 
climate of the Britain of the 1980s and the complexion and 
proposals of the new constitutional reform movement. 
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CHAPTER 1: BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND 
THE DISSENT OF THE 1980S. 
Millions of people throughout the world view a 
constitution as a written, tangible and significant d
ocument 
that is entrenched in the political psyche of a socie
ty and· 
that becomes a benchmark against which all behavior i
n that 
society is measured. As a resolute institution that p
lots 
the course of development for their societies, a 
constitution has, to many of these people, become syn
onymous 
with sacrosanctity and omnipotence, a collection of i
deas 
that provides a concise portrait of the quintessentia
l 
definition of what their nations are all about. In B
ritain, 
however, the meaning of constitution is neither tang
ible nor 
written, immutable nor omnipotent. Although the Briti
sh live 
by a set of conventions and regulations and their rul
ers are 
confined by precedents and traditions that exude from
 a 
source of authority that seems to be somewhat objective and 
ubiquitous, they cannot, unlike Americans for example
, 
accurately locate or see this source and they can ne
ither 
instinctively repeat certain segments of it nor quic
kly 
convey its larger meaning. Whereas Americans, whose 
constitution is of the substantive type, are able to 
trace 
their right to trial by jury to a specific part of their 
constitution, the vast majority of Britons are unable to 
recall from where in British constitutional history 
a 
7 
similar right emanates. 
This inability on the part of British citizens to
 
regurgitate the constitutional authority for cer
tain 
individual rights and governmental procedures com
es from the 
fact that the British Constitution is not anchore
d by an 
embedded document but is interpreted from precede
nt, 
patterns of behavior, tradition and conventions. 
This is 
shown by illustrating that while the American Co
nstitution, 
designed to control the actions of rulers and the
 ruled and 
protect the rights of citizens
1 into the future, was 
explicitly and completely (apart from the twenty-six 
amendments that have been added) set out by the Founding 
Fathers in one place, Philadelphia, at one time
2
, 1787, the 
British Constitution consists of a kaleidoscope o
f acts of 
Parliament, common law and unwritten practices wh
ich have 
varying degrees of constitutional importance, dif
fer in 
their lucidity and were adopted at disparate poin
ts in the 
development_ of the society. In addition, such an 
ad hoc 
construction is also highlighted by the fact that
 the 
British Constitution clearly matures as a reactio
n to events 
and situations and not because it guides or provi
des the 
stimulus to such events and situations. Just as th
e Magna 
1 It should be noted that the Constitution did not
 
recognize Indians or blacks as citizens. 
2 The Constitution did in fact take three months to
 
write. 
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Carta, although provoking war, was an attempt by King 
John 
to foster peace in a tense political climate, so the 
Great 
Reform Acts of the nineteenth century were responses 
by the 
establishment to the call for· political reform by such
 
social movements as Chartism. 
The reactive and haphazard complexion of the British 
Constitution had not, however, until recently, led to 
a 
proliferation of criticism. Indeed, to many scholars -
of law, 
society and politics, Britain clearly had a superior s
ystem 
since it had survived for an extremely long period of 
time 
and had been thoroughly receptive to input from all le
vels 
of society. Similarly, since Britain's Constitution w
as not' 
conceived in a single founding moment but has evolved 
in 
this rather indeterminate way, it has often been refer
red to 
as a "living organism". Therefore, just as in 1904, Sidney 
Low disapproved of the rigidity of the American approa
ch by 
calling it, ''a solid building to which a room -may be a
dded 
here, or a wing there"3 , so personalities like Walter
 
Bagehot and Lord Bryce have seen the British constitut
ion as 
a flexible and elastic creature that has adapted itsel
f 
subtly to different circumstances without causing a 
perceptible break in continuity. The veneration of thi
s 
3 From Low' s 
Marshall, Geoffrey 
the Constitution, 
1967, p. 18. 
"Governance of England'' quoted from, 
and Moodie, Graeme C. Some Problems of 
London: Hutchinson University Library, 
9 
''pouring new wine into old bottles
114 postulate is also 
espoused by Lord Hailsham who, after illuminating upo
n the 
inflexibility of written constitutions, states: 
An unwritten constitution or legal system 
is like a growing plant. It has its 
growing points and its withering points. 
It is, as it were, furry at the edges. On 
the boundaries of what is permissible or 
impermissible you do not know quite where 
you stand, though you do know that you 
overstep the boundaries at your peril. 
There is room for advance, and for retreat 
and for a temporary stance in uncertainty.! 
Even the most perfunctory glance at British history 
reveals why the Constitution is continuously viewed a
s a 
marvel of malleability by its students. From the Viki
ng and 
Norman invasions, through the Constitutions of Claren
don 
which bolstered the Crown's ultimate power over the c
hurch 
during Henry !I's reign, to the murder of Thomas Beck
et, 
British constitutional history continued to manoeuver
 
between the assertion of the King's authority over th
e 
church and papal supremacy. In a different vein, King
 John, 
in 1215, signed the Magna Carta, a political document 
designed to protect such fundamental individual right
s as 
due process of law and habeas corpus
6
, but which, due to the 
4 Hanson, A.H. and Walles, Malcolm. Governing Britain,
 
Oxford, England: Fontana Paperbacks, 1984, p. 12. 
5 Lord Hail sham. The Dilemma of Democracy, 
Collins, 1978, p. 134. 
London: 
6 For a treatment of habeas corpus and the Magna Carta
 
see, Meador, Daniel John. Habeas Corpus and Magna 
Carta: 
Dualism of Power and Liberty, Charlottesville, Vi
rginia: 
University Press of Virginia, 1966. 
10 
l\ 
nature of the Constitution, was susceptible to erosion
 or 
extension by future royal decrees. Therefore, although
 the 
Great Charter remains as part of the foundation of En
glish 
common law and the words, "no free man shall be taken 
or 
imprisoned or disserved or outlawed or exiled or in an
y way 
ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by 
the 
lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land"
7 
still provide the basis of the concept of due process 
in 
much of the western world, future monarchs were able t
o 
dilute certain components of the document or, as Char
les I 
did in 1628 with the Petition of Right or William and 
Mary 
of orange did in 1689 under the Bill of Rights
8
, promote 
specific parts. 
The evolutionary, flexible and diverse nature of the 
Constitution can also be viewed by examining sources o
ther 
than royal decree. The way in which Britons live and a
re 
7 Translated from Latin from Chapter 39 of the Magna 
Carta. Taken from Holt, J. c. Magna Carta, Cam
bridge, 
England: Cambridg.e University Press, 1965, p. 327. 
8 To many critics, the Bill of Rights was in fact not a
n 
affirmation of individual rights but merely a descript
ion of 
the Revolution and a defining of the relationship betw
een the 
Crown and Parliament. For an example of such an interpre
tation 
see Pinkham, Lucille. William III and The Resp
ectable 
Revolution, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni
versity 
Press, 1954. 
For good collections of the various arguments on the 1
689 
Bill of Rights see, Pocock, J .G.A. (ed.), Three British 
Revolutions: 1641. 1688. 1776, Princeton, New 
Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1980, and Straka, Ger
ald M. 
(ed.), The Revolution of 1688 and the Birth of the English 
Nation, Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and C
ompany, 
1973. 
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ruled today has also been painstakingly constructed by oth
er 
institutions and mechanisms. Sir Edward Coke's assertion o
f 
judicial power and changes through case law, for example the 
establishment of the supremacy of Parliament over the cour
ts 
in all matters concerning the internal affairs of Parliam
ent 
in Bradlaugh v. Gossett9 , show how the judiciary have 
influenced constitutional development. Furthermore, the 
extension of the franchise in 1832, 1867 and 1884 serve as
 
reminders of how, since the securing of the sovereignty of
 
Parliament, legislation conceived in Westminster 
consistently affects the complexion of the Constitution. 
Finally, there have been less explicit sources from which 
this impetus of change has emanated. For instance, the 
change to cabinet government during the Hanoverian 
succession was due to the cumulation of governmental actio
n 
and monarchical ineptitude. 
Foundations of Dissent. 
Yet, as has been hinted at, such a reverent postulate has 
recently found itself lacking both substance and subscribe
rs 
as, during the last twenty years, a small but growing numb
er 
of British politicians, educators, scholars and 
professionals have turned away from the advocacy of the 
evolutionary, reactive and ad hoc nature of the British 
Constitution and have looked for their society to adopt th
e 
9 Queen's Bench Division 29, 1884. 
12 
I 
American, written approach. Initially, this posi
tion of 
doubt took root in the years immediately followin
g World War 
II. As the United States and, more importantly fo
r the 
purposes of this work, its political philosophy b
egan to 
assume a position of hegemony in the internation
al system, 
many Europeans began to question the older approa
ches of 
reflexive and pragmatic responses to events. Allie
d 
liberation of France, Germany, Italy and Japan an
d the 
subsequent imposition of American sponsored polit
ical 
institutions, as well as a new·- distrust for those
 
established methods that had provided the environm
ent for 
the rise of fascism10 , meant that not only was a 
salient 
questioning of old approaches created but a moder
n, 
efficient and seemingly more democratic alternativ
e made 
available. Therefore, inevitably, much of western
 Europe and 
Japan began to construct new political processes 
under the 
auspices of the American constitutional model and
 soon much 
of the non-communist world had adopted the new sy
stem. 
Britain, however, was an exception. It trundled th
rough 
the post-war era on a straight road, its politica
l heritage 
in tact and its population as satisfied as ever w
ith the 
vitality and flexibility of its adamantine consti
tution. 
Such a trajectory was caused by three phenomenon. First, as 
1° For more on the post-war trend of constitution
alism 
that swept across the world see the opening 
chapter of 
Mcwhinney, Edward. Supreme Courts and Judicial 
Law Making: 
Constitutional Tribunals and Constitutiona
l Review, 
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986. 
13 
a victorious and unoccupied power during the war, the 
United 
Kingdom had not experienced the same cataclysmic event
s as, 
for example occupied France or Nazi Germany had. Secon
dly, 
apart from rather mundane switches between the mild so
cial 
democracy of the Labor Party and the diluted economic 
liberalism of the Conservative Party, the British poli
tical 
system had survived the Depression and the war in rela
tively 
good health and hence had not been susceptible to- the 
intense scrutiny that its European counterparts had. A
nd 
finally, because of its geographical location and its 
intimate relationship with the United States, Britain 
was 
not seen by American leaders as a vulnerable target of
 
communism and was consequently viewed as a country whi
ch was 
in no need of a fresh injection of democracy. Clearly, the 
United Kingdom had not found modern constitutionalist 
thought so contagious. 
However, as has been pointed out, such "trundling'' and
 
complacency was not shared by all. The impetus to 
constitutional change that the war had given continent
al 
Europe began to, if be it extremely gradually, infiltr
ate 
Britain as Adenauer, De Gaulle, the Japanese and other
s 
began to build virile economies at the same time as th
e 
United Kingdom found itself grasping proudly to the 
ignominity of playing a cameo role in world affairs. B
y the 
1960s, the envious eyes of Britons began to contrast t
he 
economies and living conditions of a vigorous West Ger
many 
14 
to those of a listless Britain and search for a logical 
explanation for this phenomenon. In addition, the rise of 
European integration, born out of the Council of Europe and
 
realized by the European Economlc Community, inevitably 
. furthered Anglo-continental comparisons and augmented the 
sets of jealous eyes and, as European success and British 
decline conti6ued, the search for an answer was intensified
. 
The mere existence of foreign success stories and a new 
inclination for Britons to look abroad and ignore their 
splendid isolation could not, however, provide the catalys
t 
for the formation of an organized and significant dissentin
g 
voice that could shout insults at the British constitutiona
l 
system. This would take, as shall be seen slightly further 
on, an intransigent Prime Minister, a powerful executive, 
an 
impotent opposition and a form of, even if it seems somewh
at 
mild, political authoritarianism. Yet it did provide one 
part of a two-legged foundation. In 1950, Britain signed th
e 
Council of Europe sponsored "European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights", a document that, taking 
inspiration from the United Nations Universal Declaration o
f 
Human Rights of 1948, attempted to force all signatories to
 
recognize certain fundamental rights that their citizens 
had, and which gave these citizens power to take offending 
administrations to the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg so that .a redress of any grievances could be 
granted. This was significant because not only did it 
15 
symbolize an early British intention to become more 
enveloped in European integration, but it resembled an 
entity that was fundamental to the American constitutional
 
model: an entrenched bill of rights. Therefore, although th
e 
new convention was not enforceable in British courts and th
e 
United Kingdom was not obliged to abide by the rulings of 
its tribunal, a concept at the kernel of modern 
constitutionalism was introduced into the British psyche a
nd 
hence support for change was augmented. Indeed, it was the
 
attempts to make the European Convention enforceable in the
 
courts of Britain that wrote part of the prelude to the 
contemporary constitutional reform movement. On several 
occasions, most notably in 1970, 1975, 1981 and 1987, such 
dignified politicians as Lord Wade, Lord Arran, Alan Beith
 
and Sir Edward Gardner introduced ''bills of rights'' into th
e 
House of Commons in an effort to photocopy the European 
Convention onto the statute books of the country. By 
claiming that, "what we have done is to put ourselves in th
e 
hands of judges at Strasbourg instead of putting ourselves 
in the hands of judges in Westminster and Edinburgh1
111
, 
these maverick legislators utilized the feeling of nationa
l 
embarrassment that the country blushed with every time it 
11 Lord Hailsham quoted in The Times. 4 February 1987, 
p. 1. 
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was chastised in France12 in an attempt to construct a 
number of individual rights that could not be altered or 
erased by parliamentary action. Unfortunately for them, 
however, in each instance the attempts were defeated; 
--~ whether it be by individuals like Enoch Powell who feare
d 
the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty, by the Labor Pa
rty 
who feared that the fortification of such rights could pro
ve 
to be an obstacle to centralizing socialism, or by old-
fashioned expediency and pragmatism. As T.E. Utley said of
 
the failure of the 1987 attempt: 
It was a fearful dilemma for those simple, 
decent legislators on both sides of the 
House. How could one know which side in 
British politics a human rights bill would 
ultimately favour? And that, after all{ was 
all that mattered in British politics. 
3 
The other limb upon which the challenges to Britain's 
constitution were rested was purely domestic in character.
 
Befo~e Margaret Thatcher moved into Downing Street in 1979
, 
Britain was a nation with a recent history of politically
 
and socially stable administrations, a factor that mirrore
d 
a pervasive national consensus and the public's satisfacti
on 
with the political system. This consensus and satisfaction
, 
built upon the religious and ethnic homogeneity of the 
12 As of the end of 1988, Britain had been found in 
violation of the Convention on twenty-two occasions but ha
d, 
even if begrudgingly, abided with the Court's decision in a
ll 
but one. New York Times. 30 November 1988, p. A19. 
13 The Times. 6 February 1987, p. 16. 
17 
country, the remarkable similarity of two political p
arties 
that resembled, ••two great monolithic structures (that) face 
each other and conduct furious arguments about the 
comparatively minor issues that separate them
1114
, and the 
dilution of class affinities that was accelerating 
dramatically in the aftermath of the war, was in turn
, 
caused by an eclectic pot pourri of factors. For exam
ple, 
' 
the success of organized labor and its cooption into 
British 
politics by the corporatist postures of successive 
governments led to the "gradualism'' of the Labor Party
, or, 
in other words, the willingness of working class lead
ers to 
accept the mechanics of recognized political instituti
ons 
and procedures15 • Furthermore, the major systemic wars of 
the twentieth century seemed to direct a vast array o
f 
viewpoints into a singular and unified national inter
est in 
which differences were of tone rather than of fundame
ntal 
hue. More crucially, the threat of fascism focused pe
ople's 
attention on the evils of political, economic and soc
ial 
tyranny and encouraged Britons to become more egalita
rian 
and collectivistic, factors which were reflected in th
e 
support for the welfare state and Beveridge proposals
. And 
finally, unlike its European counterparts, Britain's 
14 Robert McKenzie quoted from Punnett, R.M. British 
Government and Politics, London: Heinemann Educationa
l Books 
Ltd., 1983. 
15 For more on this argument 
Capitalist Democracy in Britain, 
University Press, 1983. 
18 
see, Miliband, 
Oxford, England: 
Ralph. 
Oxford 
political middle ground did not give way during econo
mic 
disaster and military confrontation and in fact, with
 the 
rise of the Keynesian postulate to the zenith of econ
omic 
philosophy, managed even to attain a position of hegem
ony 
where Labor politicians were forced to accept that, ''
the 
Welfare State should not stifle incentive, opportunit
y and 
responsibility, in establishing a national minimum
1116 and 
Tories often supported the nationalization of industr
y. 
Yet, during the 1970s British politics began furiously
 to 
shift direction and a violent and destabilizing polar
ization 
occurred in which the consensus was shattered and the
 
satisfaction with the political system fractured. Thi
s 
disintegration happened primarily because two major 
components of the previously ubiquitous consensus, th
e 
traditionally pragmatic complexion of the two predomi
nant 
political parties and the emphasis in Westminster of 
power 
over dogma, began to deteriorate in a process that at
tacked 
the conventional character of government from a numbe
r of 
angles. Initially, complacency in the system as it e
xisted 
then was undermined. Strains on the two party system 
and the 
increasing volatility of the electorate,~ phenomeno
n caused 
by the blurring of class lines, the rise of a new mas
s-media 
and widespread affluence, meant that by 1979 both of t
he 
16 Sir William Beveridge quoted from Cmnd. 6404 in 
Kavanagh, Dennis. Thatcherism and British Politics: 
The End 
Of Consensus, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
, 1987, 
pp. 45-46. 
19 
major parties had only half as many people who strongly 
identified with them as they did in 1964
17
• Moreover, the 
crippling inflation and unemployment that the oil
 crisis of 
..;; 
the early 1970s brought with it generated populis
t attacks 
on big government and inefficient bureaucracy and
 a belief 
that the British political system was becoming ov
erloaded. 
There was a widespread sense that the country was
 suffering, 
''from an excess of popular expectations and deman
ds and 
lacked adequate authority and resources to meet th
ese 
pressures 1118 and this allowed for the development 
of even 
the most nonpartisan critique of the status quo. 
With this atmosphere of restlessness intensifying
, it 
became fairly easy for ideologues, especially tho
se from the 
right of the political spectrum, to enhance their
 positions 
and spread their gospels. Armed with a contempt fo
r·the 
political banality of Westminster and a belief in
 the need 
of a somewhat populistic approach, these pioneers
 began to 
fine tune a postulate that would have both dynamis
m and mass 
appeal. Believing that, "an ideology simplifies, 
organizes, 
evaluates and gives meaning to what otherwise wou
ld be a 
17 The actual figures are: in 1964, 48% of Conserva
tive 
voters expressed a feeling of strong identificatio
n with the 
party compared to 23% in 1979, while 45% of La
bor voters 
expressed this feeling in 1964 compared to 27% in 19
79. Ibid., 
p. 144. 
18 b. d I 1 • , p. 124. 
20 
very confusing world1119 , they, in many instances under the 
symbolic leadership of Enoch Powell, attempted to espouse 
a 
politics that would constantly refer to a simplistic fulcru
m 
of economic laissez-faireism and fervent nationalism: thus
 
giving them a vigorous doctrine. All that was required the
n 
was to strike an accord with the British people and in 196
8 
Powell provided much of it. In transit between the 
Conservative Party, where his deploring of Tory centrism 
incurred the wrath of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Dougla
s 
Home, and the Ulster Unionist Party, he gave an anti-
immigration speech famous for its vivid reference to "rive
rs 
of blood". During the tirade, he successfully highlighted 
how much political debate in Britain had become divorced 
from its high streets and pubs and how it was mainly the 
domain of the left-wing intelligentsia. 
Soon, seeing the infinite potential of such a credo and 
set of tactics, Powell's approach had collected many new 
adherents. Espousing the philosophies of Friedrich van Hay
ek 
and Milton Friedman20 , the Conservative Party, persuaded by
 
such influential figures as Margaret Thatcher, Sir Keith 
Joseph and Lord Harris, formed a number of "new right" thi
nk 
tanks such as the Center for Policy Studies and the 
Institute of Economic Affairs. Furthermore, the populist 
19 Dolbeare, Kenneth M. and Metcalf, Linda J. American 
Ideologies Today, New York: Random House, 1988, p. 3. 
20 Two figures who are, ironically, both liberals and far 
from conservative in the British sense of the word. 
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dimension allowed the doctrine to permeate popula
r ideology 
> 
and, with the editorial support of such influenti
al papers 
as ''The Daily Telegraph'' and ''The Times'', public 
opinion 
began to move sharply to the right on issues like
 
immigration, law and order and capital punishment
21
, 
gathering more momentum as the "new right" expose
d economic, 
political and social failure as a product of corp
oratism, 
centrism and pragmatism. As inflation and unemplo
yment rose 
in the 1970s, this new faction, now becomingly rap
idly co-
opted into, and indeed even taking over, the Cons
ervative 
Party, staged a celebrated coup as the Labor gove
rnment 
under James Callaghan was forced to begin the aba
ndonment of 
Keynesian-type beliefs and submit to the need to 
control the 
money supply and cap government expenditure. By 1
979, with 
the welfare state being increasingly seen as a dr
ain on 
productive investment and a contamination of Brit
ain's work 
ethic and sense of self-reliance, old-style pragm
atic and 
scientific corporate centrism was dead. The "Wint
er of 
Discontent 1122 and Labor's inability to control the
 powerful 
21 In his "Adversary Polls, Public Opinion and Elect
oral 
Cleavages" in Kavanagh, Dennis and Peele, 
G. (eds.) , 
Comparative Government and Politics, London: Heine
mann, 1984, 
David Robertson states that seventeen issues were
 presented 
to the public in a study of October 1974. When, in
 May 1979, 
these issues were once again presented, Robertson
 found that 
the populace had noticeably moved to the right in 
all but two 
of the issues. 
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''The Winter of Discontent'' took place during 1978-1
979. 
It was a time when numerous unions, including 
some which 
provided the necessities of life, took costly a
nd lengthy 
industrial action. During this time the press po
rtrayed the 
22 
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and delinquent trade unions finally assured that there would 
be no more ''beer and sandwiches at Number 10
11
• 
23 
With the consensus broken and the infallibility of the 
British way of doing things exposed, the road towards the 
mobilization of a constitutional reform movement had found a 
departure point. Yet it still only had geographically and 
culturally distant models and a far from united Europe to 
draw encouragement from. In addition, the realignment that 
was a product of Margaret Thatcher's 1979 landslide had 
forged a new consensus that, although more ideological and 
smaller than the old one, was just as resolute. It seemed 
that the vision of a written constitution, entrenched bill 
of rights and British Supreme Court was still despondently 
murky. 
The Conception of Opposition to Mrs. Thatcher. 
As was stated earlier, the Thatcher dynasty provided the 
catalyst for the formation of the new reform movement. Yet 
in its early days, the new Conservative government did not 
even attract substantial opposition of a partisan nature, 
let alone provoking a vociferous clamor for constitutional 
modification. Labor's crushing defeat in May 1979 had left 
incumbent La~or government as impotent and the striking unions 
as disruptive and selfish. 
23 
''Beer and Sandwiches at Number 10 11 was a common phrase 
used to convey the intimate relationship that government, big 
business and organized labor shared during the height of 
British corporate, or tripartite, policy-making. 
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the party severely wounded and soon, with the defecti
on of 
top personalities like Roy Jenkins and Shirley William
s to 
the newly formed Social Democratic Party, Labor seeme
d to be 
close to relegation to third party status. As if to 
exacerbate the problem, its image in the media was al
so 
suffering greatly. The advent of the ''loony-left'', or
 
Militant as they preferred to call themselves, and th
e rise 
of young radical and uncompromising figures such as K
en 
Livingstone and Derek Hatton gave the regional and 
parliamentary components of the party a new virile e
dge but 
·also meant that it became the target of ridicule and 
hatred. 
Within a couple of years of the 1979 debacle this med
ia 
portrayal had mobilized much of the British public in
to 
viewing the Labor Party as "out of control''; a politi
cal 
institution that had been hijacked from under the nose of an 
'' incompetent scarecrow•• 24 by a conspiracy of middle cl
ass 
Marxists intent on taking the party away from the av
erage, 
decent working Briton. 
As time progressed however, Labor's perennial interna
l 
problems and the Conservative Party's continual succe
ss at 
the polls found it increasingly difficult to kill off
 
opposition to Mrs. Thatcher's leadership. Inaugurally
, this 
24 The leader of the Labor Party at the time that it hit
 
this nadir was Michael Foot. Foot was constantly portr
ayed in 
the press as a man who would have been more at hom
e in a 
university than in the Commons, his lack of pr
esence, 
intensely intellectual approach and scruffy attire
 often 
becoming the butt of Fleet Street's jokes. 
24 
opposition was meager, fragmented and adhered to the 
conventional scheme of British politics: criticizing 
governmental policy and philosophy but never questioning 
''the rules of the game". From the opposite end of the 
political spectrum came the radical left, represented in th
e 
ailing Labor Party by Militant, but also present and quite
 
potently too, in universities, the trade union movement an
d 
the inner cities. Despite suffering public condemnation fo
r 
its role in the ''Winter of Discontent''; witnessing the 
disintegration of strikes in the mining, rail and other 
industries25 ; losing hundreds of thousands of members
26 ; and 
being on the receiving end of numerous pieces of aggressiv
e 
legislation27 , organized labor was able to maintain a 
25 The famous National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.) 
strike lasted a year and made its President Arthur Scargi
ll 
a topic of the public's conversation but ended in th
e 
bifurcation of the union and the realization of the Nation
al 
Coal Board's (N.C.B.) wishes to streamline the industry. The 
rail strike of 1982 reflected the unions' less resolute side
. 
It was broken when the National Union of Railwaymen (N.U.R.) 
agreed to British Rail's new "flexible rostering" wo
rk 
schedule while the other rail union (ASLEF) and its leader Ray 
Buckton refused to accept it. 
26 National union membership fell from 13,289,000 in 1979 
to 10,402,000 in 1987. Towers, Brian. ''Running the Gauntlet
: 
British Trade Unions Under Thatcher 1979-1988" Industrial an
d 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1989) p. 175. 
27 Examples of the Conservative Party's legislative attack 
on organized labor included the 1980 Employment Act, whic
h 
stated that British employers were no longer compelled t
o 
recogni~e or bargain with unions; the 1982 Employment Act
, 
which streamlined the definition.of industrial action and th
e 
immunities that came with it; the 1984 Trade Union Act, whic
h 
outlawed secondary picketing; and the 1988 Employment Act
, 
which provided the catalyst to the Trade Union Congre
ss 
25 
constant and antagonistic resistance to the hegemony of 
Thatcherism. In a similar vein, the monetary policies of the 
Conservatives which facilitated an unemployment mark of over 
three million by January 198128 and contracted a ruthless 
approach to the controlling of government expenditure, so 
incensed much of the underprivileged community that during 
the summer of 1981 many of Britain's urban areas were 
beseiged in violent rioting. It is no wonder that Herbert 
Stein, an eminent American economist, warned: 
Thatcherism is not a bonbon (to be) 
selected from a box of equally attractive 
chocolates ••. (It) is a pill known to be 
bitter, (to be) taken after decades - some 
would say a century - in which other 
medicines had failed. 29 
Mrs. Thatcher's opposition did not only originate from 
. . . 
) . 
external sources. Her single-minded monetarist approach 
created a feeling of discontent so strong that it even 
penetrated the cabinet. As e9irly as 1981, fiscal 
stubbornness, the accelerating unemployment ~~d sterli~g 
rates had sparked such substantial protest in Whitehall that 
dissent seemed to escalate almost daily. Soon backbenchers 
and cabinet members alike were subscribing to John Cole's 
(T.U.C.) split in September 1988 when "new realists" like the 
electricians' union (E.E.T.P.U.) split from the traditional 
approach. 
28 Holmes, Martin. The First Thatcher Government 1979-
1983, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1985, p. 151. 
29 From Leach, Richard H. ''Thatcher's Britain'' Current 
History: A World Affairs Journal, Vol. 80, No. 466 (1981) p. 
198. 
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sentiment that the Prime Minister was, ''sailing into 
the eye 
of the storm, bound to the mast, her ears waxed again
st the 
siren songs of ministers claiming that they were runn
ing 
towards the rocks ••30 • And yet even when these opponent
s, 
known affectionately as the ''Wets'', threw explicit pa
rallels 
to Captain Ahab at Mrs. Thatcher, they were not in a g
ood 
position to exploit her myopia. In a number of parliam
entary 
manoeuvers and cabinet reshuffles, the dissent was slo
wly 
alienated and pushed out into the political wildernes
s. 
Norman St. John Stevas, Francis Pym and Sir Ian Gilmo
ur lost 
their jobs while other figures, like Peter Walker and Jim 
Prior were exiled to the ministerial backwaters of 
Agriculture and Northern Ireland respectively. Even in
 1986, 
I 
I 
when Mrs. Thatcher faced her worst personal crisis ov
er the 
Westland Helicopters affair31 , she was able to shrug o
ff the 
claims of a clandestine and unethical approach to pub
lic 
government and survive a personal showdown with her h
ighly 
popular Defense Minister, Michael Heseltine. 
3° Cole, John. The Thatcher Years: A Decade of Revolutio
n 
in British Politics, London: B.B.C. Books, 1987, p. 4
5. 
31 The Westland affair of 1986 concerned dual take over 
bids for the British helicopter company of the same nam
e. One 
bid, from the American firm Sikorsky, was backed b
y Mrs. 
Thatcher and the Industry Secretary Leon Brittan, wh
ile the 
other, made by a European consortium, was avidly suppo
rted by 
the Defense Minister Michael Heseltine. A split in the 
cabinet 
ensued and, in an attempt to tarnish the popular He
seltine 
publically, a letter from the Solicitor-General to the D
efense 
Minister was leaked, seemingly due to orders from the
 Prime 
Minister's Office. What followed was a widespread att
ack on 
Mrs. Thatcher's conduct and Heseltine's resignation. 
27 
The Importance of the Alliance. 
The final, yet most crucial, component of this oppos
ition 
came from a more central orientation and packed a mor
e 
forceful punch. In 1981, two years after Mrs. Thatche
r's 
victory had polarized British politics in dramatic fa
shion, 
four prominent Labor personalities who were disconten
t with 
that party's jolt to the left, Bill Rodgers, David Owen, 
Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins
32
, broke away from their 
traditional allegiance and formed the Social Democra
tic 
Party (S.D.P.). As this new party grew, it began to drift 
towards a point of fusion with the established centri
st 
party, the Liberal Party. The new consolidation, know
n as 
the Alliance, then started to move forward in a force
ful 
attempt to break the Conservative-Labor stranglehold 
on 
Downing Street. Taking advantage of the still signifi
cant 
nostalgia to return to consensual politics; the dilut
ion of 
party identification as a cue in the electorate's vot
ing 
behavior and the existence of a newly formed and huge
 vacuum 
at the center of Britain's political spectrum, the A
lliance 
utilized an appeal to a constituency that emanated fro
m a 
myriad of demographic, racial, socio-economic and 
geographical sources33 , becoming a sanctuary for 
32 Collectively known as the "Gang of Four". 
33 For a more detailed description of this diverse 
constituency see, Bogdanor, Vernon. Multi-Party Polit
ics and 
The Constitution, Cambridge, England: Cambridge Un
iversity 
Press, 1983, pp. 59-61. 
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disillusioned Labor Party voters and centrist Tories. Very
 
quickly, the momentum of the Alliance had snowballed and 
soon after the Limehouse Declaration~ the s.o.P. had 78,205 
members35 • Moreover, by March 1982 both Jenkins and William
s 
were back in the Commons~ and the Alliance had taken the 
Tory bastion of Croydon North-West from the Conservatives 
and in the 1983 general election the parties received 25.4%
 
of the popular vote37 • The impact was so dramatic that by 
1985 Donald Shell was proclaiming that, ''while Westminster 
and Whitehall continue to function according to the norms 
of 
the two-party system, at the popular level the three-party
 
system has arrived 1138 • 
Despite Shell's optimism, by 1988 the bubble had burst. A 
series of disappointing seconds in crucial by-elections, t
he 
recovery of the Labor Party under Neil Kinnock and a belie
f 
that, regardless of public support, the Alliance would not
 
be able to muster enough seats in the Commons to form a 
34 The Limehouse Declaration, announced 25 January 1981, 
officially launched the S.D.P .. 
35 Ingle, Stephen. The British Party System, 
England: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987, p. 179. 
Oxford, 
~ Williams lost her seat as a Labor M.P. during the May 
1979 general election when her Hitchin constituency depose
d 
her. She returned to the Commons as a S.D.P. M.P. in Novemb
er 
1981, winning Crosby. Jenkins was the President of th
e 
European Economic Community until 1981 and he returned t
o 
Westminster winning Glasgow Hillhead in March 1982. 
37 1 ·t Coe, op c1 ., pp. 174-175. 
38 Shell, Donald. ''The British Constitution in 1985" 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1986) p. 253. 
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government, had led to a frustration that had fragmented 
~Britain's center into three less influential parties. Just 
as quickly as the Alliance had risen so it was dead, 
replaced by the S.D.P., the Social and Liberal Democrats and 
the Green Party. 
The Alliance did leave an important legacy however. 
Whereas the far-left and the "Wets" had laid a foundation of 
dissent that was crucial to the conception of the new 
constitutional reform movement, the appeal and the influence 
of the Alliance was of much more importance. When Roy 
Jenkins made his precipitous Dimbleby Lecture in 1979, an 
event that led to much of the surreptitious diplomacy before 
Limehouse, he called for Social Democrats to initiate a 
movement that was intent on breaking down the hegemony of 
the two great inflexible, centralized and bureaucratic 
coalitions that dominated the political leadership of the 
country. Saying that Britain was unable to adapt to public 
opinion and shifts in the political environment because of 
its political structure, Jenkins was one of the first to 
step outside the boundaries of the traditional 
constitutional paradigm, when he called for a 
decentralization of power and an adoption of proportional 
representation as the nation's electoral system. 
Jenkins's call for a new method of selection was absorbed 
by the Alliance because it realized that, despite popular 
appeal, a centrist party could never form a government while 
30 
Britain had a plurality system in which the country was 
split into a number of small constituencies and the 
candidate which received the most votes in a constituency, 
however small his plurality, was able to take his seat in 
Parliament. Such a system provided an impasse to the 
Alliance because a string of second places manufactured by 
a 
core of public support was both inevitable, considering the
 
demography and politics of the United Kingdom, and did not 
facilitate the arrival of substantial power. In this way th
e 
philosophy was not welded into the Alliance's manifesto 
because of an altruistic desire for revolutionary 
constitutional metamorphosis. However, before the Alliance 
withered and died after the·1987 general election, the two 
parties were beginning to espouse forms of constitutional 
revision based upon the Jenkins desire for decentralization
 
and proportional representation. By 1986, in his book A 
United Kingdom, David Owen was stating that, "we are badly 
governed, not because the malice or lack of forethought of 
our leaders, but because the structure of our government an
d 
our society is fundamentally flawed
1139
• 
The failure of the Alliance made it clear that the new 
centralism, as opposed to traditional British corporatism 
and pragmatism; the breakdown of the established consensus;
 
latent opposition to the Thatcher government and an 
abundance of political models and other forces, only touche
d 
39 Quoted from Ingle, op cit., p. 181. 
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upon the prospects for change. For example, while th
e 
Alliance had suggested a new electoral system and a ty
pe of 
decentralization or federalism and the European Conve
ntion 
on Human Rights had invoked the idea of a bill of rig
hts, 
these new proposals existed as autonomous and unorgan
ized 
concepts that, although sensing a kinship with the A
merican, 
modern constitutional approach, lacked force and cohe
rence. 
What was needed, therefore, during the irreversible d
ecline 
of the Alliance, was a fresh and more vigorous cataly
st. 
Margaret Thatcher proved particularly munificent in th
is 
respect. 
"Electoral Dictatorship" and Contemporary Constitution
al 
Reform. 
During the Dimbleby Lecture of October 1976, Lord Quintin 
Hogg Hailsham40 coined the phrase ''Electoral Dictators
hip" 
to describe the British political system. Later, expa
nding 
upon this term in his book, The Dilemma of Democracy,
. 
Hailsham suggested that the phenomenon concisely desc
ribed 
the considerable concentration of power into the hand
s of 
.. 
the executive component of British politics. Taking t
he 
concept of parliamentary sovereign as his starting p
oint, 
the peer began to paint a detailed portrait of a proc
ess in 
which power is constantly flowing towards the Prime 
40 Among a multitude of accomplishments, Lord Hailsham was
 
a leading contender for the Conservative Party leaders
hip in 
1963 and served as Lord Chancellor. 
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Minister. Parliament, he said, was the first abso
rber of 
political power because, "its powers are restraine
d only by 
the consciences of its members, the checks and ba
lances of 
its different parts and the need, recognized in p
ractice if 
capable in theory of being deferred, for periodic
al 
elections 1141 • Next power was sucked from the Lords
 by its 
fellow legislative chamber, the Commons, which, i
n turn, had 
its efficacy absconded by the governing party. In
 its final 
stages, the crystallization of authority, this p
icture 
stated, goes through a series of relationships be
tween 
backbenchers and cabinet ministers until it reach
es its 
destination: the Prime Minister. 
Hailsham's model was not accepted in all circles 
of 
British life but there were many individuals who 
were wary 
of the possibility of a forceful government hijacking 
parliamentary power and legitimacy in a bloodless
 coup that 
would only require election victory by a vigorous
 party 
determined to be successful. To them such an even
t 
represented a return to absolutism and monarchy a
nd could 
. 
" 
occur since, whereas the American political syste
m separates 
its executive and legislative branches, in Britain
 the 
executive is a component of the legislature, mak
ing it 
possible, if the government is resolute enough, f
or the 
executive to virtually become the legislature. Mo
reover, 
such a scenario could also conceivably allow a ca
binet, and 
41 Hailsham, op cit., p. 126. 
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perhaps a Prime Minister, if he or she had enough sup
port 
and was willing to ignore constitutional prerogatives
 
concerning cabinet government, to put into action, fre
e from 
parliamentary and partisan checks, whatever policies 
they 
wanted to. To those with such an imagination it becam
e clear 
that Britain's political system was a fragile mechani
sm of 
concentric circles in which the epicenter could becom
e 
omnipotent, given the right environment, and render a
ll 
other institutions, the cabinet, the parliamentary 
opposition, the local party, the Lords, and the publi
c, 
susceptible to its every whim and fancy. 
It was the realization of this fear under Margaret 
Thatcher's government that brought the contemporary 
constitutional reform movement to fruition. Originall
y, Mrs. 
Thatcher's power, although substantial, was seen as 
legitimate. Painful as they were to many people {especially 
to those, as was seen earlier, who comprised the left-
wing 
opposition to the Tories), the ruthless containing of 
government expenditure, the escalation in the number 
of 
those without a job and the violent battles with trade 
unions were viewed as a justifiable attempt by the 
Conservatives to actualize pre-election promises. Yet
 soon 
these policies were not only being criticized in a pa
rtisan 
sense but, more crucially, for their constitutional 
propriety. As an earlier description of the "Wets" and
 their 
discontent illustrated, Mrs. Thatcher's style of gover
nment 
34 
·~ 
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was myopic, egotistical and unrelenting; and perso
nnel in 
her government began to question its legality and 
protocol. 
After resigning in the aftermath of the Westland a
ffair, 
Michael Heseltine, speaking of the Prime Ministe
r's approach 
to cabinet government and collective responsibilit
y, voiced 
a complaint that had been previously shared by peo
ple like 
Sir Ian Gilmour and Edward He·ath: 
Collective responsibility has been 
removed, and the Prime Minister's will to 
impose her views has been put in its 
place. You can't accept that. That's not 
the way we govern this couptry.
42 
Beginning at around the time of the Falkland's Wa
r, Mrs. 
Thatcher's attack on constitutional convention an
d her 
repudiation of ministerial self-restraint were exp
osed to 
more than just her Conservative government. Whereas her 
contempt for protocol and tradition had previously
 been 
witnessed within Whitehall, by the second half of
 her first 
term as Prime Minister many people began to realiz
e that she 
was intent on curbing power, freedom and rights th
at had 
been granted to the population by many years of cu
stom and 
convention. To these individuals, a catalog of dis
turbing 
events and sagas was to prove this statement by R
onald 
Dworkin chillingly accurate: 
The very concept of liberty ... is being 
challenged and corroded by the Thatcher 
42 1 ·t Coe, op c1 ., p. 167. 
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Government. 43 
The incidents that contributed to this erosion of 
liberty 
are too numerous to discuss here. However, it is u
seful, in 
order to be aware of the scale of the Thatcher att
ack on the 
constitutional tradition that protects the liberty
 of 
British citizens, to describe a few of them. For e
xample, 
there has clearly been a conscious attempt to dra
in power 
from regional, metropolitan and local government. 
In a 
series of moves which Roy Jenkins called acts of 
''civic 
degradation" 44 , Mrs. Thatcher abolished Britain's 
metropolitan councils45 and embarked upon centraliz
ing 
projects such as the so called "poll tax•• 4
6 and the national 
43 Quoted in Atlas, James. "Thatcher Puts A Lid On 
Censorship In Britain" New York Times Magazine, 5 M
arch 1989, 
p. 37. 
44 Jenkins, Roy. "The Encroaching Power Of Governm
ent" 
Index On Censorship, Vol. 17, No. 8 (1988) p. 25. 
45 In April 1986, three years after the conception of
 the 
highly controversial legislation, Mrs. Thatcher's
 government 
was able to abolish the Greater London Council and
 Britain's 
other metropolitan counties. 
46 The "poll tax", or conununi ty charge as it 
was 
officially titled, was introduced by the governmen
t to change 
the rating system in Britain. Previously, the amo
unt of rates 
to be paid by citizens was based upon the size an
d location 
of their property. Under the new system, each indiv
idual adult 
is to be charged a set amount according to wh
ere in the 
country they live. This will mean that local gov
ernment may 
lose up to half of their revenue and hence a cor
responding 
proportion of their influence. 
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curriculum for schools47 • In addition, the government 
seemed 
to be somewhat eager to restrict the freedoms of spee
ch and 
press that are sacredly guarded in the United Kingdom
 and 
there have been a plethora of examples of this. Peter
 
Wright, for instance, after writing a book on his life
 as an 
assistant director of MI5, found the government succes
sfully 
obtaining injunction after injunction to prevent its 
publication. The Prime Minister even attempted to get
 the 
book banned in Australia, and it was only after a lon
g 
battle in which several newspapers got their wrists s
lapped 
for releasing excerpts, that the text became readily 
available in the United Kingdom. In a similar episode
 
Anthony Cavendish, who like Wright had served in Brit
ish 
intelligence, found his memoirs banned. Despite the f
act 
that the contents seemed relatively harmless, the gov
ernment 
claimed that Cavendish had broken his commitment to li
felong 
confidentiality and was able to enjoin "The Sunday Times" 
and ''Granata", a Cambridge 1 i terary magazine, from pr
inting 
segments. 
Aging former intelligence agents were not the only o
nes 
to feel the force of Mrs. Thatcher's control of the m
edia. 
In April 1988 the Prime Minister attempted to block th
e 
broadcasting of a Thames Television program called "D
eath On 
47 The national curriculum, adopted in September 1989, 
allows for the government to force school students to
 spend 
approximately 70% of their time studying Whitehall-ap
proved 
subjects. 
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The Rock''. The show, which examined the shooting 
of three 
Irish Republi9an Army (I.R.A.) members by British service
men 
in Gibraltar seven weeks earlier, was screened, b
ut only 
after a last minute mobilization of government res
ources was 
fended off by the Independent Broadcasting Author
ity 
(I.B.A.). In another case, police raided the home of 
journalist Duncan Campbell and the offices of B.B.C. Glasgow 
and "The New Statesman'' magazine after Campbell h
ad put 
together a television program about the governmen
t's covert 
attempts to construct the spy satellite Zircon. I
ndeed, the 
situation deteriorated so much after the media we
re banned 
from interviewing suspected I.R.A. terrorists in O
ctober 
1988, that Donald Trelford, editor of "The Observ
er", 
remarked that, "knowledge is an offense now. Infor
mation is 
Government property••48 • 
As if to make matters worse, the pervasiveness o
f this 
suppression seemed to go even deeper than the ban
ning of 
Spycatcher or protest to the screening of televis
ion 
programs. According to a hypothesis that saw a dis
cernable 
pattern to all of this control, Mrs. Thatcher was
 attempting 
to extract as much of the power, freedoms and righ
ts she 
could from opposing organizations, groups and ind
ividuals in 
order to further her party's hegemony. In Britain
's 
universities, for example, freedom of thought has 
become an 
issue as academic liberty has been stifled by the 
proposed 
~ Quoted from Atlas, op cit., p. 38. 
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abolition of tenure and the 1988 Education Reform Bill
49 50
• 
The right to freedom of assembly was also restricted 
by the 
1986 Public Order Act51 and in another area, one which 
has 
become a favorite of the government, Mrs. Thatcher ha
s been 
using the issue of national security to silence publi
c 
officials. The revision of The Official Secrets Act's
 
Section Two has affectively widened the amount of mat
erial 
that comes under the umbrella of national security wh
ile 
diminishing the public's interest
52
• Furthermore, public 
officials, like foreign office clerk Sarah Tisdal! wh
o was 
sent to jail for six months for revealing to "The Guardian'' 
the arrival date of cruise missiles in Britain, and w
orkers 
at the Government's Communications Headquarters in 
Cheltenham, who were deprived of the right to join a union, 
' 
fell victim to the uncompromising new stance. 
49 The 1988 Education Reform Bill also abolished the Inner
 
London Education Authority and provided for a sch
eme of 
"contracting out'', a policy that was tantamount to 
forcing 
universities and polytechnics to comply to certain sta
ndards 
before they could receive funding. 
5° For a more in depth look at Mrs. Thatcher's policy o
n 
higher education see, Griffith, John. ''The Threat to
 Higher 
Education", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1 (1989) 
pp. 50-62. 
51 The Public Order Act of 1986 increased the number of 
acts of assembly punishable by law and gave police 
greater 
powers to restrict demonstrations and picketing. 
52 For a detailed look at the historical treatment and 
contemporary status of the Official Secrets Act see, 
Tant, 
Tony. ''Constitutional Aspects of Official Secrecy and 
Freedom 
of Information: An Overview" Essex Pa~pers in Polit
ics and 
Government, University of Essex, Colchester, England. 
No. 52 
( 1988) • 
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These numerous examples of what seemed to many
 as 
authoritarianism provided the final push towa
rds the 
conception of the current constitutional refo
rm movement. 
Suddenly, to a large proportion of the United 
Kingdom, Lord 
Hailsham's vision of ''Electoral Dictatorship''
 had been 
alarmingly realized and what was needed now w
as the 
implementation of new regulations to stop the
 exodus of 
power to the kernel of the peer's metaphorica
l set of 
concentric circles. Suggestions for these new 
measures came 
in many forms, but the notions of a written co
nstitution, 
designed to alter the structure of a British p
olitical 
system that had been so easily abused, and an 
entrenched 
bill of rights, to protect the fundamental pre
rogatives of 
ordinary individuals from government encroachm
ent, were by 
far the most popular. ·rt was because of this t
hat Britain, 
in the form of this new movement, finally adop
ted a 
significant push for a system, one that has be
en labelled 
the modern American constitutional model, fort
y three years 
after the original impetus was injected. 
Proposals for Constitutional Reform. 
There had been, to be sure, salient and conse
quential 
versions of this constitutional modification a
rgument prior 
to the late 1980s. Academics like Muhammad Abu
l Fazal, for 
example, called for a United Kingdom federatio
n in which 
three units, England and Wales, Scotland and a
 united 
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Ireland, would, all within the framework of a written 
constitution and an entrenched bill of rights, "retain their 
distinct national identity with adequate powers and 
resources to govern their own affairs while submitting 
themselves to a common federal government over matters that 
concern the whole of the British Isles 1
153
• Moreover, many 
MPs demanded, as was seen earlier, the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into the British 
Constitution via an act of Parliament, and in a similar 
vein, other individuals attempted to encourage judges to 
actively implement the Convention in issue areas where they 
were not bound to follow statute but were relatively free to 
shop around for precedents and interpretations
54
• What is 
more, The National Association for Freedom, established in 
1975 in the wake of Ross McWhirter's murder, promoted the 
protection and consecration of civil liberties
55
• In fact 
53 Abul Fazal, Muhammad. ''A Federal Constitution for the 
United Kingdom" Transnational Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2 
(1982) p. 19. 
54 See, for example, Jacobs, Francis G. "Towards a 
United Kingdom Bill of Rights" Thomas M. Cooley Lecture, 
delivered at the University of Michigan Law School on 2 
November 1983. Reprinted in ''University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform" Vol. 18, No. 1 (1984) pp. 29-49. 
55 Despite its apolitical name, the National Association 
for Freedom is an extremely political organization. Although 
it crusades for the protection of individual liberty, the 
cases it undertakes are really only those where a right-wing 
greivance exists. For example, it was at the center of the 
vociferous debate to abolish the closed shop practice, took 
out injunctions against postal workers who refused to sort 
mail bound for South Africa and in 1981 promoted the appeal 
of Joanna Harris, a standards inspector in the poultry 
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there was such a phalanx of suggestions that rotated a
round 
this theme of embedded constitutions and sacrosanct b
ills of 
rights, whether it be in a federalist framework or no
t, that 
conjecture about prototype British constitutions became a 
favorite pastime amongst political scientists. 
The most influential and crucial of these early propo
sals 
came from one of Britain's foremost legal figures. In
 1974, 
whilst giving the Hamlyn Lectures
56
, Lord Leslie Scarman 
used a complex critique of contemporary English common
 law 
as his vehicle to justify constitutional reform. Building 
from a reference to a number of modern challenges to E
nglish 
common law such as the growth of international law an
d 
supranational institutions, the rise in the belief in 
the 
righteousness of social justice, the increased visibility of 
environmental issues and technological changes in soc
iety, 
Scarman slowly constructed an equation from which the 
need 
for a written constitution and entrenched bill of righ
ts 
issued forth. For example, while talking about foreign
 
challenges, he highlighted how human rights in Britain
, 
safeguarded by entrenchment in America and much of we
stern 
Europe, could expose the common law as powerless in 
defending traditional individual rights from statute t
hat 
industry who was dismissed for refusing to join a union. 
56 Lord Scarman' s 1974 "Hamlyn Lectures'' and the argument 
that is paraphrased here are from Scarman, Lord L
eslie. 
English Law -The New Dimension, (The Hamlyn Lectures, Twenty-
Sixth Series 1974) London: Stevens and Sons, 1974. 
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was determined and accurate enough to dilute these
 rights. 
Similarly, with reference to the social challenges
, Scarman 
underlined the common law's rather one-dimensional
 tendency 
to emphasize distributive justice and adjudication in 
conflicts between individuals and neglect the fact
 that with 
the advent of mass government, predominantly in th
e form of 
the provision of social services, the state is of
ten a 
participant in a dispute. He even, sensing the cri
sis that 
our natural surroundings are going through, took t
he common 
law to task over environmental issues. Picking up
 on the 
fact that the common law reduces the environment t
o property 
Scarman showed ~ow, firstly, the environment can o
nly be 
protected if an individual has the money and stami
na to 
activate litigation on its behalf and, secondly, h
o~ the 
environment is subordinate to private property int
erests. 
As has been stated, Scarman's solution to the 
inflexibility and vulnerability of English common 
law was a 
form of~bnstitutional revision. Using a delicate 
balance of 
a written constitution, entrenched rights and, per
haps 
paradoxically, ultimate parliamentary sovereignty 
as his 
framework, he specifically called for four major proposals. 
First, the basis of his proposition would be the 
entrenchment of certain provisions such as a bill 
of rights 
and European treaties. Second, despite the entrenc
hment of 
. . ~ 
these provisions, they would all be susceptible, i
n line 
with parliamentary sovereignty, to repeal or amen
dment but 
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only, in line with the concept of entrenchment, by a 
substantial parliamentary majority. Thirdly, Scarman called 
for a Supreme Court, presumedly made up from either th
e 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords or the Privy 
Council, which would have the power to invalidate 
unconstitutional legislation and regulate jurisdictional 
disputes made necessary by a scheme of federalism
57
• And, 
finally, the powers of this Supreme Court would be dil
uted 
by a change in the legal system whereby, instead of be
ing 
the exception, statutory law would become the norm and
 the 
foundation on which common law is based. 
For all the scholarly qualities of Scarman's and the 
other earlier models, it was not until recently that 
constitutional reform, riding the wave of authoritaria
nism 
mentioned above, was able to undertake a prominent po
sition 
, 
in British political debate. Conceived of in the autum
n of 
1984, the Constitutional Reform Center, now headed by 
Lord 
Scarman, began this trend by galvanizing a group of 
nonpartisan individuals into an agency designed to eva
luate 
the structure, operation and inter-relationships of 
Britain's public institutions. When this project found fault 
with the country's constitutiqn, the organization alt
ered 
,, 
its emphasis and started to call for the entrenchment 
of 
57 Like Fazal and a myriad of other proponents, Scarman 
proposes a form of federalism in his modifications. H
owever, 
for reasons that were explained in the introduction
, this 
study is not going to directly discuss such reforms. 
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a 
individual rights and freedoms. The subsequent constru
ction 
of a larger constituency through the production of a g
reat 
deal of propagandist literature
58 allowed the Reform Center 
to become very popular amongst writers, journalists and 
other professionals who were finding it increasingly 
difficult to breathe under Mrs. Thatcher's style of 
leadership. Because of this, by the middle of 1988 a b
evy of 
intellectual think tanks such as ''Samizdat••
59 and John 
Mortimer's ''Twentieth of June Group
1160 had been formed 
around the topic. 
It was not until late 1988 however that this restlessn
ess 
had permeated through the confines of elite circles. 
On 29 
November of that year61 , the newly formed ''Newstatesma
n and 
S0ciety1162 periodical launched Charter 88, a document 
of 
about one thousand words that called for a new 
58 Such literature includes, Holme, Richard and 
Elliott, Michael (eds.), 1688-1988: Time For A New 
Constitution, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988. 
Also, 
a periodical published by The Constitutional Reform 
Center 
called ''Constitutional Reform, The Quarterly Review''. 
59 
''Samizdat'' is a newsletter that, it says of itself, was 
formed to, "challenge the divisiveness of the Governm
ent and 
the fear of the new of so many of its opponents''. Quote from, 
Atlas, op cit., p. 36. 
60 This group was formed by a number of unsatisfied 
writers who convened for dinner at the playwright 
Harold 
Pinter's home in the summer of 1988. 
61 Charter 88 was launched in "Newstatesman and Society's" 
2 December 1988 issue. 
62 
''Newstatesman and Society'' was previously two separate 
periodicals, "New Statesman" and ''Society", that merged
 in the 
summer of 1988. 
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constitutional settlement. In this thesis, executive powers 
and prerogatives would be subjected to the rule of law; 
government would become more open; proportional 
representation would be instituted; the Lords would be 
reorganized and become an elected chamber; the judiciary 
would be reformed and its independence assured; and power 
would be greatly decentralized. Furthermore, Charter 88 
insisted that a bill of rights, complete with such 
provisions as the freedom of association and freedom from 
discrimination, should be added to the list and then, along 
with the other proposals, be entrenched in sovereignty
63
• 
The new charter, whose name was inspired by ''Charter 77", 
a Czechoslovakian document authored by some of that 
country's politically active middle-class, based this 
argument mainly on the intrinsic paralysis of the political 
system rather than the performance of the Thatcher 
government. In this way, it was therefore able to attract 
support from all parts of the political spectrum and as a 
result it became very popular. Born with two hundred and 
forty signatories, including Lord Scarman, John Fowles, 
Peggy Ashcroft and Julie Christie, the charter had attracted 
thousands within a matter of months. Clearly the use of the 
language illustrated below had struck an accord, ranging 
from Salman Rushdie to Roy Jenkins, throughout British 
63 To view the Charter in its entirety see, ''Newstatesman 
and Society'', 2 December 1988, pp. 10-11. 
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society: 
An accumulating weight of evidence 
suggests that the feudal survivals, the 
over.centralised governing structures, the 
distorting electoral procedures and the · 
vestiges of imperial presumption in our 
institutions have for decades blocked not 
only democratic rights but also economic 
progress and social cohesion. 64 
As, ''a bold attempt to tackle the problem of securing 
the 
survival of our~human and constitutional freedoms and 
the 
complexities of modern British society••
65
, Charter 88 
symbof ized a multitude of watersheds.· It marked, 
simultaneously, the vocalization of a previously late
nt 
discontentment with the status of individual liberty i
n the 
United Kingdom; a sudden realization by a significant 
part 
of the British population that the ''living organism'' 
approach to constitutionalism was fatally flawed; and 
the 
convergence of a number of forces, such as the rise of
 
Europeanism, the disintegration of a political consens
us, 
and the nature of Thatcherism, that pushed the 
constitutional reform movement into motion. In anothe
r way, 
it brought together, under one umbrella and in a unita
ry 
expression, the main components of this diverse movem
ent: a 
written constitution, an entrenched bill of rights and
 the 
need for a supreme arbiter of these documents or, to p
ut it 
64 
''The New Chartists'', editorial 
Society", 2 December 1988, p. 4. 
I 
''Newstatesman and 
65 Scarman, Lord Leslie. ''Why I Signed The Charter'', 
The Observer, 22 January 1989, p. 12. 
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differently, a simulation of the American model. And, 
although it did not capture the entire imagination of 
the 
British public, the topic of constitutional revision a
nd 
even replacement had definitely arrived on the public 
agenda. 
---------
-
The story of the maturation of the challenges to Brit
ish 
constitutionalism has therefore been brought up to dat
e. 
Having studied the character and heritage of this push
 for 
modification, this work will now embark upon its main 
task; 
namely the more detailed examination of the movement's
 main 
proposals in the light of their potential desirability
 and 
practicability in a British context. These main propo
sals, 
the establishment of a written constitution, the 
entrenchment of a bill of rights and the forming of th
e 
logical corollary of a British Supreme Court will be f
irst 
tested for desirability. Utilizing the American model 
adopted, as was stated in the preface, because so much
 of 
the move for constitutional reform models itself on th
e 
American system, the study will use the promotion of 
democracy as the litmus test that the new form of 
constitution must pass if it is to be labelled "d
esirable''. 
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CHAPTER 2: WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS, BILLS OF RIGHTS, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY. 
It would be somewhat fatal to base any argument for 
contemporary constitutional reform in Britain on the 
assumption that it would be less democratic than the 
present 
system. This is because democracy and desirability ha
ve, for 
a long time, been dealt with by political philosopher
s as 
synonymous concepts. The provision of outlets and veh
icles 
through which a community can form and control its 
government has been viewed since at least the middle 
of the 
nineteenth century as a most judicious and potentially 
congenial way of running a society and from James Mil
l to 
Peking's class of 1989, democracy has aligned itself w
ith 
the lighter side of human nature in a violent and bit
ter 
battle with tyranny and authoritarianism. Indeed, in 
modern 
times, this view has become so institutionalized into
 our 
political psyche, that it is very difficult to argue 
that 
some vague form of democracy does not enhance the qua
lity of 
life in a society. The vast majority of students of 
political science, whether they be from Boston, Budap
est, 
Bogota or Birmingham, can reach a tenuous consensus t
hat 
some degree of public participation, ideological comp
etition 
and political equality are good for a community. 
In this way therefore, an attempt to see if the 
realization of Charter 88 and its fellow proposals wo
uld be 
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beneficial for the people of the United Kingdom must base 
its examination upon the fundamental questions: Are the new
 
proposals more democratic than the constitutional elements
 
they are designed to replace? Do the concepts of an embedd
ed 
constitution and entrenched Bill of Rights augment the 
ability of British citizens to choose and monitor their 
government? Do these quintessential components give the 
public more choice? Does the Scarman proposal of a type of
 
judicial review, an obvious necessity in a system where a 
supreme interpreter of the Constitution is going to be 
needed, promote democracy or tyranny? Does the concept of 
a 
written constitution nurture other elements such as 
individual liberty and freedom, necessary for the growth o
f 
democracy? It is the task of this chapter to embark upon 
such a study and answer these questions. Yet before it can
 
do this it must highlight the claim that the reform moveme
nt 
is inherently more democratic than the established British
 
method and then form a widely acceptable and working 
definition of democracy so that these claims can be 
adjudicated. 
Modern Constitutionalism's Historical Claim to Democracy a
nd 
Justice. 
The American, modern or written constitutional model's 
claim to be democratic pivots around two fulcrums. The firs
t 
of these emanates from the principle that power corrupts 
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l' • 
people who rule and that they will always attempt to e
nhance 
their position, even if it means that they will sidest
ep 
certain convention and traditions and abuse constituti
onal 
protocol by doing so. In this way the entrenchment of 
rules 
or the political system within a written constitution
 can 
deter avaricious executives and legislators. The secon
d 
fulcrum suggests that in a democratic society people s
hould 
\ 
be guaranteed certain fundamental rights and this is d
one by 
the reserving of these prerogatives within an omnipo
tent 
bill of rights. 
The development of these two central themes can be see
n 
and their claims to be democratic examined, if the 
historical foundations for this type of constitutional
ism 
are unearthed. For example, the roots of the concept o
f 
controlling power were born in the sixteenth century a
s 
common law began to develop alongside liberalism and 
revolutionary changes in political, social and econom
ic 
structures started to rock established arrangements. I
n what 
has been called an, ''alliance of lawyer and puritan"
1
, the 
people of this epoch commenced upon the exercise of fu
sing a 
belief in the omnipotence of God to a catalog of certa
in 
ethics that they suggested should describe codes of 
monarchical behavior. As time progressed and these new
 ideas 
undermined the power of some rulers, many societies 
1 Mcilwain, Charles Howard. Constitutionalism, Ancient
 
(, 
and Modern, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press
, 1940, 
p. 99. 
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experienced the arrival of new centers of authority o
r, in 
less dramatic circumstances, a sharing of power betwee
n 
several institutions. This necessitated the further 
promotion of constitutional philosophy since many peo
ple saw 
that, in order for societies to survive, political sys
tems 
needed to become flexible,-in a manageable and contro
llable 
way, so that they could meet new circumstances. As Ca
rl 
Friedrich says, constitutionalism was born out of the 
need, 
"to turn such change to good account, how to adapt po
litical 
life to the changing social context in order to secure
 the 
greatest satisfaction for the people"
2
• 
In the following years, as power shifted frequently an
d 
spectacularly, the concept of ethical, restrained and 
responsible leadership gathered momentum. The demise o
f the 
church and hence the most dependable check on monarch
ical 
absolutism accelerated constitutional theory, as did a
 new 
pragmatism that began to infiltrate the thought of lea
ders 
intent on maintaining power but wary of forceful chall
enges 
to their legitimacy. Moreover, not only were monarchs
 facing 
the mobilization of new counter-balancers created to f
ill 
the ecclesiastical vacuum and being forced to cede ce
rtain 
amounts of power in order to quell discontent, but wi
th the 
advent of natural law, individualism and a fledgling 
capitalism it was suggested that· all individuals were 
given 
2 Friedrich, Carl 
Democracy, Waltham, 
Company, 1968, p. 6. 
J. Constitutional Government and 
Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing 
52 
certain rights, over the heads of monarchs, by God. As 
a 
cornerstone to the new constitutionalism, this belief
 in the 
individual as a sovereign entity joined with the view that· 
man-made law was subordinate to natural law to espous
e a new 
doctrine in which people had certain prerogatives, su
ch as 
protection from interference in the public sphere and
 the 
right to a political conviction, that could not be 
legitimately taken from them. 
By the end of the American Revolution, and in the sha
pe 
of the American Constitution, a theory of modern 
constitutionalism was completed and its marriage with
 
democracy and justice cemented. At the base of this polished 
theory was the old idea that justice emanates from a 
''higher'' or ''natural'' law that can never be altered b
y 
inherently self-interested, corrupt, or arbitrary rul
ers. 
The American Constitution was especially instrumental
 in 
perfecting this notion as it embodied its political 
institutions, and later its citizens' rights
3
, in natural 
law that was, via the sovereignty of the constitution
, 
superior to man-made law which itself was susceptible
 to 
perversion and dilution by narcissistic leaders. Subs
cribing 
to the notion that power, by definition, corrupts 
3 In the Bill of Rights of 179~: 
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individuals, American Revolutionaries
4 insured that the 
concept of natural law, captured so eloquently in 
the 
emotive war-time rhetoric of ''The Declaration of 
Independence'', was employed and the provisions of 
the 
Constitution put out of the grasp of mortals. Edw
ards. 
Corwin' s prose describes the nature of this ''highe
r law'': 
There are .•• certain principles of rigQt 
and justice which are entitled to prevail 
of their own intrinsic excellence, 
altogether regardless of the attitude of 
those who wield the physical resources of 
the community. Such principles were made by 
no human hands; indeed, if they did not 
antedate deity itself, they still so 
express its nature as to bind and control 
it. They are external to all Will as such 
and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They 
are eternal and immutable. In relation to 
such principles, human laws are, when 
entitled to obedience save as to matters 
indifferent, merely a record or transcript, 
and their enactment is not of will or power 
but one of discovery and declaration.
5 
From this source, the rest of the argument surroun
ding 
modern constitutionalism's inherent democracy, and
 
consequently justice and desirability, flowed. In his work 
The Spirit, Baron Charles Louis de Secondat Montes
quieu 
·forwarded the idea that constitutions should not r
ender 
4 For more 
Antifederalists, 
of North Carolina 
on this see, Main, Jackson 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
Press, 1961, pp. 127-128. 
Turner. The 
The University 
5 Corwin, Edward s. The 'Higher Law ' Backgro
und of 
American Constitutional Law, Ithaca, New Yo
rk: Great Seal 
Books, 1955, pp. 4-5. It should be realized 
that although 
Corwin' s statement is useful in an analysis o
f natural law, 
it was written during the aftermath of the Sec
ond World War. 
This was a time when such arguments were a 
little naively 
elevated to a position of hegemony. 
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societies political systems which are vulnerable to a 
hijacking by majorities, but should construct mechanisms 
which prevent power from congregating into a small number of 
hands. Montesquieu, despite his love of England and 
monarchy, went on to describe a ''separation of powers'' in 
which government was divided into three distinct power 
centers; the executive, the judiciary and a bicameral 
legislature, that were joined in a series of complex 
relationships in which legislative powers were purely 
statutory, executive abilities merely !imitative and 
judiyial jurisdiction only concerned with moderating inter-
branch squabbling6 • Together with a similar philosophy 
espoused by John Locke, this concern of abuses of power and 
the regulation of the roles of governmental institutions 
found its way, through the American Constitution, to the 
vanguard of modern constitutionalism. 
The ''separation of powers'' approach was fused into the 
American Constitution in a background of skepticism and 
distrust for authority. After freeing itself from a very 
concentrated and tyrannical source of authority, segments of 
American thought was by nature antithetical to 
centralization and so its champions, especially James 
Madison, set out to further the case of fragmentation, even 
6 For a 
"separation 
Montesquieu, 
111. 
concise but lucid explanation of Montesquieu's 
of powers'' · theory see, Loy, J. Robert. 
New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1968, pp. 104-
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if they were aware of a need to create some form of unity 
at 
a decision-making level. With the belief that individuals 
are self-interested, corruptible and infatuated with power
 
and with faith in Montesquieu's design, the new American 
political system took on the complexion of a desultory and
 
asymmetrical mechanism as a majority of the cautious 
delegates at Philadelphia injected safeguard after safeguard 
into the document. The creation of the federal system
7
, the 
detached executive and legislative branches, the 
independence of the judiciary8 , a bicameral legislature and 
the presidential veto completely echoed these prevailing 
thoughts of the time: 
The accumulation of a1·1 powers 
legislative, executive and judiciary in the 
sameahands, whether of one, a few or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny. 9 
Montesquieu, Locke and Madison's ''separation of powers" 
and "checks and balances" thesis also provided mortar for 
the other column of democracy that modern constitutionalism
 
I 
rests on. This was so because the protection of a minority
 
by preventing the accumulation of power by a single 
individual, group or interest neatly dovetailed into the 
7 See James Madison's "Federalist 46". 
8 See Alexander Hamilton's ''Federalist 78". 
9 James Madison in ''Federalist 4 7'', quoted from, Cooke, 
Jacob E. (ed.), The Federalist, Middletown, Connecticut: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1961, p.324. 
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) 
individualistic component of constitutionalism that emanate
d 
out of the American document courtesy of John Locke. Locke 
had written, especially in his Second Treatise of Civil 
Government, that the right to rule essentially comes from 
the consent of the govern~d and, so it follows, a rational 
citizenry has a prerogative to chose its government. With 
this right established, Locke saw the need to establish 
other rights for a population and since a community's 
smallest unit is the individual, he expressed the opinion 
that these other rights belonged to the person and not the 
society. Soon the philosopher was stating that society 
consisted of a myriad of atomic units all with the 
inalienable right to self-preservation and the accumulation
 
of property 10 • 
Other philosophers shared this belief, even if they 
arrived at the same conclusion via a different route. John 
Stuart Mill, for instance, espoused an individualism that 
developed from a less social origin. Concerned with the 
"principle of insulation", Mill, who although writing in 
nineteenth century England contributed much to the theory o
f 
modern constitutionalism, stated that individuals had a 
right to be protected from government interference so that 
10 There are those who believe that Locke was an 
authoritarian who espoused majoritarianism to such an extent 
that it would crush individual rights. For an example of thi
s 
argument see, Kendall, Willmoore. John Locke and Th
e 
Doctrine of Majority Rule, Illinois University Studies in 
Social Sciences, Urbana, Illinois, Vol. 26 (1941). 
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,,,,.. 
their uniqueness could reign uncontrolled in a way that 
would allow the human race to progress. In a rather radica
l 
look at human behavior, he stated, in Political Economy, 
that the individual has an absolute right to say or do as h
e 
pleases as long as it makes no difference to others and 
< c_~'\ summed up his brand of individualism thus: 
Whatever theory we adopt respecting the 
foundation of the social union, and under 
whatever political institutions we live, 
there is a circle around every individual 
human being which no government, be it that 
of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to 
be permitted to overstep. 11 12 
These theories of individualism and individual rights and 
the ''separation of powers" approach were therefore the two
 
major ways in which the modern constitutionalism began to 
link itself to democracy. Although distinct, these two 
components both put forward the argument that democracy 
could only exist if majoritarianism was tempered, power was 
not abused and individuals had a baseline of rights and 
privileges that could never be eroded. From the roots of 
"natural law", these two elements combined the two 
disconnected principles of the fragmentation of power 
sources and the entrenchment of individual rights into a 
message that was full of democracy and the related qualitie
s 
11 From Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Chapter 
11, Section 2. The Collected Works of J.S. Mill, Volume 3
, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, pp. 937-938. 
12 Mill's philosophy is best seen in his most famous work 
On Liberty. 
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of justice and liberty. Justice because individual rights 
were fair and egalitarian, liberty because the spheres of 
freedom around people allowed them to act as they wished, 
and, most crucially, democracy because the power of 
majori·ties becomes artificially amplified and is permitted 
to crush and manipulate minorities. 
A Workable Model of Democracy. 
\ If the current task is to see whether Charter 88 and the 
rest of the current constitutional reform movement would be, 
if realized, desirable for Britain and if the means of doing 
this is to measure this philosophy's democratic content, 
then a workable and acceptable model of democracy must be 
found. This may sound a rather effortless occupation, but 
theories of democracy are abundant. Moreover, any discussion 
of a topic such as this must be careful not to pick any 
postulate that resembles a simple paraphrasing of a 
criticism on either the present American or British models. 
It is for these reasons that a cross-section of differing 
and common theories are presented ·and discussed before the 
litmus test is outlined. 
To many political theorists, the United States, as 
sculptured by the Constitution of 1787, meets a vague and 
broad set of prerequisites that form the baseline to a 
definition of democracy. J. Roland Pennock lists a number of 
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necessary conditions for the existen~e of demo
cracy13 that 
are shared by these theorists and it is clear 
that American 
society passes all these tests with flying co
lors. In 
rejecting absolutism, despotism and authoritarianism and 
adopting the evolution and stability of consti
tutionalism 
and a relatively widespread franchise, the Am
erican 
Constitution, for example, meets a number of p
olitical 
criteria, while creating an open society with
 a great deal 
of individual autonomy in the private arena; a
 large, 
educated and urbanized population; an independ
ent and 
pervasive mass-midia14 ; and indigenous social m
obility, the 
i 
Constitution allowed the founders of the Unite
d States to 
give the country a liberal democratic complexi
on. Moreover, 
the United States surely fits secular credenti
als since as, 
''religion, is for the (d) emocrat, a realm of private 
affairs 1115 , democracy becomes a set of secular 
beliefs in a 
community where religious conviction and domin
ation is a 
matter of individual choice, and in this way t
he separation 
of church and state is intrinsically democrati
c since 
13 Pennock, J. Roland. Democratic Political T
heory, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University P
ress, 1979, pp. 
213-259. 
14 For more on the role of urbanization, literacy 
and the 
mass-media in the maturation of democracy 
see, Lerner, 
Daniel. ''Urbanization, Literacy, Participation
" from Rej ai, 
M. Democracy: The Contemporary Theories, New 
York: Atherton 
Press, 1967, pp. 248-250. 
15 Shields, Currin V. "Democracy As A Secular B
elief" 
from Rejai, ibid., p. 235. 
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democracy, "cannot be very well stated if there is an appeal 
to religious dogma•• 16 • According to other theorists, there 
are other fundamental qualities that the United States 
clearly has: 
A necessary condition for the existence of 
a democratic government is widespread 
agreement (approaching 100 per cent) among 
the adult members of society on at least 
the basic questions about how political 
power is won. 17 
None of these fundamental criteria, however, are 
particularly useful except in suggesting that the United 
States is clearly a democracy in the most loose definition 
of the term. Overused to the point of ambiguity, employment 
of the term has, in this way, allowed the United States to 
become grouped with societies such as Mexico, South Africa 
and India under the umbrella of democracy. What is clearly 
needed, in order to create a workable definition of the 
phenomenon, therefore, is a process of fine-tuning and a 
specifying of these certain prerequisites. Only then will 
the American constitutional model be adequately pitted 
against democracy. 
As was stated earlier, despite the existence of a 
consensus on what democracy basically is, detailed versions 
of the concept abound. From one school of thought emanates 
the notion that in democracies governments receive their 
16 Ibid., p. 237. 
17 Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M. "Democratic 
Fundamentals'' from Rejai, ibid., p. 270. 
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legitimacy and cues from the public. J. Roland Pennock
18
, 
for example, outlines one such interpretation when he sta
tes 
that ''government of the people'' is realized only in cases 
where rulers are determined by and accountable to the 
population, there are free elections at fairly frequent 
intervals, freedom of expression and speech exists and all
 
individuals are equal under the rule of law. Others, such 
as 
Robert Dahl, equate democracy with pluralism and the 
galvanizing of interests into a kaleidoscope of competing 
factions that freely compete for influence
19
, while more 
classical renditions (for instance those of Rousseau and 
Mill) see that democracy is achieved when a government is 
formed as a mirror to the community in microcosm, an 
offshoot of this being the notion of majority rule which, 
''argues that there is a virtue in numbers when they are us
ed 
in a pattern of activities designed to produce joint action 
among a heterogeneous people (and that) ... a connection 
between numbers and justice clearly exists 1120 • In a similar 
vein, adherents to this "grass roots" school of thought su
ch 
as A.D. Lindsay suggest that democratic systems emphasize 
the process of decision-making rather than its ends and 
18 Pennock, J. Roland. Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and 
Prospects, New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1950. 
19 See, Dahl, Robert A. A Preface To Democratic Theory, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. 
20 Spitz, Elaine. Majority Rule, Chatham, New Jersey: 
Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1984, p. 216. 
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allow elections, referendums or pluralistic intera
ction to 
make policy and force governments to purely admin
ister21 • As 
H.B. Mayo illustrates, there are also theories th
at combine 
a variety of these different postulates: 
••• a democratic political system is one 
in which public politics are made, on a 
majority basis, by representatives subject 
to effective popular control at periodic 
elections which are conducted on the 
principle of political equality and under 
conditions of political freedom.
22 
Another school of thought that inhabits the expans
ive 
territory of democratic theory basis itself, in a 
manner 
that is juxtaposed to the approaches of Dahl and Pennock, on 
the study of leadership rather than the electorate
 and 
states that initiative filters down rather than up
 through 
the system. The father of this type of theory is 
Joseph 
Schumpeter who, in his book Capitalism. Socialism 
and 
Democracy, states that, "the democratic method is 
that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at politica
l 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power t
o decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the· people'
s vote 1123 • 
21 See, Lindsay, A. o. The Essentials Of Democra
cy, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1951. and T
he Modern 
Democratic State, London: Oxford University Press,
 1943. For 
a contrasting view see, Macpherson, C.B. Democra
tic Theory: 
Essays in Retrieval, London: Oxford University Pr
ess, 1973. 
22 Mayo, H.B. An Introduction to Democratic Theory, 
New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 70. 
23 Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism a
nd 
Democracy, New York: Harper and Brothers Publish
ers, 1950, 
p. 269. 
63 
By doing this, Schumpeter shows that in western so
cieties it 
is not the electorate that defines issues but pol
itical 
parties, elites and interest groups and that inste
ad of 
voters influencing the positions their representa
tives take, 
politicians present the passive public with a fait
 accompli. 
However, Schumpeter is of course not saying that 
such a 
scenario is undemocratic. He insists that democrac
y does not~ 
have to involve a strong ideological relationship 
between 
voter and representative and a rational electorate
 but that, 
r" all that needs to exist is that people have a fr
ee choice 
\) 
1 for who they want to vote for and candidates are i
nvolved in 
an uninhibited competition for these votes. In thi
s way, 
therefore, democracy can encompass manipulation, p
rejudice 
and irrationality, as long as it involves "free co
mpetition 
for free votes 1124 • As E. E. Schattschneider says: 
Democracy is a competitive political 
system in which competing leaders and 
organizations define the alternatives of 
public policy in such a way that the public 
can participate in the decision making 
process. 25 . 
From this philosophical quagmire, a workable, acce
ptable 
and unitary theory must be pulled if this study is
 to 
ultimately be able to evaluate the American const
itutional 
model. Naturally, such an exercise could yield any
 one of; 
the previously mentioned approaches but it should 
only 
24 Ibid., p. 271. 
25 Schattschneider, E. E. The Semisovereign People, 
New 
York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1975, p. 142. 
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accept the Schumpeter postulate warily. This is be
cause the 
notion that democracy filters downwards is more de
scriptive 
than prescriptive and is a dilution of democratic 
theory so 
that it more resembles reality rather than an attem
pt to 
make contemporary society more democratic. Conseq
uently, 
since the Schumpeter supposition should really be 
seen as an 
empirical account of how democracy has been weathe
red, a 
wiser choice would be to pick from the myriad of m
ore 
classical alternatives. From these, a theory espo
used by two 
American political scientists, Austin Ranney and W
illmoore 
Kendall, seems to be appropriateu. 
Ranney and Kendall see democracy as revo"lving arou
nd four 
principles, "popular sovereignty, political equal
ity, 
popular consultation and majority rule 1127 , and state, as do 
a majority of other theorists, that democracy does limit 
power and assure the protection of minority rights
. Yet th~s 
doctrine does not propose the construction of proc
edural 
safeguards and entrenched rights, but suggests tha
t the 
electorate can protect prerogatives and prevent th
e abuse of 
power given the right opportunity. This opportuni
ty can only 
occur when the voter is making a real choice, som
ething that 
itself only happens when the elector has,· ''the pr
esence of 
genuine alternatives before him; the opportunity t
o find out 
26 See, Ranney, Austin and 
and the American Party System, 
World, 1956, pp. 23-37. 
27 Ibid., pp. 23-37. 
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Kendall, Wilmoore. Democracy 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
about the nature and probable consequences of each 
alternative; and full freedom to choose whichever of t
he 
' 
alternatives seems to him - for whatever reasons he de
ems 
sufficient - the most desirable 1128 • It is at this point
 that 
the majority should prevail and constitutional parameters 
should be rescinded as, ''any attempt to see formal 
institutional limitations upon the 'absolute' power of
 
popular majorities logically results in the establishment of 
minority rule''. 29 
This approach therefore promotes the essential democr
atic 
ingredients of majority rule representative government, 
frequent elections, political accountability and polit
ical 
equality. On top of this it attempts to maximize the c
ontrol 
and input of the voter by replacing procedural safegua
rds 
and governmental prerogatives with mechanisms that allo
w the 
citizenry to determine and protect their own rights an
d 
powers. By providing a variety of choices from across 
the 
political spectrum, the populace can do this as majorities 
will be fragmented and interests will not be compromis
ed as 
they are by the co-opting nature of present monolithic
 party 
politics, whether in the United States or Great Britai
n. 
Democracy will then be pervasive as government 
accountability is tied more closely to the electorate,
 
voters are allowed more input into the system and indi
vidual 
28 • Ibid., p. 32. 
29 . Ibid., p. 34. 
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rights are protected by fractured majorities and political 
egalitarianism. 
This definition of democracy has been outlined as 
it will 
be used, throughout this essay, as the launchpad f
or the 
critical analysis of the American constitutional 
model. 
Whenever the institutions of a written constituti
on, bill of 
rights or judicial review are discussed, all of the 
arguments will emanate from this origin. Througho
ut the 
study these provisions will be examined by employ
ing 
implicit and explicit references to the design just 
presented and by treating it as if it were the ex
clusive 
,, 
definition of democracy. In this way therefore, th
is 
postulate must remain foremost in readers minds d
uring the 
rest of this work. This is what, as has been state
d (even 
if, because of the brevity of this work, in a rath
er 
perfunctory and unsatisfactory a manner), democracy is and 
how Charter 88, the American Constitution and the 
related 
models will be judged. The departure point for this critical 
examination concerns conventional arguments again
st the 
democratic and justiciable nature of written constitutions, 
viewpoints that this essay shares. 
Are Written Constitutions Democratic? 
Up until now, the modern constitutional model has 
been 
viewed by this essay in a rather insouciant way an
d the only 
real treatment of it has discussed its rise to heg
emony, its 
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development in the United Kingdom and its composi
tion. It is 
at this point however, that the work embarks upon 
its main 
argument and begins critically to assess the comp
onents of 
the approach, simultaneously activating the defini
tion of 
democracy and putting it into use. Moreover, it is
 also at 
this point that the use of the American model as a
 litmus 
test for the desirability and the practicability o
f the 
contemporary British constitutional reform moveme
nt 
commences. Subsequently, from now until the end of
 the 
essay, the American political system and experienc
e will 
become the vehicle through which the British movem
ent will 
be judged. 
Disapproval of the American Constitution is not ab
undant 
in the literature of political science
30
, a fact that 
primarily stems from the development of American h
egemony 
and the economic and political success that the do
cument 
yielded. However, despite this, the Constitution h
as been 
attacked as undemocratic since its conception. Ini
tially the 
notion of constitutionalism was assaulted by a 
heterogeneous, unorganized collection of states-ri
ghts 
colonists who based their fear of constitution on 
a bed of 
paranoia for centralization, urbanization and the 
abolition 
of slavery. Farmers, plantation owners and a multi
tude of 
other demographic and occupational groups were war
y of the 
3° For a critique of the United States Constitution
 see, 
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretatio
n of the 
Constitution of the United States, New York: Macmi
llan, 1936. 
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Constitution for many reasons and so based their 
arguments 
against its desirability in a variety of vocabula
ries. To 
some the settlement would mean mob rule, to other
s the end 
of their plantations, and to many a regrettable e
rosion of 
state autonomy. By the early 1780s however, just as the 
society was on the verge of nationhood, this disp
arate 
critique became more forceful and more homogenous
, until it 
provided the first vigorous arguments highlightin
g the 
undemocratic nature of the new Constitution. 
Thomas Jefferson was particularly active in voca
lizing 
his concerns about the new Constitution, and it i
s his 
argument that is to be used as the first to illus
trate the 
undemocratic nature of written constitutions. In 
a letter to 
James Madison during his tenure as Minister to Fr
ance in 
1789, Jefferson stated that he believed that no g
eneration 
had the right to bind another since, "the earth b
elongs in 
usufruct to the li ving"31 • Under this principle Jefferson's 
philosophy developed to incorporate the notion th
at the dead 
should not be able to determine dispersion of res
ources or 
indebt its successors since they had no jurisdiction to 
influence and affect a society in which they took
 no part. 
In accordance with this, communities should set u
p a network 
of inheritance laws in which the property of the 
deceased 
would revert automatically to the society to be d
istributed 
31 Quoted from Matthews, Richard K. 
of Thomas Jefferson, Lawrence, Kansas: 
Kansas, 1986, p. 20. 
69 
The Radical Politics 
University Press of 
as, it wished. Moreover, such logic had consequences fo
r 
constitutional theory in that Jefferson wanted society
 
either explicitly to reaffirm support for the present
 
system, and hence he rejects the principle of tacit consent, 
or construct new statutes and institutions' every twen
ty 
years so that each generation can control its own des
tiny 
rather than let it be decided by 9 preceding generatio
n. 
This "earth belongs to the living••
32 approach had other 
ramifications and Jefferson utilized it as the fulcrum
 to 
the rest of his attack on the new Constitution, an att
ack 
that also enveloped a need for laws and conventions to
 be 
malleable and reflect contemporary situations and a d
esire 
for all individuals of all epochs to participate in pu
blic 
life so that they can attain self-fulfillment. Richar
d 
Matthews paraphrases Jefferson's "the earth b~longs to
 the 
living'' principle thus: 
By this bold innovation, he hopes, first, 
to sustain every man's interest in 
governing himself, as opposed to being 
either politically and economically ruled 
from the grave or being governed by a 
permanent aristocracy; and second, to keep 
the positive laws of society in harmon~ 
with the evolutionary progress of man. 
Jefferson's ideas have witnessed many retorts. Charles
 P. 
Curtis, for example, sees the American Constitution as
 
32 This is what Matthews calls this central part of 
Jefferson's attack on the Constitution. Indeed, he
 _names 
Chapter 2, ibid., pp.19-29 after it. 
·----, 
33 b. d I 1 • , p. 22. 
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having an independent meaning in which the Constitutio
n is 
the voice of the present generation, just as a document that 
they themselves had written would be~. Similarly, Joh
n Hart 
Ely maintains that the framers injected flexibility into the 
Constitution that allowed for contemporary autonomy
35 and 
Alexander Bickel detects, "an awareness on the part o
f the 
framers that it was a constitution that they were wr
iting", 
and states that this, ''led to a choice of language ca
pable 
of growth1136 • However, Jefferson was not alone in his
 
criticism of the new Constitution during the revolutio
nary 
era and there existed postulates that are equally use
ful in 
illuminating the undemocratic constituents of the Am
erican 
Constitutional model. 
-
At the vanguard of this allied philosophy were the An
ti-
Federalists37, a heterogeneous group of constitutional
 
dissenters who, although often being fatally split ov
er a 
number of issues, did have a forceful and popular arr
ay of 
arguments. The first of these was particularly reput
able and 
concerned the quintessential notion that the creation
 of a 
34 For more on Curtis's argument see, Barber, Sotirios 
A. On What The Constitution Means, Baltimore: Th
e Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 17-19. 
35 For more on Ely's argument see, ibid., pp. 19-37. 
36 Quoted from, ibid., p. 23. 
37 For more on the Anti-Federalist approach see, Storing, 
Herbert J. What the Anti-Federalists Were For, Chica
go: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1981, and Main, Jackson T
urner. 
The Antifederalists, Chapel Hill, North Carolin
a: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1961. 
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massive new union rendered republican government impotent 
and democracy and individual liberty either weathered or 
completely destroyed. Although this argument is specific to 
the United States and does not really attack the democratic 
value of constitutions in general, the Anti-Federalists used 
their intrinsic belief that small republics were, by 
definition, conducive to a virtuous citizenry, a responsible 
government and the forging of a common good or "res publica" 
to act as a base for the rest of their doctrine. Such a 
tactic can be seen as a second argument unravelled. By 
making the republic larger, the Constitution had to delegate 
power more frequently, subsequently divorcing power from the 
people. In this way authority would move away from the 
citizenry into an aloof federal government full of elites. 
Based on their belief that power would move, for the worst, 
\ 
from the states and local politicians to a national 
government made up of a cosmopolitan elite, the Anti-
Federalists then stated that sovereignty would also shift. 
This is of particular interest in this study because the 
argument highlighted how an entrenched document itself, 
regardless of whether federalism existed or not, could 
direct power and sovereignty away from the citizenry. In 
this way an embedded constitution is clearly undemocratic as 
it weakens the ability of a people to govern themselves, 
giving power to a piece of paper, its authors, and those 
entrusted with the task of its interpretation. 
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Other more sophisticated arguments on the undemocratic 
nature of consecrated constitutions have also been 
developed. As a means by which a system of government is 
projected upon future generations, Jefferson stated that 
constitutions carve in stone the complexion of a society 
and 
usurp sovereignty. Picking up on this theme, more recent 
critics have suggested that such entrenchment becomes so 
institutionalized, since it is immune to challenge, that i
t 
establishes a stranglehold on public debate that, in turn,
 
forms an immutable consensus on values, morality and 
political philosophy. In what Arthur Selwyn Miller calls 
''the tyranny of technology 1138 , this phenomenon has been 
exacerbated in the United States via a business and 
political elite that, having an obvious motive to maintain
 
the hegemony of a constitutional system that has provided 
them with power, constantly reinforce the consensus by the
ir 
control of every component of public life, including the 
media and educational system. In this way, therefore, a 
written constitution becomes a moment in time when certain
 
values are frozen for eternity. By writing the document of
 
1787, the Founding Fathers wrapped and enshrined the 
dominant values of the period in protective clothing, 
elevated them to a position of supremacy and consequently 
38 See, Miller, Arthur Selwyn. "Democratic Dictatorship: 
The Emergent Cons ti tut ion of Control'' from Goldwin, Robe
rt 
A. and Schambra, William A. (eds.), How Democratic Is The 
Constitution?, Washington, D.C.: American Enterpri
se 
Institute For Public Policy Research, 1980, pp. 171-182. 
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removed the dynamism of ideology and counter-ideology
, 
revolution and counter-revolution, out of American po
litics. 
Although convincing in their own right, these argume
nts 
on omnipotency, sovereignty and inflexibility were no
t the 
only approaches that undermined American constitution
alism's 
link to democracy. Much of the opposition to the 
Constitution of 1787 pointed to the vagueness and::'vbr
evity 
that such a document was forced to encompass. Because
 the 
Founding Fathers, and indeed any subsequent producers
 of 
similar institutions, did not have the knowledge, reso
urces 
or time to formulate a document that would be able to
 cover 
every conceivable dispute, eventuality or circumstanc
e that 
it would have to make judgement upon, any such piece of 
paper would have to be short. Furthermore, since thes
e 
authors were unable to predict issues and events that
 could 
challenge the Constitution on the day after it was bo
rn, let 
alone hundreds of years later, the Constitution had to
 be an 
abbreviated and perplexing creation in order to give 
it room 
to meet unknown future economic, social, political, 
environmental and technological developments. With th
is in 
mind, many of its opponents viewed the Constitution a
s 
furthering elite control and extending the disintegra
tion of 
democracy. This was done because not only did the doc
ument, 
as was mentioned in the sovereignty argument, sever th
e link 
-that allows the public to confine its government but 
it 
also, after this disconnection, leaves the constitutio
nally, 
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but not democratically, restrained political system 
susceptible to hijacking by any interest powerful enough to 
usurp the reins of interpretation. The Albany Anti-Federal
 
Committee believed that such undefined powers as those 
granted by the Constitution were, ''capable of being 
interpreted to answer the most ambitious and arbitrary 
purposes 1139 , and were particularly wary of the ''necessary 
and proper••40 clause. Even the possibility that Congress or
 
the judiciary would safeguard the neutrality of the 
Constitution were dismissed. As Melancton Smith astutely 
said of potential judicial power: 
It appears to me that this part of the 
system is so framed as to clinch all 
the other powers, and to extend them in 
a silent and imperceptible manner to 
anything and everything. 41 
,,r-... --
To many, John Marshall's manufacturing of judicial review 
and the assumption of the Supreme Court to the position of
 
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution could be seen to have
, 
in that it safeguarded the document for neutrality, quelle
d 
any fears that this final scenario would be realized. It i
s 
--~ 
l• ,, "\ 
now the task of this essay, in light of the fact that Lor
d 
Scarman, among others, has called for Britain's potential 
39 , , t Main, op c1 ., p. 153. 
40 This wariness of the elasticity of the ''necessary and 
proper" clause was well founded. The provision from Artic
le 
I Section 8 of the Cons ti tut ion was interpreted so as 
to 
extend Congressional power by almost every Supreme Court. 
41 , • t Main, op c1 ., p. 156. 
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new constitutional settlement to incorporate a fo
rm of 
judicial independence and power, to discuss the validity of 
this argument. Having highlighted the undemocrati
c nature of 
entrenched constitutions, this work will now exam
ine, once 
again by employing the American experience, wheth
er judicial 
review is democratic and therefore passes the ulti
mate test 
of desirability. 
Judicial Review and Democracy. 
Lord Scarman's call for judicial independence and 
power42 , coupled with the obvious fact that a new 
constitutional settlement would require a meridia
n arbiter 
of the fledgling document, seems to point to the 
eventuality 
that if Britain's present constitutional reform m
ovement is 
to be satisfied, then judicial review will be a necessary 
by-product. Moreover, this scenario seems to be f
urthered by 
the fact that any written constitution is going t
o need a 
vigorous, independent and neutral guardian and in
terpreter 
in order to prevent itself falling prey to partisa
n 
manipulation and arbitrary utilization
43
• It would be a 
complete waste of effort if, say, Charter 88's cr
eation was 
left vulnerable since much of the new reform move
ment's 
argument bases itself not so much on the fact tha
t Britain's 
42 Lord Scarman, during his Hamlyn Lectures, does call
 for 
a version of a British Supreme Court. See, above 
at p. 44. 
43 Of course, this raises the issue of whether there
 is 
such a thing as a neutral arbiter. 
" 7 6 
present constitution is unwritten, but on the notion t
hat it 
is susceptible to compelling interests that are able t
o use 
it for their own gain. In this way, whatever may be mu
rmured 
to the contrary, the realization of this new movemen
t's 
utopia must involve a certain amount of judicial review. 
The experience of the United States is an ideal benchm
ark 
by which to measure the democratic propensity of such 
an 
institution as a law court interpreting a constitution
. This 
is because although the American Constitution does not
 
mention the concept of judicial review, some of the Founding 
Fathers seemed to intend the judiciary to play an important 
role in the political system. Those at Philadelpµia 
dedicated the whole of Article III of the document to 
the 
topic and, if we are to believe Madison and remember 
Montesquieu's contribution, seemed to subscribe to the
 
concept of a strong independent judiciary being an essential 
part of a balanced separation of powers mechanism. Ind
eed, 
the wording, "The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, th
e Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made
1144
, does seem to 
furnish the way for judicial integrity and, more 
importantly, sovereignty. Consequently, it is not so 
difficult to visualize how John Marshall was able in 1
803 to 
pronounce that, "it is, emphatically, the province an
d duty 
44 Article.III Section 2 of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
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of the judicial department, to say what the law is", and 
therefore conclude that since the Constitution is, 
'' fundamental and paramount law of the nation. • • an act of 
the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void
1145
• 
o Once established by Marshall's brash political 
l 
manoeuvering, judicia1; review in the United States began to 
be scrutinized for its relevance in a liberal democracy. T
he 
definition of democracy that this study uses would clearly
 
dismiss both the United States Supreme Court or Scarman's 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords or Privy Council 
''Supreme Court'' as inherently undemocratic since a select,
 
unelected body of people would be allowed to declare 
popularly devised legislation as unconstitutional. And ye
t, 
despite this, Americans have constantly viewed judicial 
review as conducive to democracy, seeing Supreme Court 
justices as mere lenses through which an impartial 
interpretation of the Constitution passes and as people 
whose job it is to see that the rule of law is upheld and 
the rule of self-interested and corruptible men 
subordinated. In fact, although this indigenous American 
viewpoint may be somewhat naive, there are certain 
democratic qualities to judicial review that does allow the 
., 
institution to sit more comfortably with democracy. For 
example, despite the enormous power Supreme Court justices 
have, it would seem that they are severely restricted by 
45 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
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certain checks. 
several of these constraints are built into the system to 
prevent a complete judicial usurping of power. Such official 
preclusions can, for example, emanate from the Supreme Court 
itself as do the impedances of only permitting justices to 
adjudicate on constitutional issues when there is a 
plaintiff asserting some right or claiming an injury, and of 
making a Court decision only legally binding to the two 
parties directly involved. Others are external checks such 
as constitutional amendment and interdepartmental 
restrictions. Amendment can, with the mobilization of 
Congress and the state legislatures46 , change the 
Constitution so as to circumscribe and redirect the freedom 
within which justices are able to roam, while the executive 
branch and Congress can check the Supreme Court in a number 
of other ways. After all, the President does appoint 
justices and this appointment process includes the need for 
the support of a majority of the Senate before a nominee can 
take a seat on the Court. This means that, even if quite 
indirectly, a potential justice's political philosophy, 
since this would have to reflect the ideology of the 
President and the Senate; legal aptitude, since this is 
46 In order to be passed an amendment commonly needs to 
be approved by a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the 
federal legislature and by three-quarters of the states' 
legislatures. This, in reality, makes the use of amendment as 
a way of restricting judicial behavior naturally very 
difficult. 
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measured by an American Bar Association scale that 
influential figures in the nominating process pay close 
attention to47 ; social standing and moral principles; are 
scrutinized by democracy. In turn this has lead to the 
defeat of a number of nominations. Clement Haynsworth, 
because of his ideological posture and ethical 
indiscretions48 , and G. Harrold Carswell, because of the 
mobilization of liberal interests against his appointment 
and his perceived incompetence, were defeated during the 
Nixon Presidency. In addition, Douglas Ginsburg and Robert 
H. Bork were rejected as Reagan nominees because of an 
admission to having once smoked marijuana and an intense 
conservative dogma respectively. 
More ammunition for the argument that judicial review can 
be democratic comes in the shape of more informal boundaries 
to judicial liberty. After the Marshall and Taney eras, 
epochs when the Supreme Court's power was still on the rise 
and judicial review was becoming institutionalized into the 
American psyche, the Court found it expedient to impose 
certain restrictions on itself. After the controversial 
47 The American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary plays an informal but widely recognized role in the 
nominating process by evaluating the qualifications of 
nominees and then making these evaluations known to Senators. 
48 Haynsworth' s major ethical mistake was to hear two 
cases involving subsidiaries of companies in which he had 
stock. In one case, he actually bought the stock in the time 
between his court made a decision in favor of the corporation 
whose shares he purchased and the public announcement of this 
verdict. 
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''Dred Scott'' decision49 , many individuals and political 
institutions had become wary of the increasing power of the 
Court and were concerned that it might commence upon an 
encroachment into matters that were, for example, 
exclusively the realm of, say, Congress. Responding to the 
threat that other branches of government may meet judicial 
power and attempt to isolate the Court, justices therefore 
started to use influence more sparingly, especially on 
issues that antagonized partisan debate5
0
• Robert Mccloskey 
describes such a change in strategy when he talks of the 
Court'svnew posture in two military trial cases
51 during the 
Reconstruction period: 
The Court tacitly acknowledges an informal 
but very real limit on its jurisdiction: 
the most explosive issues are non-
justiciable. 52 
Judicial self-restraint was not only a collective thing 
49 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard 393 (1857). 
50 It was not only during the politically sensitive era 
of Reconstruction, with "Dred Scott" fresh in its mind, that 
the Court was aware of its role in ideological and partisan 
issues. Justice Harlan Fisk Stone's dissent in United States 
v. Butler, 297 US 61 (1936) is one of a myriad of passages 
that are illustrative of this: 
... it is (not) the business of 
courts to sit in judgement on the 
wisdom of legislative action. Courts 
are not the only agency of government 
that must be assumed to have the 
capacity to govern. (at p. 87.) 
51 Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866) and Ex Parte 
Mccardle, 7 Wallace 506 (1869). 
52 Mccloskey, Robert. The American Supreme Court, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 111. 
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however, and many individual justices came to Washington 
with personalities and philosophies that saw passivism
 and 
strict interpretation of the Constitution as the corr
ect 
direction in which to travel. Perhaps the most dedica
ted of 
these individuals was Felix Frankfurter, a man who sa
w the 
Constitution as strictly neutral, an institution that
 
espoused neither an ideology nor a value-system. Arri
ving on 
the Court just after the explicitly laissez-faire rulings of 
the early twentieth century, Frankfurter believed tha
t 
judges should restrain themselves in order to, firstly, 
prevent subjectivity from undermining legitimacy, power and 
independence, and, secondly, allow public policy to m
irror 
public opinion, something that only elected officials
 could 
do. Furthermore, he was a democrat and he viewed the 
imposition of social and economic biases on the popu
lation 
by justices that strictly represented an elite class as 
antithetical to majority rule53 • His views on judicial self-
restraint and democracy are evoked by his emotive dis
sent in 
the famous flag salute case of 1943 when the Supreme 
Court 
ruled that mandatory flag salutes violated Jehovah's 
Witnesses' freedom of and from religion
54
: 
If the function of this Court is to be 
53 For more on Frankfurter's beliefs see, Macleish, 
Archibald and Prichard, E. F. (eds.), =L=a~w __ a=n~d ____ P~o~l=-=-i~t=i~c~s~: 
Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, New York: H
arcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1939. 
54 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 us 
624 (1943). 
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," 
'I 
..., 
essentially no different from that of a 
legislature, if the considerations 
governing constitutional construction are 
to be substantially those that underlie 
legislation, then indeed judges should not 
have life tenure and they should be made 
directly responsible to the electorate.
55 
There were other Supreme Court justices who shared 
Frankfurter's posture, even if they did not carry 
it to such 
an extreme. Benjamin Cardozo, for example, although 
recommending that judges ignore antiquated rules and use 
their own sapience in some areas, did offer a fram
ework that 
contained "principles of selection" designed to st
ifle 
judicial freedom and to guide justices who are unable to 
lecin on readily available common law, precedent, s
tatute or 
constitutional provision. In these grey areas whe
re no 
conventional cues existed, he suggested that those
 entrusted 
with making decisions should mold their conclusion
s around 
such principles as the historical treatment of th
e issue 
under review or contemporary social mores
56
• Similarly, like 
-Cardozo, who, in his incorporation of those right
s that were 
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered libert
y" during 
the Palko v. Connecticut57 decision, illustrated a 
position 
somewhere between restraint and activism, Oliver W
endell 
Holmes fluttered among total passivity and mild ac
tivism. 
55 • Ibid., p. 652. 
56 For more on Cardozo's judicial philosophy see, 
Cardozo, Benjamin N. The Nature of the Judicial Process, New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1921. 
57 302 us 319, 325 ( 1937). 
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Viewing the Constitution as a neutral document, h
e, like 
Frankfurter, believed the employment of due proce
ss and 
liberty of contract provisions to promote the free
 market 
philosophy of the early 1900s was intrinsically w
rong. To 
Holmes, the Constitution merely purveyed a set of
 
regulations, not an ideology or ethical theory as
 his famous 
dissent in Lochner v. New York
58 highlights. Yet, as was 
hinted at, Holmes did preach action, especially w
hen the 
states threatened harmony: 
I do not think the United States would 
come to an end if we lost our power to 
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could 
not make that declaration as to the laws of 
the several States. 59 
As well as the self-restraint that the Court from
 time-
to-time imposed upon itself, another informal con
straint 
fenced in judicial liberty. During the era of laissez-faire 
rulings that Frankfurter and Holmes despised so m
uch, the 
Court had ruled against a myriad of regulatory me
asures but 
by the mid-1930s, the public was becoming increasi
ngly 
impatient with such a posture. The country was su
ffering in 
a severe depression from which a majority believed the only 
salvation came in the form of direct governmental
 
intervention into the economy and, more important
ly, it had 
58 198 us 45, 74-76 (1905). 
59 Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Collected Legal Pape
rs, 
Norwood, Massachusetts: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 
Inc., 1920, 
pp. 295-296. 
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elected a President that shared these views. By 193
7, 
despite the clear need to allow Franklin D. Roosev
elt to 
alleviate the misery, the intransigent Court was s
till 
holding its position on economic matters, labellin
g federal 
gover~ment regulation as either depriving citizens
 of due 
j 
process or interfering with freedom of contract. T
herefore 
with legislation being repeatedly held unconstitut
ional~, 
the popular President, viewing the Court as aloof 
and 
undemocratic, saw that it was necessary to allow p
ublic 
opinion to overrule judicial philosophy and in an 
unprecedented action he threatened to transform th
e entire 
complexion of the Court61 • Although Roosevelt's pla
n was 
defeated in Congress, the Court soon realized that
 without 
the support of public opinion and popularly electe
d 
officials it would find its legitimacy and power d
iluted. 
Justice Owen Roberts, under constant pressure, swi
tched from 
the slim five-to-four majority in a decision that held state 
minimum wage statutes for women unconstitutional
62 so as to 
6° For example the National Industrial Recovery Ac
t in 
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 2
95 us 553 
(1935) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act's processing tax 
in United States v. Butler, 297 us 61 (1936). 
61 Roosevelt's plan included a prov is ion to appoint 
an 
extra judge for every judge on the Court who was over seventy 
years old and would not voluntarily retire. Being a
ble to add 
an extra six justices would have allowed the President to 
create a pro-New Deal majority. I;:, 
~ Morehead v. New York, 298 us 587 (1936). 
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make such legislation enactable~ and Justice Willis Van 
Devanter was forced to retire. Although later Roberts 
claimed that he only switched position because he believed 
the plaintiffs in the second case had explicitly asked for 
the overruling of the predominant precedent from Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital~ while those in the first had asked him
 
to merely distinguish, something he could not do
65
, there 
could be no doubt that the Court had been brought in line 
with hegemonic public opinion and by the mid-1940s 
Roosevelt's Second New Deal legislation was being almost 
unanimously approved by a new ''rubber stamp'' Court. 
Such confinements on judicial independence, whether they 
be formal or informal, have all led, as was stated earlier, 
to an American consensus that believes judicial review is 
democratic. Alexander Bickel, for example, states that 
judicial review has allowed the Supreme Court to pull from 
the malaise of individualism that affects all other 
components of American society, a commonweal or public good
 
63 West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 
(1937). 
~ 261 us 525 (1923). 
300 us 379 
65 For more on Roberts 's motives for this switch in 
position see, Leonard, Charles A. A Search For a Judicia
l 
· Philosophy: Mr. Justice Roberts and The Constitutiona
l 
Revolution of 1937, Port Washington, New York: Kenn~ka
t 
Press, 1971. 
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that the rest of the political system fragments
66
, while 
Howard H. Dean bases his thesis of judicial review and 
democracy on the fact that the community's support for, 
''fundamental law itself is greater than its sup~8rt for any 
casual, transient majority••67 • Yet, despite these approaches 
and the existence of restraints, judicial review is, in 
reality, an awesome power that lies, vulnerably, at the 
disposal of an unelected body. Although the Supreme Court 
has, on many occasions, declined to activate the privilege 
and always seems to deploy it advisedly, the power 
nevertheless exists and the Court sits, omnipotently waiting 
to strike down any act of Congress or any state legislature 
that it views, through a case or controversy, as 
unconstitutional according to a document that, it must not 
be forgotten, is brief and vague and consequently allows for 
much freedom of interpretation. 
An argument that labels the concept of judicial review as 
undemocratic could start from its chronological roots and 
Justice John Bannister Gibson's dissent in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case of Eakin v. Raub of 1825
68
• Although much 
of Gibson's argument is idiosyncratic to the American 
M For more on Bickel's argument see, Bickel, Alexander. 
The Least Dangerous Branch, Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1962. Chapter 4, pp. 111-198. 
67 Dean, Howard E. Judicial Review and Democracy, New 
York: Random House, 1966, p. 57. 
M 12 Sargeant and Rawle (Penna.) 330. 
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.:.,,·-: 
Constitution and therefore not particularly useful 
in this 
context, for example,1 he brings up the perennial po
int that 
nowhere in the Constitution is the notion of judicial review 
explicitly referred to, some of it does look under 
democratic stones. Primarily, Gibson states that 
sovereignty, in a democracy like the United States,
 emanates 
from the people and that therefore they should, pre
sumedly 
through the ballot box, ''correct abuses in legislat
ion by 
instructing their representatives to repeal the obn
oxious 
-act ... 1169 • He then goes on to say that, since abso
lute power 
resides in the people and that because the judicial branch, 
in conventional democracies anyway, plays the role 
of 
administrator and distributor, the elected legislat
ive 
branch in government should determine the complexio
n of 
policy. As he says: 
Inequality of rank arises not from the 
manner in which the organ has been 
constituted, but from its essence and the 
nature of its functions, and the 
legislative organ is superior to any other, 
inasmuch as the power to will and to 
command, is essentially superior to the 
power to act and to obey •.• ro 
Picking up from Gibson's prologue, this argument ga
thers 
momentum and becOmes more convincing. Atthough, as 
was 
- - ---- ·-'\ 
illustrated earlier, Supreme Court justices ·are appointed by 
directly elected officials, they are nevertheless a
ppointed 
69 • Ibid., p. 354. 
70 • Ibid., p. 351. 
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and this process, despite often yielding judges that mirror 
public opinion, permits them freedom and autonomy from 
democratic influences. This liberty is based upon a life 
tenure which cannot be reversed by distasteful political 
philosophy or impending old age and hence acttvely 
encourages the Supreme Court's estrangement from the 
mainstream of the political system. Theoretically justices 
can be impeached, ''for Treason, Bribery, or other high 
crimes -and Misdemeanors••71 , but in reality it is difficult 
to 
whe 
~---·lize a concerted effort against a justice, especially 
considers the sanctity with which the American 
public regards the Supreme Court and the lack of success th
e 
country's most popular President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, ha
d 
when challenging the institution. There has been only one 
real attempt to impeach a justice, that being when staunch 
Federalist Samuel Chase was charged with highly partisan 
offenses in 1804, but then, even after the House found Chas
e 
guilty, he was acquitted by the Senaten. 
Similarly, in addition to the difficulties that external 
forces experience when attempting to bring a justice in line 
with majority rule, the members of the Supreme Court 
themselves have little incentive to relinquish power. This
 
71 Article II Section 4 of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
n The impeachment motion against Chase was passed by a 
majority of forty in the House but he was acquitted by the 
Senate in March 1805. 
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• 
motivation can stem from ideological conviction, a
s William 
Brennan's tireless defense of the libertarian dyna
sty of the 
Warren empire in the face of invading Reaganism ill
ustrates, 
or from, as Henry J. Abraham notes, human nature: 
It is human to cling to power and 
influence, and it is particularly human to 
enjoy a role of such significance and 
nationwide esteem.n 
The undemocratic nature of judicial review becomes even 
more ubiquitous, and therefore proportionately mor
e 
disconcerting, when it is realized that the Americ
an Supreme 
Court, an unelected body, has, by its assertion of
 judicial 
review and the need for a strong independent judiciary in a 
constitutional settlement such as the United State
s, been 
able dramatically to shape the national agenda. Fo
rmally, 
such a manipulation is done through the Court's ab
ility to 
choose what cases it wants to hear and subsequentl
y the 
legal and constitutional issues that the media, the
 rest of 
the political system and the public are going to p
ay most 
attention to. During the nineteenth century the Co
urt was 
forced to adjudicate nearly every case on its docket, but 
since the early 1900s the institution's caseload ha
s been 
infinitely inflated and now it can only arbitrate 
in a small 
percentage of those cases. In 1925, the Judge's Bil
l gave 
the Court the freedom to decide what cases it would
 hear 
fully, hence keeping the reducing process in judicial hands, 
n Abraham, Henry J. The Judicial Process, New 
York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 43. 
90 
and soon it was regulating its workload and pruning the 
docket in conjunction with its own preferences. It was able 
to do this because cases in its appellate jurisdiction, that 
is disputes that reach the Court through a maze of lower 
state and federal tribunals and because of an aggrieved 
party's persistence, could, after 1925, be rejected if the 
Court agreed with the decision handeq down by its immediate 
subordinate, or merely dealt with rapidly, if the case did 
not evoke a substantial federal question. This was 
. 
tantamount to allowing the Court decide which issues, 
interstate commerce, civil rights, freedom of contract for 
example, raised the most salient national questions. 
Furthermore, the creation of the writ of certiorari in the 
1925 act permits justices to hear cases that have not come 
up through appeal, at-their discretionn. In this way not 
only have unelected justices, through judicial review, the 
ability. to make policy, but so the size of its docket and 
the assumption of discretionary powers has given them the 
choice of what they should make policy on. Clearly, the 
Supreme Court is likely to hear cases in which it has an 
interest or in which it feels a lower court has passed up 
verdicts it sees as repugnant. 
This ability to have a certain amount of influence on 
Congressional, Presidential and public debate has not only 
74 See, the Supreme Court's Rule 17, Section 1, which 
concerns, ''Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari". 
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stemmed from the power to hear cases that it w
ishes to hear, 
but also certain dynamics that the Court has. 
Because it is 
small, cohesive and occupies a position at the
 zenith of 
American public life, the Supreme Court has be
en able to 
rapidly pick up on issues and forcefully project them into 
public debate and, on several occasions, it has
 actually 
been able to define public morality and viewpo
ints. During 
the Warren Court, for instance, justices found the ability 
to simultaneously present the democratic proce
ss with its 
issues and become the vanguard for conventiona
l ethical and 
political postures. In the area of civil right
s, the Court 
of that time brought the issue out of its isola
tion in the 
Jim Crow South and onto the national stage. Ju
st as Plessy 
v. Ferguson~ had been the prelude to segregatio
n, so the 
momentous Brown v. Board of Education Topeka, 
Kansasu 
decision of 1954 precipitated a black struggle 
for racial 
equality and thrust civil rights under the cou
ntry's 
microscope. Similarly, as the rest of Washingt
on, with 
partisan allegiances and Southern Congressiona
l power 
foremost in its mind, was treating the race iss
ue with kid 
gloves, so the Court went in its maverick and c
rusading 
style to right other wrongs. Soon minorities an
d· the 
powerless individual, often left out of the po
litical 
process, were being empowered by the Court. In
 a number of 
~ 163 us 537 (1896). 
n 347 us 483 (1954). 
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cases, such as Mapp v. Obion, where the justices ruled that 
evidence gathered from an illegal search and seizure s
hould 
be excluded from the evidence submitted to a state trib
unal, 
and Gideon v. Wainwrightn, where the court assured a 
defendant's rigqt to counsel, justices explicitly 
incorporated the criminal provisions of the Bill of Ri
ghts 
into state constitutional law and in Baker v. Carr~, a
 
dispute in which gerrymandering was seen as 
unconstitutional, the Court ensured that all people, r
ich or 
poor, black or white, would be politically equal. Arch
ibald 
Cox says of this period: 
Although the justices have differed 
sharply upon the propriety of using the 
bench as a "bully pit'', one· suspects that 
the course of decision is sometimes 
influenced, in great cases, by the 
realization that the influence of the 
Supreme Court's opinions goes far beyond 
the formal limits of its decrees. The Court 
is often the voice of the national 
conscience. The Justices shape, as well as 
express, our national ideals. Brown v. 
Board of Education restated the spirit of 
America and lighted a beacon of hope for 
Negroes at a time when other governmental 
voices were silent.~ 
With the enormity of judicial liberty in mind, this 
· foundation of judicial power, sovereignty and autonomy has, 
n 367 us 643 (1961). 
n 372 us 335 (1963). 
~ 369 us 186 (1962). 
8° Cox, Arqhibald. The Warren Court, Cambridge
, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 26-
27. 
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despite the several checks to Supreme Court power, allo
wed 
justices to, ''proceed on an ad hoc basis to implement 
(their) personal views of national policy••8
1
• In this way 
therefore, judicial checks on personal self-interest and 
ideological affinity, whether they be conscious or sub
-
conscious, are not enough to prevent biases, prejudices and 
political sympathies from providing the ultimate cue to
 
action and discretion has not been used as much in wie
lding 
such awesome power as is sometimes believed. Such a 
phenomenon is perhaps the most vivid example of the 
undemocratic nature of the Court and can be illustrated
 by 
showing how, without references to traditional cues lik
e 
stare decisis, common law or constitutional guidelines
, 
tendentious justices clearly inject their own personal whims 
into decisions. Although it is always difficult to show
 
whether a verdict has been reached via political biase
s or a 
well-trodden path of precedent, frequent switching of 
judicial position can throw some light on the issue. 
The Constitution is, it must be admitted, an evolution
ary 
concept and not a static one. In this way it is therefo
re 
justifiable for the Supreme Court to fall in line with 
subtle shifts in public opinion, which has been shown 
it 
does not always do, or alter lines of precedent to sui
t 
contemporary social norms and climates. The Roberts sw
itch 
81 Lusky, Louis. By What Right?, Charlottesville, 
Virginia: The Michie Company, 1975, p. 21. 
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in ''Morehead''~ has been seen to be perhaps an exceptio
n to 
this, but examples do abound. In ''The Slaughter House''
 cases 
of 1873~ a small, but important, dissenting voice, 
personified by Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradl
ey, 
gave birth to the notion that the due process clauses 
of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rendered state and fed
eral 
governments unable to regulate economic activity. Not 
only, 
as Holmes and Frankfurter were later to show
84
, did such a 
postulate inject a political philosophy into the 
Constitution and mark the explicit attempt by justices to 
impose their personal interests onto society but it pr
ovided. 
the prelude to some very traumatic and inconsistent us
e of 
due process precedent. As was suggested, the laissez-
faire 
approach of Field and Bradley was dismissed in ''Slaugh
ter 
House" but soon it would be erected. Initially the Cou
rt did 
not have the legal ammunition to shoot down economic 
regulation with due process bullets, so it began to 
undermine it by utilizing the less controversial comme
rce 
clause as a vehicle and by 1895 the Court had preclude
d 
states from granting telegraph monopolies
85 and regulating 
~ See, above pp. 85-86. 
~ 16 Wallace 36 (1873). 
~ See, above pp. 82-84. 
85 Pensacola Telegraph Company v. Western Union Telegraph 
Company, 96 US 1 (1878). 
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interstate railroad rates86 and Congress from inter
fering 
with production practices87 • However, even when the
 due 
process doctrine seemed to be victorious in the Al
lgeyer v. 
Louisiana case of 189788 , the Court wrestled with it
s 
political philosophy, discriminating between the 
desirability of various types of regulation and ob
livious to 
precedent and the status of the due process and fre
edom of 
contract provisions. Thus, ''Allgeyer'' seemed to be
 
overturned in Holden v. Hardy~ when the Court uphe
ld a Utah 
law limiting the length of a miner's work day; ''Ho
lden" was, 
in practice, overruled in Lochner v. New York
90
, which held 
a New York state law restricting the hours that ba
kers work 
unconstitutional; and ''Lochner'' seemed reversed in
 Muller v. 
Oregon91 , which permitted an Oregon law regulating 
the 
working hours of women92 • 
u Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railroad Compani
es v. 
Illinois, 118 US 557 (1886). 
87 United States v. E. c. Knight Company, 156 us 1 ( 1895) •
 
88 165 us 578 {1897). 
89 169 us 366 ( 1898) • 
90 
"" 
198 us 45 (1905). 
91 208 us 412 (1908). 
92 Al though this ebbing and flowing seems to be a monum
ent 
to judicial inconsistency and self-interest, such a conclusion 
should be somewhat qualified. As Robert G. Mcclos
key states 
(op cit., pp. 136-139.) there did seem to be some logic to 
these switches of position; a ''judicial dualism'' that was 
caused by attempts to balance political necessit
y against 
undesirable state paternalism. 
96 
I' 
The Court's undemocratic activity can even be said to 
have gone further than this. In the ''Brown'' case
93
, the 
Supreme Court, by relying on evidence presented by 
sociologists and psychologists, not only imposed its 
morality to subordinat.,e fifty-eight years of precedent
, 
however ethical this actually was, but it actually usur
ped 
legislative power in its 1955 addendum to the original 
decision which decreed that states should insure, ''with
 all 
deliberate speed1194 a peaceful end to segrega._tion. The 
Court 
,r .. 
also seemed to be legislating in the abortion case of R
oe v. 
Wade95 • Although the creation of the right of abortion 
under 
certain constitutional protections that constitute the
 right 
to privacy looked to be justified as legitimate judicial 
action, the justices did step on a few Congressional toes by 
establishing a timetable that drew the line between leg
al 
and illegal abortions. As John Hart Ely stated, the Co
urt in 
"Roe'', ''manufactured a constitutional right out of who
le 
cloth and used it to superimpose its own view of wise s
oc~al 
\ 
' / 
policy on those of the legislatures
1196
• 
To conclude therefore, despite the checks that the 
political system puts on judicial review and the impedances 
93 See, above p. 92. 
~ 349 us 294, 301 (1955). 
~ 410 us 113 (1973). 
96 Ely, John Hart. ''The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment 
on Roe v. Wade'' Yale Law Journal, Vol. 82, No. 5 (1973) pp
. 
920-949. 
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., 
of a more informal nature, the existence of judicial 
sovereignty and autonomy is inherently undemocratic. 
Although this study does not attempt to suggest that t
he 
American system is as intrinsically faulty as John 
Marshall's baby, judicial review itself does not fit into 
the definition of democracy that this work has adopted
. This 
is so because the power is exercised by unelected 
individuals who have life tenure and is often abused, 
in 
this case by an American Supreme Court that consciousl
y 
influences the national agenda and justices who impose their 
personal biases on policy. In this way, like the insti
tution 
of a written constitution, judicial review, which is 
necessitated by the former, is undemocratic and conseq
uently 
undesirable. It is now the task of this essay to depar
t from 
this examination and pick up on the discussion of whe
ther 
the concretization of Britain's constitutional reform
 
movement is feasible, asking how practical are the 
modifications suggested by Charter 88 et al? Are they 
simple 
to enforce and make work? Would they work in Britain? 
To 
answer these questions, the American experience is on
ce 
again the model, but this time, as seems fitting in th
is 
eclectic romp through modern constitutionalism, the B
ill of 
Rights will be the vehicle. 
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CHAPTER J: THE INHERENT PROBLEMS OF ENUMERATING RIGHTS 
AND THE INABILITY OF BILLS OF RIGHTS TO 
PROTECT RIGHTS. 
Some of the elements of the British constitutional reform 
movement have in fact anticipated the same problems with 
written constitutions and judicial review that this essay 
has illustrated. These components are quick to identify and
 
admit to the inflexibility of ensconced procedures and 
regulations, especially during periods of considerable 
change; are aware of the usurping of sovereignty that such
 a 
scenario would establish; and to some extent fear an 
enhancement of judicial power and integrity. Because of 
this, they, and the posture of Charter 88 would seem to fal
l 
into this category, want to, despite much dilution, retain 
the fundamental intimacy between Parliament and sovereignty
. 
What these parts are intensely concerned with however is th
e 
recent Mrs. Thatcher-sponsored tendency towards the erosion
 
of traditionally protected and celebrated civil liberties. 
It is here that their protestations and proposals are at 
their most vociferous. As the numerous attempts to push th
e 
European Convention on Human Rights through the House of 
Commons, the nature of the present public discontentment an
d 
the nonpartisan complexion of the reform movement highligh
t, 
the entrenchment of individual rights is the most vigorous 
and vital ingredient of the constitutional modification 
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standard-bearers repertoire. 
/ 
Indeed, most inhabitants of liberal democracies would 
find it extremely difficult to conceive of, let alone 
mobilize, opposition to an argument that suggests imp
ervious 
protection for fundamental rights. Although "bills of 
rights" have been consistently defeated in Parliament,
 their 
losses)lave been due not so much to a concerted counter-
argument, but to partisanship and an ephemeral and 
heterogeneous espousal. Moreover, what principle impe
diments 
there have been to consecrating rights have been ·slow
ly 
weathered by the swelling concern shown by the British
 
people who have recently witnessed the undermining of 
free 
speech, press and assembly rights and the due process 
provisions that traditionally fair legal systems gran
t. 
Surely, although it may be possible to show how the 
embedding of a set of rules for the complexion of a na
tion's 
political system may seem arbitrary, out-moded and 
undemocratic, any creditable postulate cannot present 
an 
attack on the undesirability or irrelevance of essent
ial 
human rights. Yet, even though this essay believes tha
t 
civil liberties and prerogatives are neither undesirab
le nor 
irrelevant, it will now go on to suggest that their 
entrenchment can be ineffective, impractical and even 
harmful in a democratic society. 
The first rounds fired by this argument concern the fa
ct 
that by enumerating rights, any omnipotent approach w
ould 
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provoke the question: Is anything that is not explici
tly 
mentioned by a charter of rights by definition not a r
ight? 
Continuing the usage of the American experience, it ca
n be 
seen that the deliberate reserving of certain rights o
ften 
gives rise to inherently undemocratic scenarios, espec
ially 
in this time of changing technology and complex societ
ies. 
It does this since enumeration can lead to the belief 
that 
what is not uttered at conception is not included or, 
at 
best, a fierce public debate over the question. An exa
mple 
of this problem can be seen by American society's hand
ling 
of the abortion issue and how the idea of a right to a
n 
abortion has been dealt with by the Supreme Court. 
It was clearly the case that when they adjudicated the 
watershed Roe v. Wade1 dispute in 1973, the Supreme Cou
rt 
justices of that time, or at least those in the plurality, 
believed that the creation of an abortion right would 
be 
ethically correct, politically expedient and legally 
desirable. Consequently, with these assumptions foremo
st in 
their minds, they began an attempt to construct such a 
right 
from the very fragile and vulnerable constitutional 
foundation of the right to privacy. This right had been
 
conceived of during the Griswold v. Connecticut
2 case when, 
Justice William o. Douglas had suggested that the righ
t to 
privacy was not protected by a single constitutional 
1 410 us 113 (1973). 
2 381 us 479 (1965). 
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provision but emanated from a penumbra of rights granted by
 
the Constitution and which carved a zone of exclusion
3 ; 
Justice Arthur Goldberg had stated that the Ninth Amendmen
t 
protected privacy; and Justice John Marshall Harlan had 
forwarded the notion that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment alone created privacy. In ''Roe'' the 
justices incorporated abortion into this sphere of personal 
privacy that had been created by ''Griswold'' and was already
 
inhabited by, ''the personal intimacies of the home, the 
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child 
rearing"4 , by utilizing Harlan's Fourteenth Amendment 
mechanism. This action was tantamount to stating that the 
right to abortion was reserved and consecrated, however 
indirectly, by its intimate relationship with privacy and, 
subsequently, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights that
 
seemed to suggest that the Founding Fathers wanted some so
rt 
of right to privacy to exist. 
Indeed, the justices' posture attracted a multitude of 
subscribers, many of whom centered their approval around 
3 This penumbra was constructed out of the First 
Amendment (right of association is an assertion of the right 
of privacy), Fourth Amendment (the provision securing 
individuals from illegal searches and seizures creates privac
y 
in one's own home), Fifth Amendment (right to protection from 
sel-f-incrimination creates a zone of privacy in which t
he 
government is not allowed to force a person, ''to surrender t
o 
his own detriment''), the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's ''due process'' clause. For more on this see
, 
Justice William o. Douglas's majority opinion in "Griswold" 
at p. 484. 
4 Paris Adult Theater Iv. Slaton, 413 US 49, 65 (1973). 
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either the notion that the right to abortion flows from the
 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause or
 
Justice Harlan F. Stone's famous footnote number four i~ 
United States v. Carolene Products
5 which gives 
extraordinary constitutional protection and grants certain 
prerogatives to those that are unlikely to receive adequate
 
consideration in the political process.
6 Similarly, another 
argument stemmed from the fact that, ''the capacity to 
maintain and support (an) enclave of private life marks the 
difference between a democratic and totalitarian society
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and therefore privacy and the freedom to do what one wants 
to in a particular sphere is essential for democracy. Yet 
however fervent and vigorous were the claims that a right t
o 
abortion did exist in the United States, they could not 
command a place on the list of constitutionally protected 
rights. 
This was to prove a problem of substantial dimensions. 
Although those who believed there was an intrinsic right to
 
abortion now had precedent on which they could rest their 
5 304 us 144, 152 (1938). 
6 This argument suggests that such special protection be 
granted to pregnant women. There are arguments however (see, 
for example, Ely, John Hart. ''The Wages of Crying Wolf: 
A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade" Yale Law Journal, Vol. 82, No. 
5 
(1973) pp. 920-949.) that believe the protection should be 
provided to the fetus. 
7 Emerson, Thomas I. ''Nine Justices in Search of a 
Doctrine" Michigan Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 1 (1965)·, pp. 
219-234. 
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argument, they were still faced with the task of protecting
 
/ 
privacy and abortion from an onslaught which dangerously 
threatened the fledgling right. Since it was not part of th
e 
catalog of prerogatives explicitly mentioned by the 
Constitution, abortion was simultaneously attacked as an 
arbitrary and artificial appendage to the Bill of Rights an
d 
weakened because of its inability to attach itself to the 
Cons ti tut ion. Justice Hugo Black's dissent in ''Griswold'' wa
s 
the first criticism of the right to privacy's new found 
status: 
.•• I get nowhere in this case by talking 
about a constitutional ''right of privacy'' 
as an emanation from one or more 
constitutional provisions. I like my 
privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
nevertheless compelled to admit that 
government has a right to invade it unless 
prohibited by some specific constitutional 
provision. 8 
The fact that a right to abortion was not anchored by the 
Constitution meant that it was susceptible to a much more 
concerted attack than, say, the right to free speech would 
ever be. After 1973, abortion's lack of reference in the 
Bill of Rights allied itself to the widespread belief that 
the "Roe" decision marked an illegal extension of judicial 
power through the usurping of legislative prerogative and t
o 
the new social conservatism that manifested itself in 
powerful right-to-life groups, the Reagan administration 
8 Justice Hugo Black's dissent in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 us 479 (1965) pp. 509-510. 
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and, perhaps more crucially, new Supreme Court appointees 
like Antonin Scalia. This, in turn, led, perhaps inevitably
, 
to the Court undermining ''Roe'' in a July 1989 case Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services9 • Speaking for the plurality
 
of the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist issued an 
opinion that was tantamount to taking the issue of abortion
 
out of the hands of the judiciary and once again making it a 
political issue. In destroying a large part of the hope tha
t 
certain segments of the community had in seeing abortion 
become a protected right, the Chief Justice stated that: 
.•• the goal of constitutional . 
·adjudication is surely not to remove 
inexorably ''politically divisive'' issues 
from the ambit of the legislative process, 
whereby the people through their elected 
representatives deal with matters of 
concern to them. The goal of constitutional 
adjudication is to hold true the balance 
between that which the constitution puts 
beyond the reach of the democratic process 
and that which it does not. 10 
It would seem that a major reason for the erosion of 
"Roe'' was the fact that a right to abortion or privacy is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
11
• Such a 
predicament meant that, firstly, by missing the boat in 
1791, whether because of the technological primitiveness of
 
the era or because the Founding Fathers intended there to b
e 
9 57 LW 5023, 3 July 1989. 
1° Chief Justice William Rehnquist Ibid, p. 23. 
11 Perhaps the primary reason for the erosion of ''Roe'' was 
the arrival of the Reagan appointees (O'Connor, Scalia and 
Kennedy) on to the Court. 
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no such right, abortion was going to find it extrem
ely 
difficult in adding itself to the select number of
 rights· 
that had, by the adoption of the Bill of Rights, f
used 
themselves into the pervasive American consensus. 
In this 
way, whereas freedom of the press, the right to co
unsel and 
the protection from illegal searches and seizures 
had been 
accepted by all as unremovable, the right to abort
ion would 
always, even if the Court were to see it on severa
l 
occasions as a fundamental prerogative, be challeng
ed and 
attacked. Secondly, because of its inability to cla
im a 
place among the constitutionally immutable elite, 
the right 
to abortion and privacy could actually be seen as 
an ''anti-. 
right". Many individuals have argued that by not e
numerating 
rights, the Founding Fathers were actually stating
 that 
these rights were expressly not reserved. This argu
ment is 
naturally undermined by the Ninth Amendment which 
states 
that, "the enumeration in the Constitution, of cer
tain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparag
e others 
retained by the people1112 , but is not altogether de
molished 
when it is realized that those who framed the Bill
 of Rights 
could have been referring to as little as two righ
ts. 
Even with such a provision as the Ninth Amendment, 
the 
problem of the to enumerate or not to enumerate dic
hotomy 
remains. Although the Supreme Court saw that the A
mendment 
12 The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of the Uni
ted 
States. 
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. 
provides the foundation to the right of workers to 
organize13 and the right of a citizen to retain his own 
property against taxation for the support of private 
industry14 and Bennett B. Patterson believes that the 
facility is a grandiose design that grants human rights tha
t 
are fundamental for a free people living in a social 
compact15 , the Ninth Amendment actually confuses the matter
. 
If it was injected as a way of giving the Constitution a 
certain.amount of elasticity in the wake of technological,
 
political and social changes, then the Amendment becomes a 
way by which entrenchment envelops flexibility and renders 
itself susceptible to evolution, but, more critically, also
 
an undermining of the very principle on which the reasoning
 
behind the consecration of liberties is built. Bills of 
rights are authored to protect specific rights and the Nin
th 
Amendment, in its admirable realization of the possible nee
d 
to add further prerogatives, neither specifies nor 
emphatically safeguards such rights. Moreover, the amendme
nt 
process and its cumbersome nature, as the disappointments o
f 
13 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Company, 301 US 1 (1937). 
14 Savings and· Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 US 686 
(1875). 
15 Patterson, Bennett B. The. Forgotten Ninth Amendment, 
Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Incorporated
, 
1955, pp. 55-62. 
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the Equal Rights Amendment show
16
, certainly furthers the 
viewpoint that entrenchment encourages r
igidity. 
It can be argued, of course, that the fir
st eight 
amendments of the Constitution were to pr
ovide a baseline of 
rights which could never be eroded, excep
t perhaps by 
further addendum, and that the Ninth Ame
ndment was to be the 
vehicle through which the Bill of Rights
 could, at certain 
times, expand. However, if the first argu
ment put forward by 
this study to illustrate the intrinsic pr
oblems connected 
with the entrenchment of rights does not 
seem watertight, 
then a second, more forceful argument, ca
n be added. This 
other postulate is particularly cogent be
cause it concerns 
itself with the bifurcating and mutually 
exclusive concepts 
of individual rights and public good and 
suggests that the 
ensconcement of civil liberties can often
 prove to be an 
obstacle to collective welfare. 
The most obvious example of the tensions 
that are created 
between individual privileges and the hea
lth of the 
community can be seen in the American Co
nstitution's Second 
Amendment. Stating that, ''a well-regulate
d militia being 
necessary to the security of a free state
, the right of the 
16 See, for example, Mansbridge, Jane J. Why
 We Lost The 
E.R.A., Chicago: University of Chicag
o Press, 1986, and 
Berry, Mary Frances. Why E.R.A. Fa
iled, Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986. 
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people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed
1117
, this 
constitutional provision has, despite its entrenchmen
t, 
surprisingly experienced numerous attacks on its 
inviolability. The Supreme Court, for instance, has 
overruled the right for an individual to own a gun on 
several occasions18 and there have been many pieces of 
state 
and national legislation, ranging from New York's 
precipitous Sullivan Law of 1911 that regul-ated the 
carrying, sale and possession of deadly weapons, throu
gh the 
Gun Control Act of 1968 that, in the light of the Kenn
edy 
assassinations and the murder of Martin Luther King, 
outlawed the interstate trafficking of firearms, to th
e 
recent wave of state regulation
19
• However, despite this 
bombardment of the right, the prerogative still remain
s. 
Stemming from the words of the Amendment itself and th
e 
belief that the right to bear arms fits nicely into th
e 
17 The Second Amendment of the Cons ti tut ion of the United 
States. 
18 For example, in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 us 553 
(1876) the Court stated that the right to bear arms was not 
granted by the Constitution; in Presser v. Illinois, 
116 US 
252 (1886) the Court upheld a state's right: to regulate fire 
arms; and in United States v. Miller, 307 us 174 (1939) the 
Court stated that the taxing power could be used by C
ongress 
to control the movement of certain types of weap
ons. In 
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (1981) the 
Court denied certiorari and consequently sustained a f
ederal 
district court's ruling that there was no individual ri
ght to 
bear arms. 
19 This was initiated in April 1988 by 
legislation that effectively banned the manufacture 
of short barreled and inexpensive handguns. 
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Maryland 
and sale 
macrocosmic design of the Bill of Rights· since it, just like 
the rest of the provisions, arrests the encroachment 
of 
government into the individual and state realm,
20 powerful 
interests have been mobilized in order to protect the 
integrity of the Amendment. The National Rifle Associa
tion 
(N.R.A.), through the frequent deployment of political 
action committees and ebullient lobbying, has. been 
particularly successful in maintaining the kernel of 
the 
right in response to Supreme Court attacks. In 1986 the
 
N.R.A. successfully diluted the Hughes Amendment, an a
ttempt 
to extend the 1968 Gun Control Act, and in 1988 it bloc
ked 
the Brady Amendment, a proposal to impose a seven day 
waiting limit for potential handgun purchasers, by 
extensively organizing its membership and spending an 
influential three million dollars.
21 
Therefore, despite energetic assaults on the right to 
bear arms, the Second Amendment survives. However, thi
s 
victory of individual freedom has signalled the defeat
 of 
collective good as a variety of statistics and inciden
ts 
illustrate. In 1985, for example, 8,092 people were k
illed 
2° For more on the historical origins of the Secon
d 
Amenqment see, Kennett, Lee and Anderson, James La
verne. 
The Gun in America: The Origins of a National D
ilemma, 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976. 
21 For more on the N.R.A. 's lobbying techniques and its 
ability to transfer this into real power in Washingto
n see, 
Leddy, Edward F. Magnum Force Lobby: The National 
Rifle 
Association Fights Gun Control, Lanham, M~ryland
: The 
University Press of America, 1987. 
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by handguns in the United States, a country of 
239 million, 
while only eight out of Britain's fifty-seven 
million died 
in this fashion22 • In more vivid examples, a no
rmally law-
abiding gun owner, William Bryan Cruise killed 
six people 
and wounded ten others in April 1987 in a shopp
ing mall in 
Palm Bay, Florida and Patrick Purdy killed five
 elementary 
school students with a semiautomatic weapon in 
California 
during January 1989. There are surely no more d
ramatic 
examples of the potential destructive power of 
individual 
liberty .. 
The American experienc·e yields other examples 
of how the 
rights of individuals impede the community's w
ell-being. 
During the 1960s, for example, when the Warren 
Court was 
slowly incorporating the provisions of the Bi
ll of Rights 
and making them applicable to the states via th
e due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Suprem
e Court 
declared that the Fourth Amendment protection f
rom illegal 
searches and seizures was assured in state as w
ell as 
federal jurisdictions. In Mapp v. Ohio23 , a case in which a 
woman had pornographic material seized from he
re home by 
police officers who were not carrying out a w
arranted 
search, Justice Tom c. Clark established an ''ex
clusionary 
rule'' in which the defendant in a case is prote
cted from the 
22 Church, George C. "The Other Arms Race'' Time
, Vol. 
133, No.6, 6 February 1989, p. 20. 
~ 367 us 643 (1961). 
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state or federal prosecution's use of evidence obtained via 
unlawful means. This clearly marked the zenith of individual 
rights over societal encroachment in this particular issue I 
area but also brought with it certain reservations. Benjamin 
Cardoz.o had expressed doubts about this interpretation of 
the ''exclusionary rule'' during his tenure on the. New York 
Supreme Court when he stated that, "(t)he criminal is to go 
free because the constable has blundered1124 , and soon after 
''Mapp'' many critics were worried that a multitude of those 
who had clearly committed a crime against the community 
would be released because their protection from illegal 
searches and seizures subordinated any collective interest. 
Because of the fact that the community's welfare may have 
been subjected by more potent individual liberties and the 
errors of law enforcement agents, there became a need to 
redress this imbalance. In New York v. Quarles25 the Supreme 
Court introduced a "public safety" exception to the 
"exclusionary rule 1126 • In this particular case a suspected 
24 People v. Defore, 242 NY 13, 21 (1926). 
25 467 us 649 ( 1984) • 
26 In fact, the Court ruled that in cases where public 
safety was at risk, the suspect did not have to be read his 
''Miranda" rights (see, next footnote) . However, since 
"Miranda" had ruled that only evidence garnered after the 
reading of the rights could be employed in court, this was 
tantamount to carving a "public safety11 ·exception out of the 
''exclusionary rule''. 
The difference between the waiving of "Miranda'' and the fact 
that "Miranda" is a prerequisite for admissible evidence is 
important, as Justice Sandra Day o' Connor revealed in her 
concurring opinion. Al though she agreed that the disputed 
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rapist who was thought to be armed was pursued into a 
supermarket and frisked, handcuffed and interrogated b
efore 
being read his ''Miranda rights••
27
• Although under the ''Mapp'' 
doctrine the evidence gathered before the explanation 
of 
"Miranda'' would be impermissible in a court of law, Ju
stice 
William Rehnquist created an exception to the ''exclusi
onary 
rule", realizing the need for the public's protection 
to be 
-
secured by the police before an apprehended criminal's
 legal 
rights are read. In a similar incidence
28
, the Supreme Court 
introduced a ''good faith'' exception to the rule, statin
g 
that if the law enforcement officer genuinely believed
 he 
was acting in accordance with Fourth Amendment regulat
ions, 
then the evidence that is gathered unlawfully, yet 
unintentionally so, should still be admissable. Such a
n 
extension of the collective right over its individual 
counterpart was based on the logic that the "exclusion
ary 
rule'' is designed purely to deter the police from acti
ng 
with misconduct and therefore, if this deterrence has 
evidence collected in this case should be admitted
, she 
believed that this should not be so because ''Miranda"
 ought 
to be suppressed, but because the evidence in this c
ase, a 
gun, was nontestimonal. 
27 The Miranda Rights are a set of prerogatives that a 
police officer should make aware to a suspect who 
he is 
arresting. Established in Miranda v. Arizona, 483 u
s 436 
(1966), the four rights that should be read before an arrest 
is made include the right to counsel and the right to 
remain 
silent (that is the· right of protection from self-
incrimination). 
28 United States v. Leon, 468 us 897 (1984). 
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worked, all evidence garnered should be legitimate. 
These tensions between community and individual rights 
consequently present one of the largest dilemmas for the 
entrenchment of rights. Moreover, this emphasis on 
individuality, an accentuation that is clearly experienced 
in American history and one that is the direct product of 
the elevation of individuality to a position of hegemony by
 
the Bill ·of Rights and the American consensus, has broader
 
implications for society. The creation of a myriad of lega
l 
entities armed with a number of rights has resulted in the 
proliferation of a multitude of litigation and the 
subsequent over-burdening of the legal system as 
individuals, rather than utilizing their rights as a shield
 
against government zeal, have employed constitutionally 
granted prerogatives against each other. This, in turn, ha
s 
resulted in even greater problems as the community has been
 
sliced up into a kaleidoscope of warring units that have 
been able to suffocate the concept of community and the 
public interest. out of the individualism inherent in 
American society since the era of Puritan self-reliance, a
nd 
that was petrified and epitomized by the Bill of Rights, ha
s 
therefore come anomic individuals who, deprived of the norm
s 
of social responsibility and civic consciousness, have 
relied on personal instincts to achieve goals that, because
 
of the individualistic posture of American society, are 
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clearly private and individual in nature
29
• The ultimate 
result, according to David Riesman, is a ''Lonely Crowd
1130 ; a 
society in which the community is fragmented, made up of 
atomistic individuals unable to make contact with and 
perceive the feelings of others, and that has no conception
 
. 
of community interest. 
The belief in the need to encourage individual autonomy 
over community interest may have had more relevance in an 
earlier epoch. During the nineteenth century, the western 
hemisphere, and most notably Britain, was undertaking a 
dramatic metamorphosis in which quiet, uncomplicated rural 
life was being overhauled by a more complex industrial 
existence designed to tap an unlimited supply of material 
riches. Life was becoming viewed entirely through an 
economic lens as the system moved forward in an 
uncoordinated fashion, the laissez-fairism of David Ricardo 
and Adam Smith encouraging people to become more conscious 
of the individual as the unit of analysis and creating a 
scenario whereby, ''a vast, uncontrolled, inchoate, 
thrusting, surging growth and change, in which adventurous, 
masterful men gained place and fortune, and the country as 
a 
~ For more see, .especially, Merton, Robert K. Social 
Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press o
f 
Glencoe, 1957. 
3° For more see, Riesman, David. The Lonely Crowd, New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950. 
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whole moved to new pinnacles of weal th and power
1131
• 
However, in the late twentieth century irresponsible 
individual.ism and haphazard expansion seem to be somewhat 
dated. No longer is society on the edge of capitalism 
looking into a chasm of wealth that has no parameters and 
infinite resources. The fracturing of the community that 
Victorian economic libera.lism either brought to or as, in 
the case of the United States, quickened in western 
societies was essential for material growth during the era 
in which the wealth of the west was based 'On the small 
entrepreneur and innovator. But today the world needs to 
gather its expertise and carefully plan the future of its 
environment and its people so that continued prosperity can 
be assured and human progress maintained. Challenges posed 
by a deteriorating environment and limited resources make 
coordinated and collective efforts, like the European 
Community and agreements to control the amount of 
chloroflurocarbons released into the ozone layer, 
increasingly more desirable. 
" 
The need to compromise individual liberty with collective 
welfare can be seen no more vividly than in environmental 
issues. Entrepreneurial capitalism has pushed the world to 
the brink of environmental disaster and the continuation of 
individualistic and uncoordinated assaults on the earth's 
31 , Evans, R.J. The Victorian Age 1815-1914, London: 
Edward Arnold Ltd., 1958. p. 18. 
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resources will surely push society into the precipice. 
currently in the United States, where the entrenchment of 
rights has given the individual a great advantage over the 
common interest, American citizens are protected by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment provisions which prevent the 
federal and state governments respectively from taking 
• 
private property for public use "without just 
compensation••32 • This has meant that, except in a few cases 
where justices have allowed federal and state governments to 
prohibit ''noxious" use of private property33 , the Supreme 
Court has been able to protect private property rights from 
encroaching collective interest such as the defense of the 
environment34 • Moreover, individual rights can dominate 
environmental interests because, as ·Lord Scarman has 
stated35 , the environment has no power or prerogatives in a 
court of law and therefore needs a party with such rights to 
bring litigation on its behalf. This being the case in 
Britain at the moment, as well as of course the United 
States, a move towards the entrenchment of individual rights 
32 This is known as the ''takings clause" of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
33 For example, Penn Central Transportation Corp. v. City 
of New York, 438 us 104 (1978), Agins v. Tiburon, 447 us 255 
(1980), and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887). 
34 For example, Monongahela Navigation Company v. United 
States, 148 US 312 (1893), Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
US 164 (1979) and United states v. Causby,,328 US 256 (1946). 
35 See, above p. 43. 
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could provide the catalyst to the further dilution of a 
• 
communal interest in protecting the environment. That, in 
turn, could prove fatal. 
Not. only does the entrenchment of individual rights clash 
with, and ultimately subdue, collective interests, but it 
also leads to the proliferation.of a multitude of other 
dilemmas, this time concerning conflicts between 
individuals. The most prominent of the questions raised by 
such a scenario revolves around the troublesomeness of 
etching the line between where a person is justified in 
exercising his or her constitutional rights and where they 
have exceeded this sphere and are invading the liberty bf 
others. An example of this perplexing problem has come when 
the American Supreme Court has had to adjudicate in cases 
where one party asserts an absolute power to the exclusive 
or free use of its private property and an opposing argument 
claims that the First Amendment right to free speech 
subordinates this assumption. Such a clash of individual 
rights is made even more difficult to evaluate because the 
entrenchment of rights gives little indication if a 
hierarchy in which these provisions are assembled exists. 
Furthermore, even if such a ranking did occur, the granting 
of certain values to prerogatives would not overcome the 
problem of in which particular situations one right should 
yield to the exercising of another. Although free speech may 
be seen, by some constitution writers for example, as being 
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more important than the right to own property, it cannot, 
surely, be allowed to subject private property to secondary 
status in every conceivable incidence. The right to freedom
 
of speech may be the more important value to country X, but
 
that does not mean that Mr. Smith should be allowed to rush
 
into the Browns' bathroom and start advocating socialism 
while Mrs. Brown is taking a shower. 
As was.stated, the Supreme Court has had difficulty 
during its intervention in private property versus free 
speech disputes and it has experienced inscrutible problems
 
when etching the boundaries between one individual's 
exclusive right to make use of his own property and 
another's constitutional prerogative to free speech. 
Although dealing with the tensions between public property 
and free speech rights, the cases of Edwards v. South 
Carolina36 and Adderley v. Florida
37 are vivid illustrations 
of how the United States's highest tribunal has struggled 
over the concepts of clashing individuals and dueling 
rights. In ''Edwards", for example, the Court stated that by
 
arresting several black protesters at the site of the South
 
Carolina state legislature, that particular state had 
violated the demonstrators's inalienable liberty to express
 
.. 
themselves as they desired. In "Adderley", however, a numbe
r 
of black students who were protesting the jailing of several 
~ 372 us 229 (1963). 
37 385 us 39 (1966). 
119 
. - ---~~--------
----------
. 
of their college mates were arrested as they vocalized their 
dissent on the jail driveway. In this latter case the Court 
stated that, despite the existence of a pro-desegregation 
protest on public grounds, ''Edwards'' should be 
distinguished. According to Justice Hugo Black's opinion, 
the fine line between First Amendment rights and the 
prerogatives of local authorities to restrict the use of 
public property should be drawn between municipal properties 
that are open to the whole public and those that are 
generally not38 • Therefore, since a prison is a place not 
usually open to citizens, First Amendment rights were not 
applicable there~. 
Besides the problems of unenumerated rights, the frequent 
subordination of the common good, and the dilemma of 
adjudicating between the relative importance of certain 
rights and where an individual's right ends and another's 
begins. the American experience reveals another fallible 
feature of the entrenchment of rights in a bill of rights. 
This vulnerability bases itself on the notion that the 
enumeration of these constitutional provisions requires, in 
38 Ibid., p. 41. 
39 The Court also distinguished ''Edwards" because the 
Florida trespass statute that the petitioners in "Adderley" 
were found guilty of could not be seen as a broad, indefinite 
and loose law as the breach of peace charge in ''Edwards" was. 
The trespass statute was aimed at the conduct of one limited 
kind and was not vague and all-embracing, something that the 
point of law in ''Edwards'' was accused of being. (see ibid., 
p. 42.) 
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order to be affective, a society that furnishes an 
atmosphere that is conducive to the protection of the 
prerogatives and that is able to make their exercise 
meaningful. Clearly American history divulges a catalog of 
episodes that have either rendered the first ten amendments 
of the Constitution helpless to concerted attack and 
unavailing in the light of social, economic or political 
conditions. 
During the McCarthy era, for instance, the entrenchment 
of individual rights did little to protect both people or 
liberty .. The Cold War atmosphere, intensified by ''the fall" 
of China, the Korean War and the end of America's nuclear 
monopoly and whipped into a frenzy by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy's Wheeling speech in 1950, made a particularly 
brutal attack on the political, academic and religious 
freedoms supposedly guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
Julius and Ethel Rosenburg were executed and intellectuals 
like C. Wright Mills and Norman Mailer were isolated. In a 
similar vein, radicals like Henry Wallace were either forced 
rightward in a frenetic wave of paranoia and hysteria or 
' 
faced fines and imprisonment by states, interrogation by the 
federal government's House Committee on Un-American 
Activities and dismissal by petrified employers. Nowhere was 
the weathering of political freedoms more explicitly 
portrayed than in the Supreme Court's opinion of the Dennis 
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v. United States40 case of 1951. On this occasion, eleve
n 
Communist Party members who had been convicted under th
e 
Smith Act that outlawed the advocation of political 
revolution, had their lower court sentences sustained. 
Although the Court based its reasoning on the notion th
at 
the communists, by espousing their political theory, po
sed a 
threat to public safety, it is clear that the justices were 
unable to use the First Amendment to protect rights in
 an 
episode where a majority believed that a minority should not 
have such rights; the very circumstance that the Bill 
of 
Rights was constructed to prevent happening. As Justic
e Hugo 
Black astutely noted in his dissent in ''Dennis'', entren
ched 
rights only protect individuals when society wants them
 to: 
Public opinion being what it now is, few 
will protest the conviction of these 
Communist petitioners. There is hope, 
however, that in calmer times, when present 
pressures, passions and fears subside, this 
or some later court will restore the First 
Amendment liberties to the high preferred 
place where they belong in a free society.
41 
.q 
Not only has the American experience unleashed explici
t 
offenses on enumerated rights, but it has created a so
ciety 
that has made the granting of such privileges often 
worthless. Such a contingency can be witnessed if the 
treatment of the First Amendment's freedom of press 
provision is utilized. In the United States all media 
40 341 us 494 ( 1951) . 
41 , Ibid., p. 581. 
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facilities, whether they be television or radio stations 
or 
newspapers, are privately owned. This, of course, fits 
nicely into the notion of a mass media free from the 
constraints of government control and hence the spirit of
 
the First Amendment, but because of the nature of market 
economics, means that all components of the media must be
 
financially successful to survive. With this prerequisite
 
foremost in their minds, owners are constantly at the mer
cy 
of subscribers and advertisers, people whose favor they r
ely 
on for their livelihood. Consequently, in order to reach 
as 
many people as possible, and hence be as profitable as 
possible, the media tends to direct itself into the niche
 on 
the political spectrum that the majority of Americans occupy 
and reflect the homogenous and hegemonic values of what h
as 
been repeatedly called the American consensus in this ess
ay. 
In this way therefore, economics has forced the media to 
predominantly legitimize and reflect prevailing values (it 
does of course reinforce and subtly manipulate them on 
occasions too) rather than becoming a platform for diverse 
public debate and providing an environment for the 
encouragement of the publication of all viewpoints. This 
can 
be clearly seen by the fact that on American television 
seventy per cent of the characters are middle-class, men 
outnumber women by three to one and most women are 
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housewives. 42 
An examination of media ownership in America also 
illustrates why its press is not really .''free''. Although, 
before the advent of television, the American media was 
dispersed amongst philanthropic millionaires, partisan 
businessmen, labor unions and conscientious journalists, it 
is now concentrated very much in the hands of a small number 
of extremely powerful corporate conglomerations. The three 
major networks NBC, ABC, and CBS, control much of 
televisions watched output and with the relaxation of 
Federal Communications Commission regulations on ownership 
concentration in 1984, the newspaper industry is now 
controlled by a few massive corporations such as the Gannet 
Group which owned ninety-three daily newspapers in the 
United States in 198543 • Such concentration was also aided 
as the newspaper industry began to become increasingly 
profitable with competition being snuffed out and sources 
from which news and comment originated unified; as William 
Randolph Hearst, Jr. estimated, if competitive morning and 
evening papers, each making a profit of one hundred thousand 
dollars were merged, they would net not two hundred thousand 
42 Gerbner, George, Gross, Larry, Morgan, Michael and 
Signorelli, Nancy. "Charting the Mainstream: Television's 
Contributions to Political Orientations" from Graber, Doris 
(ed.), Media Power in Politics, Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984, p. 119. 
43 Graber, Doris. Mass Media and American Politics, 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1989, p. 45. 
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dollars but half a million~. However, such a phenomeno
n was 
naturally detrimental for media diversity and freedom.
 Just 
as the demands of profitability have influenced the co
ntent 
of media output, with huge conglomerations in control,
 the 
composition of the actors in the field are shaped by 
corporate politics. Business empires are the ,ubiquitou
s 
king-pins and television entrepreneurs and newspaper 
pioneers are either suffocated into liquidation by mor
e 
competitive and efficient operations or coopted into o
ne of 
the massive coagulati()!ls45 • 
What this argument on the freedom of the press 
constitutional provision illustrates is that the enum
eration 
of rights requires the simultaneous existence of a fra
mework 
of democracy, political diversity and a socially and 
economically just society in order to be authentic and 
meaningful. This viewpoint is further enhanced when it
 is 
realized that the right to freedom of the press in Am
erica 
is even more diluted by the fact that around seventeen
 to 
twenty million American adults cannot read~ and twenty
 
seven and a half million live in poverty, unable to af
ford 
44 Hodgson, Godfrey. America In our Time, Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, 1976, p. 138. · 
45 For more 
Bagdikian, Ben H. 
1983. 
on media concentration in America see, 
The Media Monopoly, Boston: Beacon Press, 
46 
"When mom and dad can't read'', U. s. News and World 
Report, Vol. 100, No. 17, 5 May 1986, p. 9. 
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access to the media47 • Added to the flaws in the 
entrenchment of rights that are highlighted by unenumerated 
( 
rights, the individual-community interest dichotomy, and the 
inherent problems in defining a hierarchy of rights or 
spheres where private interest is predominant, this notion 
that reserved prerogatives are only given meaning by the 
society in which they are consecrated has shown that the 
fusion of a list of rights into a sovereign document is 
extremely problematic, if not undesirable. However, to many 
critics of the British Constitution, these arguments are not 
strong enough to crush the push for a United Kingdom "Bill 
of Rights" and therefore the next chapter will continue to 
deal with the topic of the entrenchment of privileges. In 
this case however, it will attempt to bring this together 
with the related concepts of written constitutions and 
judicial review and challenge the contemporary British 
constitutional reform movement by questioning the 
compatibility of British society and the American or modern 
constitutional model. 
47 ''Recalculating Poverty'' 
January 1989, p. 29. 
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CHAPTER 4: WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS, BILIS OF RIG
HTS. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BRITISH SUITABILITY. 
Even if, the last two chapters of this essay 
aside, it is 
accepted that in theory the proposals forwarde
d by this new 
constitutional reform movement were congenial
, the question 
must be asked as to whether such suggestions w
ould prove 
workable in the United Kingdom. In this way, t
herefore, 
surmounting the difficulties of the myriad of 
tests so far 
employed in this work would still leave consti
tutional 
modification with the task of fitting smoothly
 into all 
aspects of the British way of life. Could sove
reignty be 
gently coaxed out of Parliament and into a con
stitution? 
Would the British psyche be.able to digest the
 new emphasis 
on individual liberties? Would the British peo
ple accept 
such revolutionary change? Is British society
 capable of 
making such a dramatic metamorphosis meaningfu
l? These 
questions rip open a can of worms which illus
trate that the 
implementation of these constitutional reform
s is fraught 
with a kaleidoscope of dilemmas. 
Before an attempt to garner and repatriate the
se worms is 
embarked upon, it may first be appropriate to 
undertake the 
study of a little legal philosophy. Law requir
es legitimacy 
if it is to elicit order from the populace, wh
ether it be a 
system of coercive ''norms'' which emanate from 
the state and 
are coercive in that they force certain types
 of appropriate 
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behavior1 , ~r it is of the more natural kind that eman
ates 
from above the politically powerful and lives in the 
consciousness of the people. This is so since the onl
y other 
means of creating order, coercion and unanimous agreem
ent, 
have been destroyed by the ballot box and the size of 
modern 
societies. In turn, in order to be seen as legitimate,
 law 
needs to have other characteristics or sociologically 
valid 
elements2• It must stem from an arbitrary source, that 
is 
either an origin that has no overwhelming interest in
 the 
nature of the complexion of law or one that does have 
an 
explicit interest but has been given power by a large 
majority of the ruled; it must be stable or change only in 
an evolutionary manner and not fluctuate dramatically;
 and 
it must be approved of by a great proportion of the 
citizenry. Hence, .to paraphrase, so as to maintain or
der, 
and therefore the bedrock of society, law must be seen
 as 
legitimate, a quality it gains from emanating from an
 
·objective source, being perched on top of a consensus and, 
perhaps most importantly, as Franz Neumann states, bei
ng 
relatively immutable: 
A predictable action of the state; i.e. 
its measurable interference, even if 
oppressive, is to be preferred to 
1 For more on this definition of law, see Kelsen, Hans. 
General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge, Massach
usetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1945. Translated by Anders W
edburg. 
2 Franz Neumann talks about such sociologically valid 
characteristics of law in The Rule of Law, Leamingt
on Spa, 
England: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1986. 
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immeasurable intervention (unpredictable, 
arbitrary action), even if at one time 
benevolent, as such immeasurable state of 
affairs creates insecurity. 3 · 
With this crude knowledge of legal philosophy in mind,
 it 
can be seen that the first obstacle that the instillati
on of 
the new reform would face would be perhaps its most 
considerable. Since the replacement of parliamentary 
sovereignty and erosion of constitutional tradition, h
owever 
evolutionary the process, would surely undermine the 
legitimacy, and subsequently the power, of the superse
ding 
institutions, the actual assumption of a written 
constitution and the accompanying provisions proves to
 be 
monumentally problematic in its own right. such Britis
h 
political institutions as the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, cabinet government, ministerial responsibilit
y and 
the multitude of idiosyncracies in parliamentary proce
dure 
have all been slowly built upon by hundreds of years o
f 
tradition and convention, a fact that has given such 
institutions legitimacy in the eyes of the British pe
ople. 
Therefore, because power and legitimacy are constructe
d 
along an extremely ad hoc, pragmatic and languid path 
based 
upon custom, tradition and stability, the rather rapid
 
imposition of these constitutional reforms may undermi
ne 
their potency. Moreover, such a reaction could have ev
en 
more far reaching effects. As soon as a dispenser of 
3 Ibid., p. 32. 
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justice, in this case the Constitution, probably via a 
supreme court, is no longer seen as legitimate an
d is 
perhaps viewed as a tool of partisanship or a part
icular 
class interest, as are most sudden changes in the 
complexion 
of government, then the arbitrary and neutral myst
ique of 
the rule of law may crumble and society could begi
n to 
destabilize. Since British society, despite the fr
equent 
existence of debilitating political and social cle
avages, is 
pulled together by the notion that demacratically 
made law· 
is distributed by insouciant judges, any corrosion of the 
rule of law could be disastrous. 
The implementation of the American Constitution, b
y 
contrast, did not suffer from the need to establis
h itself 
on the ruins of a usurped system that had degenera
ted to a 
state of nature. Having helped push the British ou
t of the 
thirteen colonies, the American Founding Fathers, 
for all 
the opposition to the Constitution, were creating 
a new 
') system from mainly fresh materials, not the remains 
of a 
u 
previous one and therefore the legitimacy of the n
ew 
settlement was measured in other variables, such a
s popular 
sovereignty, nationalism and its suitability to th
e material 
expansion of the country. Similarly, nations such 
as West 
Germany, Japan, France and Rumania went, or are pr
esently 
going, through a series of cataclysmic events tha
t created a 
vacuum into which it was necessary that a new para
digm 
I 
enter. Britain is today not experiencing such wate
rsheds as 
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a devastating war defeat, a social revolution or the 
toppling of an omnipotent dictator. Nor is it, as is 
currently occurring in eastern Europe, listening to a
 
vociferous, and nearly unanimous, cry for fundamental 
reform. The absence of such conditions, the entrenchme
nt of 
the current constitutional complexion and the fact tha
t 
legitimacy grows proportionately with stability has me
ant 
that the United Kingdom and the contemporary constitut
ional 
modification proposals hardly welcome each other with 
open 
arms. 
The British judiciary provide a second hindrance to the 
adoption of the new proposals. The inevitable developm
ent of 
judicial independence and power, if not sovereignty, would 
be tantamount to handing over the running of society t
o a 
single class or interest since the British judiciary, unlike 
the more heterogeneous House of Commons, originate alm
ost 
exclusively from a narrow band from within the upper 
echelons of the country's social spectrum. Although a
 recent 
trend towards the admission of personnel from lesser 
socioeconomic backgrounds has occurred, between 1820 a
nd 
1968 75.5% of British judges originated from the upper-
middle-classes or the commercial and landed upper-clas
ses4 
and in 1964 only three of fifty five High Court judges had 
not been to Oxbridge and nearly one third of the seven
ty 
4 Harris, Phil. An Introduction to Law, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984. 
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four County Court judges had been to the private schools of 
Charterhouse, Eton, Marlborough, Rugby, Shrewsbury and 
Winchester5 • This has meant that, despite· a recent opening 
up of the judiciary to democratic and egalitarian forces, 
there still remains a very upper-class and landed huP to th
e 
profession. Consequently, if it can be argued that judges 
already have the power to make law through their ability 
indiscriminately to distinguish cases or their substantial 
freedom in statutory interpretation
6
, and it is realized 
that judicial review gives judges policy making and 
legislative powers, it is clear that the accumulation of 
power into the hands of a single and tightly-knit interest 
would be augmented. 
Another obstruction to any potential assumption of the 
new reforms to the Constitution dwells in the depths of the
 
British subconscious. Although seemingly contrary to the 
interests of its people, pervasive British values 
continually counteract a push for the entrenchment of 
certain individual rights, emphasizing a need for a level o
f 
5 Abel-Smith, Brian and Stevens, Robert. Lawyers and the 
Courts, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
, 
1967, p. 300. 
6 There: is a lot of leeway given to judges by the 
ambiguity of statutory interpretation. Words can be define
d 
in any number of ways, as shown by the debate over the meanin
g 
of the word ''terrorism'' in McKee v. Chief Constable o
f 
Northern Ireland, (1984] 1 WLR 1358 (House of Lords), and the 
intention of the statute can be interpreted in a similarl
y 
free manner, as shown by the debate between judges over the 
intent of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceeding
s 
Act of 1976 in Davis v. Johnson, [1978] 1 All E.R. 1132. 
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economic justice. Remarking that individualism is not as 
potent as it is in the United States, Max Hastings, editor 
of ''The Daily Telegraph'', illustrated such a trait when he 
stated that, whilst talking about the public outcry to the 
erosion of some prerogatives, ''Thatcher is an extremely 
shrewd judge of what the public cares about and what it 
doesn't. . • these are issues it doesn't care about''. 
7 This 
argument is shown even more vividly when Hastings's 
statement is juxtaposed to the passion with which the 
British have protected collective and economic privileges 
such as the welfare state and The National Health Service. 
In April 1985, a decision by the Thatcher government to 
disassemble completely the student grant system and replace
 
it with an American style loan mechanism was crushed by a 
coalition of Conservative backbenchers, middle-class parent
s 
and students. In a similar vein, a fervent and passionate 
opposition to Mrs. Thatcher's plans to privatize The 
National Health Service has also surfaced. Conservative 
backbenchers have once again been mobilized, trade unionist
s 
have marched and taken industrial action
8
, and a majority of 
the British people have expressed a want to pay higher taxe
s 
7 Quoted from Atlas, James. "Thatcher Puts a Lid on 
Censorship in Britain" New York Times Magazine, 5 March 1989
, 
p. 97. 
8 In 1988 there was a nurse's strike; the National Union 
of Public Employees and COHSE, the health workers' union, too
k 
industrial action; and on 5 March 1988 fifty thousand trade
 
unionists marched against National Health Service reform. 
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in order to rescue the declining public health monolit
h9 • As 
an American journalist in simplistic and condescending, if 
nevertheless fairly accurate, terms put it: 
,r, .. 
' 'The heal th service is the one thing that 
makes this class-divided society feel 
warmly egalitarian, and Britons ·Of all 
political persuasions consider it the most 
sacred of national budgetary cows. 
1110 
The fact that the British do not tend to value individ
ual 
and political freedoms as much as economic and social 
justice can be seen in more detail if the postures of 
American and British social movements are compared. E
xamples 
of these differences are abundant, but the employment 
of two 
nineteenth century working- class movements is partic
ularly 
illuminating, despite their chronological distance. 
The Chartist movement in the United Kingdom of the mid
-
nineteenth century was a working-class call for a num
ber of 
political rights, such as universal manhood suffrage a
nd 
equal electoral districts, that, superficially anyway,
 
seemed very ''American'' in its objectives. However, whereas, 
for example, the black civil rights movement of the 19
50s 
and 1960s for the most part forwarded such objectives within 
a framework that called for the granting of political 
and 
legal equality as a matter of right and an ends in its
elf, 
9 A January 1988 Gallup Poll showed that 67% of Britons 
were willing to pay higher taxes if this revenue went d
irectly 
to the National Health Service. De Young, Karen. ''The B
ritish 
Love Their National Health Service: But Can It Su
rvive?'' 
Washington Post, 15 March 1989, p. 18. 
10 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Chartists demanded political parity as a stepping s
tone to 
power and ultimately, the correction of economic im
balance. 
l:\ 
In this way, the American civil rights movement, be
fore 1963 
anyway, called for restaurants to be desegregated b
ut not 
for a black man or woman to be able to afford to ea
t there, 
while the Chartists described themselves in this rh
etoric: 
An entire change in society - a change 
amounting to the complete subv~rsion of 
the existing order of the world is 
contemplated by the working-classes. They 
aspire to be at the top instead of at the 
bottom of society-~ or rather that there 
should be no bottom or top at all. 
11 
Such claims were made because the Chartists were no
t so 
much a bourgeois movement altruistically seeking ub
iquitous 
political and legal equality but were, "the first g
reat 
working-class political movement in the history of
 the 
world1112 • Gathered under the pervading umbrella of C
hartism 
were a myriad of radical intellectuals, such as Wi
lliam 
Thompson and Thomas Hodgskin; labor unions, like th
e Grand 
National Consolidated Trades Union; working-class m
ovements, 
for example Feargus o 'Connor's influential ''Northe
rn star" 
newspaper and Luddite vandalism; and proletarian di
ssenters 
who opposed the cruel 1834 Poor Law and remembered 
the 
11 Chartist leader Bronterre O'Brien quoted from Brigg
s, 
Asa. The Age of Improvement, London: Longmans Gree
n and Co. , 
1959, p. 290. 
12 Ward, J.T. Chartism, New York: Barnes and Noble 
Books, 1973, p. 11. 
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injustice and bloodshed of Tolpudd.le13 and Peterloo. 
14 All 
this resulted in a virile attempt to protect and promo
te 
rural and urban working-class interests and, in many w
ays, 
the traditional values of collective paternalism, tory
ism 
and economic and social justice, from the ruthless economic 
liberalism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. As E.J. Ho
bsbawn 
has stated: 
The traditional view, which still 
survived in a distorted way in all classes 
of rural society and in the internal 
relations of working-class groups, was that 
a man had a right to earn a living, and if 
unable to do so, a right to be kept alive 
by his community. The view of middle-class 
liberal economists was that men must take 
. ~---- -·-····,-·.,. 
such Jobs as the.,. market offered~ wherever 
and at whatever rate it offered, and that 
the rational man would, by individual or 
voluntary collective saving and insurance 
make provision for accident, illness and 
old age. 15 
This dynamic between collectivism and economic justice, 
and individuallsm and the dominance of political and l
egal 
rights did not occur in American society, as the exam
ination 
13 The Tolpuddle martyrs were six Dorset laborers who, in 
1834, were victimized by a government wary of labo
r and 
working-class discontent and found guilty of practicing 
secret 
oaths to uphold their union. They were transport
ed to 
Australia as punishment. 
14 The ''Peterloo Massacre'', so called as it took place in 
st. Peter's Field in Manchester and was seen to resemb
le the 
bloodshed of Waterloo, took place in 1819 when the 
local 
yeomanry, who were supervising a huge and peaceable gat
hering 
that was calling for parliamentary reform, incited vi
olence 
that led to the death of eleven protesters and injuries to 
hundreds more. · 
15 Hobsbawn, E.J. Industry and Empire, 2nd. volume. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1968, p. 69. 
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of that country's nineteenth century working-class mo
vement 
illustrates. Although Grangerism and Populism, with th
eir 
emphasis on cooperativism, the free coinage of silver,
 an 
equitable taxation system and government ownership of 
transportation and large utilities, resembled a discern
able 
movement outside of the American paradigm and an expli
cit 
call for economic egalitarianism, these approaches·we
re 
marginalized by middle- class and urban interests and 
then,· 
through a process of osmosis, coopted by the ubiquitou
s and 
pragmatic Democratic Party. 16 Moreover, despite the fa
ct 
that the American labor movement had its Peterloos and
 
Tolpuddles, for instance the police brutality during th
e 
Haymarket Square riots in the Chicago of 1886
17
, the 
shooting of striking steel workers by the hated Pinker
tons 
at Andrew Carnegie's Homestead plant in 1892 and the 
violence of the Pullman Strike in 1894, it did not 
incorporate the deep rooted resentment of laissez-fairi
sm 
and the belief in the need to furnish economic and soc
ial 
safety nets so that the poor, sick and elderly would n
ot be 
left out of the system; as the Chartists did. To be su
re, 
there were the Knights of Labor who united much of the
 
16 For more on Populism, see Lawrence Goodwyn's classic 
work on the movement Democratic Promise: The Populist 
Moment 
in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
17 For more on the Haymarket Square riot see, Foner, 
Philip s. History of the Labor Movement in the United S
tates, 
Volume 2: From the Founding of the A. F. of L. t
o the 
emergence of American Imperialism, New York: Interna
tional 
Publishers, 1977. 
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American workforce, regardless of ability, race, sex a
nd 
geographical location18 , and the International Workers 
of 
the World (I.W.W.) who preached Marxist hegemony and 
witnessed the omnipotence of class war
19
• Yet, for a number 
of reasons, American labor was unable to force British
-type 
values into the mainstream of the American consensus.
 
Some of the reasons for this failure were structural a
nd 
concerned such problems as the fragmentation of the !.W
.W. 
due to internal squabbles over ideology and policy. H
owever, 
the main driving force behind this inability to create
 some 
vignettes of class consciousness or a push for econom
ic 
equality was the omniscience of the American consensu
s, 
something that was created by the constitutional settle
ment. 
To be sure, there were societal factors involved and t
he 
patchwork of religions, languages and cultures that w
as 
America was activated by racism and xenophobia that 
fractured class lines and polarized people around more
 
ethnic interests as the material abundapce and high 
standards of living that existed tended to reinforce t
he 
belief that poverty did not exist in the United States
. But 
it was the value system and pervasive ideology that he
ld the 
18 For more on the Knights of Labor see, Foner, Philip S. 
History of the Labor Movement in the United States. Vo
lume 1: 
From Colonial Times to the Founding of the American Fed
eration 
of Labor, New York: International Publishers, 1977. 
19 For more on the Industrial Workers of the World see, 
Foner, Philip S. History of the Labor Movement in the 
United 
states, Volume 4: The Industrial Workers of the World
 1905-
1917, New York: International Publishers, 1980. 
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key. The fact that the epicenter of the American labor
 
movement of the epoch in question, the American Federa
tion 
of Labor (A.F.L.), excluded non-frotestants and non-whites, 
\_ \ 
would only enlist skilled artisan~ and only pursued 
industrial democracy, fair salaries for members and hu
mane 
working conditions and not social revolution or upheav
al; 
simultaneously reflected and institutionalized convent
ional 
American values. In adopting a doctrine that was, ''a 
rejection of socialism combined with a search for 
respectability for labor in its acceptance by American
 
society as a whole1120 , the A. F. L. 's leader of the time,
 
Samuel Gompers, both catered for and espoused the beli
ef in 
the right to private property, the justice of equality of 
opportunity and the inducement of sloth that equality 
of 
condition brings, as well as the righteousness of poli
tical 
and legal equality. 
If a comparison of English and American working-class 
movements reveals the importance of a value system an
d a 
national ideology in the emphasis of individual libert
ies, 
then the current constitutional system that Britain le
ans on 
provides a final reason for why the conception of the 
American constitutional model is not practical in the 
United 
Kingdom. Despite the recent criticism of it, Britain's
 
constitutional mechanism has been extremely resilient 
and 
20 Dick, William M. Labor and Socialism in America, Port 
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1972, p. ~13. 
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consistently successful in protecting individual rights and 
civil liberties. This is because such provisions have been 
embedded in common law and legal tradition to such an extent 
that statute has been unable to remove them, whether it be 
because the nation is unwilling to see the removal of law 
which is so entrenched or that this law defies removal 
itself. For example, habeas corpus is granted in Britain as 
a right, not through an explicit declaration such as a bill 
of rights, but from a privilege that stems back from the 
Norman invasion and the roots of common law. Whereas many 
people would believe that it was established with the 
passing of the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1679 and 1816, the 
right to habeas corpus has in fact grown as the common law 
has developed, allowing statute not to determine the 
direction and velocity of its growth but merely to fine tune 
the character of the right. In this way, the evolutionary 
doctrine of the British Constitution seems to be somewhat 
more able to secure civil liberties than a verbal or written 
declaration of habeas corpus. This is because the ammunition 
of a mature common law tradition backed up by forceful 
legislation secures the exercise of a freedom much more than 
any universal declaration of the existence of such rights as 
they are aimed more towards the elevation of the right 
rather than merely recognizing its actuality. As A.V. Dicey 
states: 
There is no difficulty, and there is often 
very little gain, in declaring the 
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existence of a right ••• The true difficulty 
is to secure its enforcement.
21 
British society and its whole constitutional, legal an
d 
political machinery can not only secure the exercising
 of 
certain individual rights better than a system that at
tempts 
to entrench liberties, but may also cultivate an enviro
nment 
in which such rights can be more effectively practiced
. 
Employing the right to the freedom of the press in Am
erica 
as an example, the last chapter explained how the exis
tence 
L,_, 
of individual freedoms is only really meaningful if th
e 
society that states that it allows them in principle 
creates 
certain favorable political, economic and social condi
tions 
to help nurture them in actuality. With this in mind, 
whereas the United States, utilizing the modern 
constitutional system, has yielded a society in which 
freedom of the press really only exists totally in the
ory 
and not quite fully in practice, the United Kingdom ha
s 
provided a society in which freedom of the press is no
t 
explicitly granted but does exist in reality. 
This argument naturally recognizes that it is not 
entirely the construction of a type of political syste
m and 
constitutional set-up that produces such differences. 
Nevertheless, such factors do play significant roles. 
Whereas the right to print, publish or broadcast anyth
ing is 
21 Dicey, A. v. Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution, London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 
1965, 
p. 221. 
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lucidly outlined by the First Amendment to the United S
tates 
Constitution, the British system, whether it be in comm
on 
law or parliamentary statute, only seldomly mentions th
is 
liberty. However, juxtaposed to this scenario, the United 
States finds it difficult to protect such a right, as 
the 
reasoning of the last chapter and the material presente
d on 
the McCarthy era has highlighted. on the other hand, th
e 
prerogative, although not quite as freely exercised du
ring 
the Thatcher era as it has been during earlier governm
ents, 
is more liberally performed in Britain. Stemming from t
he 
fact that, ''the so-called liberty of the press is a me
re 
application of the general principle, that no man is 
punishable except for a distinct breach of law
1122
, the 
growth of freedom of expression and the press has only
 been 
circumscribed by such laws as those concerning libel s
ince 
there are really no explicit statutes that outlaw 
publication of certain viewpoints. On top of this, and
 with 
the earlier definition of democracy foremost in the mi
nd, 
the British system has also proved itself conducive to
 
providing the public with fairly meaningful vehicles to
 free 
expression. Being a society in which there exists diffe
ring 
and distinguishable ideologies, alternatives, politica
l 
parties, classes and interests, Britain has always bee
n, 
even if this has become more difficult from time to tim
e, 
able to nurture and encourage the development not only
 of 
22 Ibid., p. 248. 
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media, but also the publication and broadcasting of a 
myriad 
of diverse philosophies. Coupled with the state owner
ship of 
such mediums as the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(B.B.C.), this has meant that access to both print and an 
audience has been secured for both communists and fasc
ists 
alike (indeed Britain does have its own widely circulated 
Communist daily newspaper, ''The Morning Star'') • These 
factors may not seem particularly significant, but whe
n it 
is compared with how, in the United States, market for
ces, 
the pervasive consensus, and the two pragmatic and non
-
ideological mass parties help to stifle choice, an 
ingredient that was earlier seen to be an integral pa
rt of 
democracy, then perhaps it may be concluded that the B
ritish 
approach best secures freedom of the press. 
Naturally the British way does not render the country 
a 
utopian nation complete with equally competing and 
vociferous postulates as well as a diverse, well-infor
med 
and totally literate populace. Indeed, the problems th
at the 
American media has have been shown to exist in Britain
. 
Independent publishers rely on the market, even if the
 
diversity of it allows for more varied material to be 
produced, as much as their American counterparts do. C
ertain 
mediums, especially cable television and newspapers, a
re 
becoming increasingly susceptible to concentration, as
 the 
dynasties of Rupert Murdoch, Tiny Rowland and Robert M
axwell 
have illustrated. And television is far from being fre
ely 
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competitive, the B.B.C. had a monopoly ,:before the adve
nt of 
Independent Television in 1954 and is still, especially
 
during the That.cher era as the first chapter illustrate
d23 , 
perhaps too closely connected to the government
24
• However, 
what Britain does most crucially have, is the diversity
 and 
ideological complexity to make the right of freedom of
 the . 
press consequential, at least in the theory of practic
e. As 
Peter Golding, whilst referring to the B.B.C., claims: 
••• big, even semimonopolistic media are 
necessary to supply the fourth estate arm 
of communications with the resources and 
weight required for its watchdog role. Thus 
investigative journalism requires massive 
industrial backing to lend it significance, 
confidence, and the ability to scale the 
other commanding height of the social 
structure. 25 
There are, subsequently, a number of ways in which 
contemporary British society and the proposals forward
ed by 
the recent constitutional reform movement can be seen 
to be 
incompatible. Firstly, the imposition of a new system, 
in 
this instance in the guise of a written constitution a
nd the 
by-products of entrenched and enumerated rights and judicial 
23 For more on Mrs. Thatcher' s relationship with the 
B.B.C. and how this has affected editorial freedom
 see, 
Walters, Peter. "The Crisis of 'Responsible' Broadca
sting: 
Mrs. Thatcher and the B.B.c. 11 Parliamentary Affairs, 
Vol. 
42, No. 3 (1989) pp. 380-398. 
24 Although 
government, its 
Whitehall and it 
the B.B.C. operates independently of the 
chairman and governors are appointed by 
does depend on the executive for revenue. 
25 Golding, Peter. The Mass Media, London: Longman Group 
Ltd., 1974, p. 52. 
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., 
review, would seem illegitimate to the society, sin
ce it 
" 
would create instability and the belief that it em
anated 
from the whim and caprice of a partisan source. Th
is would, 
in turn, result in the undermining of the cohesive 
hegemony 
of the rule of law and, perhaps, the disintegration
 of order 
and society itself. Secondly, the assumption of judicial 
sovereignty, bearing in mind the complexion of the 
British 
judiciary, would be tantamount to delegating a substantial 
slice of power over to a small, professional and pu
blic 
'· 
school educated elite. Thirdly, the British tendenc
y to 
accentuate collectivism and economic prerogatives m
eans that 
the call for individual political and legal liberti
es is 
muffled and may, if implemented in the form of entr
enchment, 
destabilize the society. Finally, the British postu
late 
already secures, at least for the most part, the pr
ovisions 
that any bill of rights would attempt to safeguard 
from a 
concerted ideological and legislative attack by env
eloping 
rights in centuries of protective common law and st
are 
decisis. Parliament may be sovereign, but it is sti
ll 
manipulated by a public opinion that is strangely n
ostalgic 
and strongly influenced by tradition and convention
. 
These practical problems for the construction of th
e 
American constitutional model in the United Kingdom
 are, as 
the rest of this study has suggested, built upon ot
her 
arguments that suppose that written constitutions,
 bills of 
rights and judicial review are flawed. Utilizing the 
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American experience and many episodes of American 
constitutional, social and political history as signposts, 
this essay has reasoned that such a system is intrinsically 
undemocratic and that the entrenchment and enumeration of 
civil liberties is inherently problematic. However, as the 
examination of the contemporary constitutional reform 
movement and the political and social climate that succored 
it have illustrated, there clearly exists both a need and a 
v demand for reform. Therefore, recognizing that the 
termination of the work at this particular juncture would 
render it devoid of necessary prediction and prescription, 
the conclusion of this discourse will present its own 
version of what reform should look like, bearing in mind 
that it has already dismissed the doctrine espoused by 
Charter 88 and its allies. 
I 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: A DOCTRINE 
FOR THE FUTURE. 
By delving frequently into the rich history of the United 
States, this work has attempted to discuss and evaluate the 
proposals forwarded by Britain's recently mobilized 
constitutional reform movement. It has also, by utilizing 
such benchmarks as democracy and the prevailing British 
value system, suggested that the imposition of a sovereign 
constitution containing enumerated individual liberties and 
the consequential resultant of judicial review would be 
neither desirable nor practical in the United Kingdom. And, 
what is more, this essay has seemingly shut the door on any 
attempt to extract sovereignty and power from the 
institution of Parliament, claiming that such an action is 
undemocratic, destabilizing and contravenes British 
traditions and values. 
However, despite this, it should be realized that there 
does seem to be some need for reform. The ''Spycatcher", 
"Zircon" and ''Death On The Rock'' cases that were mentioned 
in the first chapter illustrate a discernable weathering of 
the freedom of speech prerogative that Britons enjoy and 
during the 1980s, British citizens, of whatever race, sex or 
socioeconomic status, were being gradually and 
surreptitiously embezzled of a multitude of freedoms and 
rights that had been granted to them by hundreds of years of 
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struggle, compromise and triumph. Furthermore, Lord 
Hailsham•s perceptive ''Electoral Dictatorship" scenar
io is 
being vividly spotlighted by the almost authoritarian 
hijacking of the mechanics of Parliament and government by 
Mrs. Thatcher. In a substantial incrementation of powe
r, .. the 
present Prime Minister has been able to alter the comp
lexion 
of the political system and dilute,the prerogatives of
 
citizens as if by whim or fancy. By employing her uniq
ue 
personality and huge electoral mandate and exploiting 
the 
impotency of her parliamentary opposition and the 
vulnerability of a system which invests most of its po
wer in 
the executive branch, she has been able to dictate cha
nge at 
will. Although this could all have been checked by the
 
ballot box and potent parliamentary opposition, neithe
r, 
except for the ephemeral rise of the Alliance, have be
en 
particularly forthcoming. 
It is because of this recognition for reform that a 
qualification to the dismissal of Charter 88 and the r
est of 
the constitutional modification movement's argument sh
ould 
be interjected. This qualification takes the form of an 
alternative view of adjustment and metamorphosis, one that, 
in light of the posture of this essay, is of a more m
odest 
complexion than the grandiose designs mentioned earlie
r. 
Nevertheless this prescription is certainly significan
t 
since, although it does not attempt to shift the locat
ion of 
sovereignty in the British political system, it does c
all 
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for a reforming of the electoral system in order to envelop
 
proportional representation. Although this shift would 
continue to reflect majoritarianism and allow for the 
maintenance of stability in the mechanism, it would promot
e 
change by putting a check on the immense executive power 
that is inherent in.Britain; something that would be done b
y 
preventing the amplification of parliamentary majorities and 
making them more reflective of public opinion. 
Having identified a need for change and realizing that 
such alterations should come in the form of this revision o
f 
the electoral system, it remains to be asked as to how such
 
proportional representation will work. At a macro-level it
 
is clear that what proportional representation will do is 
fracture power in the House of Commons and make it more 
difficult for the government to enact its policies in a 
nonchalant and excessive manner. This will be achieved as 
power centers will emerge throughout the two legislatures,
 
giving Parliament the character of a true debating chamber
 
and not just a rubber stamp approving government policy. In 
addition, parliamentary sovereignty, majoritarian rule and 
the conventions and traditions that provide the cohesivene
ss 
for British society will be maintained since it will only b
e 
the way in which the voters elect their M.P.s and not the 
workings of government itself that shall be revolutionized.
 
Meanwhile, at a micro-level, Britain will become more 
democratic. Majorities that currently, under the simple 
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plurality system, can theoretically receive a minority of 
the votes cast will be toned down and susceptible to the 
backing of less well-supported parties and candidates. 
Whereas, as in 1979 and 1983, the Conservative Party in 
Britain formed governments with only 43.9% and 42.4% of the
 
votes cast respectively1 and the present constituency system
 
can result in the party winning the most votes losing the 
election2, proportional representation will make all votes
 
cast, whether they be for a majority or a minority, count. 
Rather than allowing a candidate who wins a contest, such a
s 
a British by-election or American Presidential or 
Congressional race, to carry the whole of his constituency,
 
this will be done by making the distribution of seats in th
e 
Commons reflective of the total national vote cast. For 
1 Bogdanor, 
Representation?, 
Company Ltd., 1984, 
Vernon. _Wh _____ a_t __ ~~i~s~---P-r~o~p_o _____ r t-i_o_n_a ____ l 
Oxford, England: Martin Robertson and 
p.18. 
2 In the February 1974 general election, the Conservative 
Party received 308,000 more votes than the Labor Part
y 
(11,963,000 to 11,655,000) yet won five seats less than their 
opponents (296 to 301). (Hanson, A.H. and Walles, Malcolm. 
Governing Britain, Oxford, England: Fontana Paperbacks, 1984
. 
p.28) In a similar example, the 1960 American Presidential 
election yielded a result in which John F. Kennedy receive
d 
eighty-four more electoral college votes than Richard Nixo
n 
(303 to 219) but only 0.3% more of the popular vote (49.8% to 
49.5%). With this in mind it is conceivable that Kennedy would 
still have got to the White House, even if he had received 
a 
smaller proportion of the popular vote than Nixon* ( Wayne, 
Stephen J. The Road To The White House, New York: St
. 
Martin's Press, 1984, p.290) 
* N.B. Although in practice electoral college votes are 
bound by the popular vote to a particular candidate, this i
s 
not so in theory and therefore may feasibly not always be the 
case. 
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example, if the Conservatives win forty per cent of the 
nationwide vote, this can only be translatable into two-
fifths of the seats in the House of Commons. Moreover, this 
will not only stop the over-amplification of majority 
sentiment but will also secure minority representation. For 
instance, if the Social and Liberal Democrats receive twenty 
five per cent of the vote in finishing second in all the 
constituencies in the country, it will not receive no seats, 
but will occupy one quarter of the Commons come the next 
Parliament, a scenario that can be juxtaposed with the 1983 
election returns in which the Labor Party, which got 27.6% 
of the vote, won two hundred and nine seats and the 
Alliance, which mustered 25.4% of the vote, garnered only 
twenty-three seats3 • As Joseph F. Zimmerman has said in his 
argument for the implementation of proportional 
representation in American local and city elections: 
The principle advantage of PR 
(proportional representation) is the fact 
the system elevates rather than submerges 
minority voting strength and relies on 
design rather than chance to produce direct 
and II fair'' representation. 4 
There are a variety of proportional representation models 
that this new Britain could adopt. The Single Transferable 
Vote (S.T.V.), which is employed by the Republic of Ireland 
and in all Northern Irish elections except those that 
3 Bogdanor, op cit., p.17. 
4 Zimmerman, Joseph F. " "A Fair Voting System For Local 
Governments" National Civic Review, Vol. 68 (1979), p.507. 
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involve appointment to Westminsi;er, is one such system and 
although the mathematics of S.T.V. are extremely' 
complicated5 , what this approach basically entails is the 
ranking of candidate preferences by the electorate and a 
series of elimination rounds in which candidates that do no
t 
receive enough votes to continue in the race are pushed out
 
and the voters who selected them have their votes 
transferred to other candidates according to who was next o
n 
the voters' hierarchy of choices. Similarly, the West 
German, or ''·additional member", system could be adopted. 
This postulate involves two ballot papers and two choices 
for each voter. The first vote is from a list of candidates
 
and the winner, whether he has an absolute majority or not, 
is selected as the legislator for that constituency; hence 
maintaining the link between government and local 
constituency needs and wishes that many opponents of 
proportional representation say it actually severs. Yet, i
n 
West Germany only one-half of the Bundestag is filled in 
this way since the second vote is used to choose the other 
half. In this instance, the vacant seats are filled so as t
o 
ensure that the number of seats given to each party is 
proportional to the votes cast for it in both ballots. This
 
is done by computing how many seats each party would have 
won on a strictly proportional basis during the second vote
 
5 For more on S.T.V., see Bogdanor, op cit., chapter 5, 
pp. 75-110. 
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and then subtracting from this total the number of seats 
each party won in the constituency contests. 6 
Any detailed discussion of iljchoice between S.T.V. and 
the West German system lies outside the jurisdiction of this 
work, even if it is interesting to note that the ''additional 
member'' method maintains the constituency-central government 
nexus and prevents the proliferation of minor parties by not ,, 
allowing any party that did not secure at least five per 
cent of the total vote across the country to take up the 
allocation of seats that it gained in the second ballot. 
What is important however, is to highlight s~veral estimable 
characteristics of proportional representation and to rejoin 
some of the criticism that is often aimed at this particular 
electoral system. Clearly, despite. the many, almost comical, 
references to the instability of Italian governments elected 
by proportional representation, this system selects 
administrations that are able to rivet a nation's political 
mechanism and produce some semblance of coherent and 
consistent policy-making. Neither Dublin nor Bonn have been 
pulled away from responsible policy-making by extremist 
minorities such as Sinn Fein and the nee-Nazis respectively, 
and both have yielded coalitions that have been able to 
construct forceful and meaningful legislation. In addition, 
West Germany's system is clearly conducive with the building 
6 For more on the ''additional member'' system, see 
Bogdanor, op cit., chapter 4, pp. 46-74. 
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of a dynamic economy through a planned and managed approach
. 
The domination of a coalition of the Christian Democrats, 
Free Democrats and Social Democrats, that is obviously of a 
different consistency at different times, has sculptured a 
broad consensus in West German society that has forged a 
sense of nationalism and identified national problems and 
discovered national solutions. In this way, proportional 
representation, as the West Germans have illustrated, does 
not fracture society into a kaleidoscope of single-issue an
d 
extremist parties but emphasizes the sharing of power and 
responsibilities and accentuates cooperation rather than 
competition, commonweal rather than self-interest. As Verno
n 
Bogdanor states: 
The central strength of proportional 
representation is that it makes for the 
sharing of power at governmental level. 
This inculcates attitudes that spread 
outwards into society so that power in the 
economy and in industry also comes to be 
shared. Advocates of proportional 
representation tend to see it as a 
political concomitant,~ and indeed pre-
requisite, of power-sharing policies in the 
economic and social sphere ... 7 
To end on the recommendation of proportional 
representation as the solution to the problem in hand would
 
not reveal the whole story and so, before this work draws to
 
a close, it is perhaps worth remarking upon another factor 
that makes the proposed constitutional refurbishment less 
agreeable and, in turn, the alternative of proportional 
7 Bogdanor, op cit., pp.154-155. 
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representation more desirable. Since 1973, when Edward 
Heath 
signed the Treaty of Rome and Britain joined the European 
Economic Community, the United Kingdom, and more impo
rtantly 
its citizens, have been relinquishing economic, politi
cal 
and legal sovereignty to a body of European judges, 
politicians and economists who reside in such cities a
s 
Strasbourg and Brussels. The European Court of Justice
 
(E.C.J.) and the European Court of Human Rights, which 
itself is not part of the European Community (E.C.) but to 
which Britain. releases sovereignty because of the sign
ing of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, have 
swelling jurisdictions that are beginning to infiltrate 
Britain. Although these two institutions merely delive
r 
declaratory rulings and have no enforcement powers, be
ing 
dependent as they are on the acceptance of their verdi
cts by 
member countries, they have the ultimate authority to 
define 
the Treaty of Rome and the European Convention on Huma
n 
Rights respectively, and hence a nation's treaty 
obligations. As the arbiter in intra-E.C. disputes and
 the 
interpreter of E.C. laws and treaties, the E.C.J. will
, as 
Europe becomes one market in 1992 and E.C. law begins t
o 
subordinate national statute in some issue areas, comm
ence 
in an unprecedented fashion to increase its power and 
the 
number of cases and personalities answerable to it. 
Despite the fact that, as was seen in chapter one, the
 
European Convention on Human Rights has not been 
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incorporated into British law, the Strasbourg court that 
enforces the treaty is able to dictate Anglo jurisprudence. 
As of the end of 1988, Britain had been found in 
contravention of the European Convention on twenty-two 
occasions8 and only once had it declined from accepting the
 
Court's ruling. In this particular instance Mrs. Thatcher's
 
government refused to agree with the institution's 
disapproval of the provision of the 1974 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act that permitted the·prearranged detention, for
 
up to a week, of individuals suspected of terrorist activit
y 
because, not only was the administration convicted to a 
course of stiff anti-terrorist measures, but the public, in
 
the aftermath of the Pan-Am 747 explosion over Lockerbie, 
demanded a counter-attack against all forms of terrorism. 
Meanwhile, in the other twenty-one rulings, Britain fell i
n 
line, answering to Strasbourg rather than Whitehall, 
Westminster or its own courts. In February 1982, for 
example, the Court stated that corporal punishment in 
schools breached the Convention after a Scottish mothe·r had
 
brought litigation to defend her son's refusal to be beaten
 
with the tawse,. a leather strap. The decision resulted in a
 
flood of cases being brought to Strasbourg by all types of 
individuals who had experienced corporal punishment in 
British schools and, ultimately, due to a great amount of 
pressure, the phasing out of such means of castigation in 
8 New York Times. 30 November 1988, p. A19. 
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the United Kingdom's educational system. 
The examples of the European Community, European Court of 
Justice and the European Court on Human Rights neatly tie u
p 
the argument of this essay. Already susceptible to a 
usurping of sovereignty by a written constitution that 
Charter 88 and its allies are proposing, the British people
, 
through their representative body, the House of Commons, ar
e 
also facing the prospect of sovereignty and power flowing t
o 
European institutions, whether they be the legal ones 
mentioned above or their political and economic counterpar
ts 
such as the European Parliament. With 1992 looming and the 
first major step towards a United States of Europe 
completed, it would seem that the establishment of modern 
constitutionalism would have the amplified effect of almos
t 
draining Parliament of power and influence and taking away 
from the country's people the only way in which they can 
control the destiny of their own and their nation's future.
 
By repatriating sovereignty in an entrenched document that 
would be interpreted by a judiciary equipped with the 
ability to review legislation, the new constitutional refor
m 
movement does not only comply with the arguments against it
 
that this essay has illuminated but, if the swelling 
restlessness and impatience of the forces of European unity
 
are taken into account, would be tantamount to taking the 
last remnants of power out of the hands of the British 
voter. Sovereignty that once resided in Westminster would b
e 
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scattered throughout Europe and the pages of a new 
constitution and Parliament would be relegated to a 
meaningless, impotent institution. In this way surely a 
change in the electoral system, not constitutional 
complexion, is in order, because, if Charter 88 gets its 
way, democracy•in Britain will be in a much worse state of 
health than it would be after any mauling that Mrs. Thatcher 
could ever imagine to give it. 
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APPENDIX. 
CBARTBR 88 
We have been brought up· in Britain to believe that we 
are 
free: that our Parliament is the mother of democracy; 
that 
our liberty is the envy of the world; that our system 
of 
justice is always fair; that the guardians of our safety, 
the police and security services, are subject to democratic, 
legal control; that our civil service is impartial; t
hat our 
cities and communities maintain a proud identity; that
 our 
press is brave and honest. 
Today such beliefs are increasingly implausible. The g
ap 
between reality and the received ideas of Britain's 
"unwritten constitution'' has widened to a degree that 
many 
find hard to endure. Yet this year we are invited to 
celebrate the third centenary of the ''Glorious Revolu
tion'' 
of 1688, which established what was to become the Unit
ed 
Kingdom's sovereign formula. In the name of freedom, o
ur 
political, human and social rights are being curtailed
 while 
... 
the powers of the executive have increased, are increa
sing 
and ought to be diminished. 
A process is underway which endangers many of the 
freedoms we have had. Only in part deliberate, it bega
n 
before 1979 and is now gathering momentum. Scotland is
 
governed like a province from Whitehall. More generall
y, the 
government has eroded a number of important civil freed
oms: 
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for example, the universal rights to habeas corpus
, to 
peaceful assembly, to freedom of information, to f
reedom of 
expression, to membership of a trade union, to loc
al 
government, to freedom of movement, even to the b
irth-right 
itself. By taking these rights from some, the gov
ernment 
puts them at risk for all. 
A traditional British belief in the benign nature 
of the 
country's institutions encourages an unsystematic
 perception 
of these grave matters; each becomes an "issue'' co
nsidered 
in isolation from the rest. Being unwritten the c
onstitution 
also encourages a piecemeal approach to politics;
 an 
approach that gives little protection against a de
termined, 
authoritarian state. For the events of 1688 only s
hifted the 
absolute power of the monarch into the hands of th
e 
parliamentary oligarchy. 
The current administration is not an un-English 
interruption in the country's way of life. But wh
ile the 
government calls upon aspirations for liberty, it 
also 
exploits the dark side of a constitutional settlem
ent which 
was always deficient in democracy. 
The 1688 settlement had a positive side. In its tim
e the 
Glorious Revolution was a historic victory over R
oyal 
tyranny. Britain was spared the rigours of dictato
rship. A 
working compromise between many different interest
s was made 
possible at home, even if, from Ireland to India, 
quite 
different standards were imposed by Empire abroad.
 No 
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criticism of contemporary developments in Britain shou
ld 
deny the significance of past democratic achievements, 
most 
dramatically illuminated in May 1940 when Britain defie
d the 
fascist dominat·ion of Europe. 
But the eventual victory that liberated Western Europe
 
preserved the paternalist attitudes and institutions o
f the 
"'~ United Kingdom. These incorporated the popular desire 
for 
work and welfare into a post-war consensus. Now this h
as 
broken dowp. So, too, have its conventions of compromi
se and 
tolerance: essential components of a free society. In
stead, 
the inbuilt powers of the 1688 settlement have enabled
 the 
government to discipline British society to its ends: 
to 
impose its values on the civil service; to menace the 
independence of broadcasting; to threaten academic free
dom 
in the universities and schools; to tolerate abuses 
committed in the name of national security. The break 
with 
the immediate past shows how vulnerable Britain has alw
ays 
been to elective dictatorship. The consequence is that
 today 
the British have fewer legal rights and less democracy
 than 
many other West Europeans. 
The intensificati6n of authoritarian rule in the United
 
Kingdom has only recently begun. The time to reverse th
e 
process is now, but it cannot be reversed by an appeal 
to 
the past. Three hundred years of unwritten rule from ab
ove 
are enough. Britain needs a democratic program that wi
ll end 
unfettered control by the executive of the day. It nee
ds to 
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reform a parliament in which domination of the lower house 
can be decided by fewer than forty per cent of the 
population; a Parliament in which a majority of the upper 
house is still determined by inheritance. 
We have had less freeqom than we believed. That which we 
have enjoyed has been too dependent on the benevolence of 
our rulers. Our freedoms have remained their possession, 
rationeJ out to us as subjects rather than being our own 
inalienable possession as citizens. To make real the 
freedoms we once ,took for granted means for the first time 
to take them for ourselves. 
The time has come to demand political, civil and human 
rights in the United Kingdom. The first step is to establish 
them in constitutional form, so that they are no longer 
subject to the arbitrary diktat of Westminster and 
Whitehall. 
We call, therefore, for a new constitutional settlement· 
which would: 
Enshrine, by means of a Bill of Rights, such civil 
liberties as the right to peaceful assembly, to freedom of 
association, to freedom from discrimination, to freedom from 
detention without trial, to trial by jury, to privacy and to 
freedom of expression. 
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Subject executive powers and prerogatives, by whomsoever 
exercised, to the rule of law. 
Establish freedom of information and open government. 
Create a fair electoral system of proportional 
representation. 
Reform the upper house to establish a democratic, non-
hereditary second chamber. 
Place the executive under the power of a democratically 
renewed parliament and all agencies of the state under the 
rule of law. 
Ensure the independence of a reformed judiciary. 
Provide legal remedies for all abuses of power by the 
state and the officials of central and local government. 
Guarantee an equitable distribution of power between 
local, regional and national government. 
Draw up a written constitution, anchored in the idea of 
universal citizenship, that incorporates these reforms. 
170 
!, , 
-.l 
our central concern is the law;; -'No country can be 
considered free in which the government is above the law. N
o 
democracy can be considered safe whose freedoms are not 
encoded in a basic constitution. 
We, the undersigned, have called this document Charter 
88. First, to mark our rejection of the complacency with 
which the tercentenary of the Revolution of 1688 has been 
celebrated. Second, to reassert a tradition of demands for
 
constitutional rights in Britain, which stretches from the
 
barons who forced the Magna Carta on King John, to the 
working men who drew up the·People's Charter in 1838, to th
e 
women at the beginning of this century who demanded 
universal suffrage. Third to salute the courage of those in
 
Eastern Europe who still fight for their fundamental 
freedoms. 
Like the Czech and Slovak signatories of Charter 77, we 
are an informal, open community of people of different 
opinions, faiths and professions, united by the will to 
strive, individually and collectively, for the respect of 
civil and human rights in our own country and throughout th
e 
world. Charter 77 welcomed the ratification by 
Czechoslovakia of the UN International Covenant on Politic
al 
and Civil Rights, but noted that it ''serves as a reminder o
f 
the extent to which basic human rights in our country exis
t, 
regrettably, on paper only''. 
Conditions here are so much better than in Eastern Europe 
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as to bear no comparison. But our rights in the United 
Kingdom remain unformulated, conditional upon the good
will 
of the government and the compassion of bureaucrats. To
 
create a democratic· constitution at the end of the twe
ntieth 
century, however, may extend the concept of liberty, 
especially with respect to the rights of women and the 
place 
of minorities. It will not be a simple matte·r: part of 
British sovereignty is shared with Europe; and the exte
nsion 
of social rights in a modern economy is a matter of de
bate 
everywhere. We cannot foretell the choices a free peop
le may 
make. We are united in one opinion only, that British 
society stands in need of a constitution which protects
 
individual rights and of the institutions of a modern a
nd 
pluralist democracy. 
The inscription of laws does not guarantee their 
realisation. Only people themselves can ensure freedom,
 
democracy and equality before the law. Nonetheless, suc
h 
ends can be far better demanded, and more effectively 
obtained and guarded, once they belong to everyone by 
inalienaDle right. 
172 
..... 
Name: 
Place of Birth·: 
Date of Birth: 
Names of Parents: 
Education: 
Experience: 
VITA. 
Andrew John Taylor. 
Reading, United Kingdom. 
21 February 1966. 
John· Patrick and Veronica Helen 
Rosemary (nee Tollervey) Taylor. 
1988; B.A. in American Studies (Politics 
and Government) from the University of 
Kent at Canterbury in the United 
Kingdom. (Second Class, First Division). 
1990; M.A. in Government from Lehigh 
University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 
U.S.A .. 
Teaching Assistant in the International 
Relations Department at Lehigh 
University from 1988 until 1990. 
173 
